ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:

EXPLAINING DIFFUSION AND *ESCALATION*

EDITED BY STEVEN E. LOBELL
AND PHILIP MAUCERI

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CHAPTER 1

Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict

Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri

Introduction

In this book we offer an approach to understanding the internationalization of ethnic conflict in different regional contexts that integrates international relations and comparative analysis. We examine four core explanatory frameworks that contribute to the diffusion and the escalation of ethnic conflicts in divided states and societies. These explanations are at the nexus of comparative and international understandings of conflict. Much of the literature on ethnic conflict focuses on the origins of ethnic identity (instrumentalists versus constructivists; Smith 1986, 1993; Kaplan 1993; Connor 1994; Arfi 1998) or on the sources of ethnic conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1998).[1] We focus on the link between ethnic and interstate conflict, and specifically, on the internationalization of ethnic conflicts. We recognize the internationalization of ethnic conflict as requiring an understanding of "intermestic" structures and processes.[2]

By treating the state as a unitary actor that pursue national interests and international relations as the interaction of sovereign states, many international relations theorists ignore the domestic political environment that characterizes most divided states. For instance, realists assume that the central government commands the obedience of different groups under its authority and thereby controls what goes on within its borders (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1990; Mearsheimer 2001). International conflicts are viewed largely as interstate conflicts involving unitary state actors. Yet, internal armed conflict is much more prevalent than interstate conflict. Since the end of World War II, most wars have been internal conflicts, a trend that accelerated in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1994, there were no fewer than 99 civil wars, with 80,000 deaths in the 1993–1994 period alone (Gurr 1994; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). The majority of these internal conflicts had a strong ethnic dimension. Although few states have ceased to exist, even in the third world (David 1991), states experiencing internal ethnic conflict face serious threats to their structures and regimes, which are often of a much higher order in comparison with external threats (Ayoob 1991; Gause 1992). What has increasingly been referred to as "state failure,"

territory, has been largely the result of spiraling internal ethnic conflicts and not interstate wars (Carnegie Commission 1997).

Few comparative political analyses focus on the role of international structures and politics to explain domestic conflicts, as Theda Skocpol (1979: 18–19) long ago pointed out. Whether analysts focus on culture or structure, what often results is an approach that comes close to suggesting the enclosed and *sui generis* nature of the conflict being examined (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1997: 143). Conflict is viewed as the result of purely internal disputes and histories, only indirectly influenced by external dynamics. Yet international conditions can provide favorable or unfavorable opportunities for access to resources, legitimacy and coalition partners. Most theoretical approaches that focus on the impact of international politics in domestic conflict remain limited largely to the economic policy making process. Dependency school theorists (Amin 1976; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Evans 1979) were the first to draw attention in systematic ways to the important influence exercised by multinational corporations, foreign governments, and international financial organizations in the internal policy making processes and political coalitions of underdeveloped countries. More recently, growing market integration and technological changes have renewed attention to the links between policies and their outcomes in different states (Keohane and Milner 1996). Still, even in the area of political economy, many, such institution-oriented analyses, continue to focus on domestic economic structures in determining policy outcomes and coalitions.

Many realist accounts accentuate systemic pressures as determining but ignore the influence of domestic politics. Comparative analyses that emphasize internal factors grant domestic coalitions primacy but neglect the importance of international politics. In this book we integrate this literature. We argue that "intermestic" forces, and especially the entangling of domestic and international pressures, and their internal and external reverberations, contribute to the diffusion and the escalation of ethnic conflict (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988; Muller and Risse-Kappen 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995; Keohane and Milner 1996; Lobell 2003).

We believe that there are significant differences within states, with multiple actors that influence a state's international policies and its position in the global system. Moreover, international actors play a major role in the possibility of constructing domestic political coalitions, not only through direct intervention but by supporting and/or opposing them. In an analysis of the relation between internal ethnic conflict and international relations, it is useful to view the state as consisting of a ranked or unranked divided ethnic systems (in most system there are more than two ethnic groups; Horowitz 1985: 21–36). In the ranked system, one ethnic group is superordinate and the other is subordinate. In this system subordinates can try to displace superordinate groups or raise their own position without denying the legitimacy of the hierarchy. In the latter system, neither is subordinate to the other. Instead, parallel ethnic groups coexist, perhaps autonomously, with each "peak" group internally stratified. In this system there is strong pressure for educational and occupational proportionality by both ethnic groups.

entails igniting conflict in other states or the spillover processes by which conflicts in one country directly affect neighboring countries (Migdal 1988; Gurr 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1998). *Escalation* involves the drawing or pulling in of other states, non-state actors, or outside ethnic groups into the internal conflict. We examine four explanatory frameworks to understand the escalation and diffusion of interstate ethnic conflict.

The Weakening of State Institutional Structures, Particularly Where There has been a Preexisting "Ethnic Contract"[3]

Ethnic contracts in divided societies entail formal guarantees of power sharing, minority rights, state patronage, and jobs in the public and private sector.[4] Ethnic contracts specify the rights and responsibilities, political privileges, and access to resources of each ethnic group. Some of the safeguards include power sharing arrangements, proportionality, electoral rules, and mutual vetoes (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 13–14). When such safeguards for minority ethnic groups are effective, they feel secure in relation with the state and the ethnic majority about their future (Lake and Rothchild 1998). As Van Evera notes (1994), such a minority-respecting nationalism will grant rights to other nationalities (while a minority-oppressing nationalism denies such right to these other nationalities, subjugating them instead).

One of the basic functions of the modern state is to provide internal order and security. Posen (1993), Snyder (1993), and Saideman (1998) emphasize the emerging anarchy that results from the weakening of the state. Severe economic crises, demographic pressures, deterioration of infrastructure and public services, external conflicts, or internal conflicts between actors regarding the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements can undermine the ability of the state to guarantee security within its territory (Migdal 1988; Baker and Ausink 1996). At the extreme, the result is the complete collapse of the state.

The weakening of state institutional structures, particularly where there has been a preexisting ethnic contract, will create insecurities on the part of vulnerable ethnic groups. When the central authority declines, groups become fearful for their survival. Under such conditions, each ethnic group will look to their own devices for protection against others; safeguards are absent to guarantee their political status or economic and even physical security.

Because the state has a monopoly of force and authority, its resources can be an ethnic group's greatest ally or its adversary. One outcome of the weakening of state structures is competition among ethnic groups for control of the state, its apparatus, and its resources. The position of each group is that if my group does not capture the state, another group will, putting my group at the mercy of the state. As Saideman notes, "If the state cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to control the state, decreasing the security of other groups and decreasing the ability of the state to provide security for any group" (Saideman 1996: 23). Thus, the collapse of the state and the loss of its

ethnic groups find themselves without a third party that can credibly guarantee agreements between them (Fearon 1998).

Escalation

Outside ethnic groups will join ongoing internal ethnic conflicts when they possess opportunities. Where the central authority has recently collapsed (i.e., competition waged among different ethnic groups for control of the state), predatory outside ethnic groups will take advantage of windows of vulnerability and opportunity in order to capture the spoils (Posen 1993; Van Evera 1999). In this instance, predatory ethnic groups consider states with significant internal conflicts to be an easy target. External support can also be used in order to prolong the conflict and to drain its enemies economy, thereby weakening it from within.

Diffusion

Ethnic security dilemmas can lead to the escalation and the diffusion of ethnic conflict (Posen 1993). With the collapse of the state structure, ethnic groups will take measures to protect themselves, practicing self-help, to ensure their security. These domestic measures may be seen as threatening by neighboring ethnic groups, especially in instances of enduring external ethnic rivalries. The outcome can be a hostility spiral of action and reaction, resulting in the diffusion of the conflict. Ethnic security dilemmas are particularly intense when offense and defense balances are indistinguishable and when offensive military operations are more effective than defensive military operations.[5] Under such conditions, ethnic groups will engage in offensive strategies in order to survive.

The Role of Non-State Regional and International Actors in Reducing State Sovereignty and Empowering Domestic Actors

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are composed of states and the individuals who are sent as delegates to such organizations representing the interests and policies of their home governments. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) consist of individuals or national groups who are not official representatives of national governments. Important NGOs include religious bodies, ethnic and religious political parties, and advocacy and militant groups.

Divided states, weak states, and states undergoing formation are likely to have relatively porous borders (Gause 1992).[6] In such states, trans-border communities from kin states can reach out to their ethnic diasporas through transnational ideologies, IGOs, and NGOs to promote dissent against the ruling ethnic group and to challenge the Westphalian sovereign state system (King and Melvin 1999/2000). Expatriates and foreign activists can intentionally heighten a nation's awareness of its divisions. Such states will have a lowered ability to fend off military interventions and domestic subversions from the outside.

Transnational penetration and foreign meddling in domestic politics will be more effective against divided societies, becoming the battleground for outside powers, and thereby contributing to the escalation of ethnic conflict. Members of external ethnic groups are concerned about the welfare and condition of ethnic kin in neighboring states. The status of the ethnic group can have an important impact on the intensity of conflictual relations between the states. Transnational ethnic linkages will have a greater influence on the interactions of states if the members of the ethnic group in the target state are in the minority and the members of that same minority group are in power in the neighboring state (Moore and Davis 1998). Escalation is most likely to occur when a disadvantaged ethnic minority is politically active in an effort to modify their status. In such instances, neighboring kin will intervene through IGOs, NGOs, or state action to support their brethren's cause. Support can take many forms, ranging from popular encouragement to covert training, arms supply, and financing of armed groups.

Diffusion

Ethnic kin can use NGOs to transcend weak state boundaries and threaten ruling ethnic groups in neighboring states (Gause 1992). Few states have the ability to project their power over long distances; divided states lack the weapons and the logistical capability for direct protracted conflict beyond their borders. As Walt notes, most threats are from approximate neighbors (1987).

Heightened ethnic awareness allows outsiders to appeal to their ethnic members in neighboring states through IGOs and NGOs. Ethnic groups are likely to appeal to neighboring ethnic kin to destabilize the majority ethnic group. This will be accomplished through supporting dissident groups by groundswells of popular support, questioning the legitimacy of the ruling regime, redrawing state boundaries, and/or overthrowing the ruling regime that opposes them. The dominant ethnic group will view such manipulation as a direct threat to the independence of the state, reacting negatively toward the state directing the campaign. The more intrusive the penetration, the greater the backlash from the target state.

Changes in the Ethnic Balance of Power that Have Real or Potential Repercussions in the Competition for the Distribution of Social, Economic, and Political Resources

When the balance of ethnic power is stable, conflict is unlikely. Problems arise when the balance of ethnic power shifts, resulting in demands by the new majority for a redistribution of the economic, political, social, and military resources and a revision of the existing ethnic contract (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Shifts in ethnic power differentials can result from demographic changes due to migration and differential birth rates, and uneven rates of economic development such as ethnically differentiated modernization (Horowitz 1985: 102).

majority is likely to demand a reallocation of political and economic entitlements commensurate with its new position or in proportion to the changing numbers. These changes will embolden the new majority and threaten the newly but entrenched minority.

Escalation

As the influence of one ethnic group declines, there is the incentive for aggression by both the new ethnic majority and the new ethnic minority, and outside ethnic kin to engage in preventive aggression.[7] There is ethnic apprehension that decline will be accompanied by a weakening of one's bargaining position and a corresponding decline in the political, economic, cultural, and other benefits that one receives from the status quo. The weakened side is tempted to engage in *preventive* aggression before its relative power is expected to decline. By attacking immediately, the group can enhance its chances for long-run security by blocking or retarding the rise of the ethnic challenger while that opportunity is still available (Levy 1987). The concern is that changes in the distribution of ethnic power will embolden the new ethnic majority to impose its will on the new ethnic minority. The distrust of the concentration of power in the hands of the new ethnic majority and the belief that power corrupts will contribute to the escalation of the conflict. As well, the rising challenger might initiate aggression rather than wait to be pushed down its power curve.

Through a process of omni-balancing, the threatened group(s) will appeal to secondary outside groups in order to balance against the primary internal threat (David 1991). In such instances, the threatened group will protect itself, at the expense of the interests of the state. Alliances, especially ethnic alliances, will draw neighboring kin into the internal ethnic conflict.

Power shifts are most likely to result in escalation under several conditions: when the ethnic challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant ethnic group; if the rise of the ethnic challenger is rapid; if the dominant ethnic group is inflexible in its policies; if there is not tradition of friendship between the ethnic groups; and if the ethnic challenger sets out to revise the status quo (Organski 1968: 376).

Diffusion

Upsetting the balance of power in one state can have a chain reaction or fusion reaction on neighboring power distributions. The new ethnic majority are likely to assist their brethren in neighboring states, especially if they are an abused minority, upsetting the domestic balance of power.

The Degree of Economic, Social, and Cultural Integration within the Regional or Global System (Especially Reinforcing Versus Crosscutting Interstate Cleavages Between/Among Ethnic Groups)

Political and economic differentials exist among ethnic groups. These include access to positions of political power, civil service, inequalities in income, access

distinguishes between those groups that enjoy privileged access to resources and an interest in economic modernization, and those that do not (1985: 166).[8] A group may be "modern" because it is disproportionately educated and represented in the civil service and the independent professions, disproportionately wealthy and well represented in business. A "modern" group is one that has benefited from opportunities in education and nonagricultural employment. They are represented above the mean in number of secondary and university graduates, in bureaucratic, commercial, and professional employment, and per capita income.

A group may be more "traditional" because it is disproportionately rural, in subsistence rather than the cash economy, or disproportionately poor or uneducated. Such groups are less favorably situated in terms of educational attainment, high-salaried employment, and per capita income (Horowitz 1985: 233). While the modernizing ethnic group is more interested in education and new opportunities to be tied into the modern economy and its international dimensions, especially in the West, traditional ethnic groups have some inhibitions on taking up new opportunities and remain somewhat apart from full participation in the modern sector of the economy (Horowitz 1985: 148). It should be noted that these differences cannot usually be solely ascribed to culture or region. Traditional groups have most often been the historical victims of political, ethnic, or religious oppression, either domestically an/or internationally (e.g., colonialism) and their disadvantageous position in a particular state clearly reflects that prior history. Moreover ongoing discrimination and oppression may also be a factor limiting access to resources.

An additional factor in this dynamic is the process of globalization, which will create domestic winners and losers. Globalization, understood in its most basic sense of a growing integration of political, social, economic and cultural structures and relations across borders, involves a reduction in identity with territoriality and jurisdictional boundaries. Nonetheless it can also be boundary-heightening (Rosenau 1994; Rothchild and Groth 1995) by producing a backlash of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, or what is termed localization. Where globalization allows people, goods, information, norms, practices and institutions to move about despite boundaries, localization involves narrowness and a pressure to withdraw, highlighting borders and attachment to land. This latter process inhibits the movement of people, goods, information, norms, practices, and institutions. Winners from globalization will benefit from the expansion of production, trade, and investment beyond national borders. Losers from globalization will be harmed due to loss of jobs, the displacement of native industries by foreign ones, the loss of cultural icons, and the erosion of belief systems. Not surprisingly, according to Horowitz, "there is much evidence that so-called backward groups are more frequently initiators of ethnic violence and advanced groups more frequent victims" (1985: 166).

Diffusion

It is clear that traditional ethnic groups are losers from globalization. Apprehensive about their survival (economic, political, and cultural), such groups are likely to respond to globalization by engaging in ethnonationalism to

strengthens the sense of identity and mutual belonging to an ethnic group by its emphasis upon past sufferings and present or future threats at the hands of outsiders to the group. Traditional groups will use diversionary conflicts with opposing internal and/or external ethnic groups to facilitate the process of localization. Such a policy will create cohesion among these groups, through conflict with the modernizing and globalizing out-group and their foreign kin. Localization includes mobilizing communal groups by contributing to their sense of common identity, cohesion, and organization. Through diversionary conflicts, traditional groups will formulate an image of "others which is characterized by hostility, malevolence, suspicion, and mistrust" (Rothchild and Groth 1995: 71).[9] Ethnic groups will castigate those members of one's own national core group who cooperate with the enemy.

Escalation

Traditional ethnic groups that are losers from the globalization process will most likely press for closer ties to kin in and outside their borders in order to undermine the modernizing groups (especially contiguous). Such traditional groups will retrieve group members across a territorial border in order to shore up their position for localization.

Summary of the Book

This book examines ethnic conflicts in several regional contexts.[10] We review four explanatory frameworks as they relate to escalation and diffusion of interstate ethnic conflict: (1) the weakening of state institutional structures, particularly where there has been a preexisting ethnic contract; (2) the increased role of non-state regional and international actors (NGOs and IGOs) and the reduction of state sovereignty and the empowerment of domestic actors and interest groups; (3) changes in the ethnic balance of power have real or potential repercussions in the competition for the distribution of social, economic, and political resources; and (4) the degree of economic, social, and cultural integration within the regional or global system (especially reinforcing versus crosscutting interstate cleavages between/among ethnic groups).

This volume examines several cross-regional cases. The richness of this book is that while individual authors adopt different approaches and methods, not all of which address each explanatory framework, the total project provides a comprehensive discussion of the internationalization of ethnic conflict. In this way, the volume provides a series of case studies that highlight both the differences and similarities in the internationalization process. We make no claims about offering a new theoretical explanation on the origins and development of ethnic conflict. Nor are we testing specific hypotheses. Our purpose is to examine the internationalization of ethnic conflict in light of a series of explanatory frameworks that helps us integrate and entangle domestic and international factors. We believe that the case studies explored here highlight the links between

for this enterprise to be a first step toward theory building in the area of ethnic conflict.

The remainder of the book includes chapters that focus on specific cases. Chapter 2, by David Carment and Patrick James, compares the cases of Post-Communist Yugoslavia and Post-Independence Somalia, focusing on intervention by third-party states. Chapter 3, by Neal Jesse and Marc Simon, use a game-theoretic approach to compare ethnic violence in Northern Ireland and the Republic of South Africa. Based on the framework developed in this chapter, they address why diffusion and escalation occurred in the latter case but not in the former. In chapter 4, Shale Horowitz examines ethnic conflicts in the Soviet successor states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. While all escalated to involve other states, none diffused into neighboring states. In chapter 5, Kristen Williams, examines the internationalization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Chapter 6, by Philip Mauceri, examines Latin America. He contends that a mix of demonstration effects, the increased role and interconnectedness of the international media, a shift in the international agenda of major powers toward human rights and the protection of minorities, and the growing presence and sophistication of NGOs explain the diffusion of ethnic-based conflict throughout Latin America. In chapter 7, John Quinn discusses what many have called Africa's First World War, and the links between ethnic conflict, regime change, and internationalization. In chapter 8, Jeffrey Helsing examines the internationalization of ethnic conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict. Finally, in chapter 9, Bob Oberst examines the expansion of the Sri Lankan conflict from a low-level and sporadic warfare to a war with strong international connections and ties.

Notes

1. On constructivists (socially constructed identities), see Young (1993); and Brubaker (1995).
2. This term is coined by Abraham Lowenthal.
3. Lake and Rothchild (1998: 13) credit Leonard Binder for coining this term.
4. Ethnic contracts can be formal or informal. One such solution is consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977). Consociationalism involves executive power sharing and grand coalitions, formal and informal separation of powers, balanced bicameralism and special minority representation in the upper chamber, a multiparty system, proportional representation, territorial as well as nonterritorial federalism and decentralization, and a written constitution protecting minority rights through difficult procedures for amendment.
5. On the offense–defense balance, see Posen 1984; Lynn-Jones 1995; Van Evera 1998.
6. External intervention of NGOs can have a positive dimension as well. The establishment of such transnational networks allow "ethnic groups with greater opportunities for transnational interactions: the exchange of ideas, information, wealth, and political strategies" (Stack 1997: 21).
7. Escalation can occur even if: (1) the chances of success for the preventive attack are long provided that the chances of success later would still be longer; and (2) the stronger group promises not to exploit the weaker group in the future.

resources as "advanced" and to those who do not as "backward." Given the changes in comparative terminology since Horowitz developed his framework, we prefer to use the terms "modernizers" and "traditionalists" to capture the differences outlined by Horowitz.

9. See Snyder and Ballentine (1996) on myths.
10. On the concept of a region, see Lake and Morgan (1997); Stein and Lobell (1997).

CHAPTER 2

Third-Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention

David Carment and Patrick James

The Problem of Ethnic Intervention

Why are some states predisposed to intervene in other states' ethnic conflicts? Internal wars continue to outpace interstate wars both in intensity and duration, so questions about ethnic intervention are becoming central to the study of violent conflict (Saideman 1997, 1998, 2001a,b; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000; Carment and Rowlands 2001; Kaufman 2001; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Far from resolving internal disputes, third-party involvement frequently translates into interference-prolonging and even intensifying such conflicts. Indeed, many of the most intractable civil conflicts in recent decades are marked by high-profile and disastrous interventions by outside states. Examples include India's 1987 efforts to mediate Sri Lanka's protracted conflict, Russia's intervention in the civil wars in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Greece's involvement in the Cypriot conflicts, and confrontations between India and Pakistan over successive Kashmiri insurgencies (Carment 1994). Major issues in both theory and policy related to ethnic intervention and its aftermath continue to challenge the field (Hayden 1996a,b; Wallace 1996; Woodward 1996).

Instances of ethnic intervention continue to accumulate. Unfortunately, students of conflict management are only beginning to construct theories about third-party interventionism with a general range of application, most notably with respect to ethnic conflict (Gurr 1992; Saideman 1998, 2001b; Tenorio 2001).[2] This oversight is particularly glaring given the fact that such involvement continues to spoil or delay peace settlements in so many civil conflicts (Weiner 1971; Gurr 1992; Carment 1992, 1993; Brown 1996b; Lobell and Mauceri, chapter 1, this volume). Moreover, with the acceleration of globalization and the growth of supranational organizations, so-called internal conflicts have become more "internationalized" than ever before (Midlarsky 1992; Brown 1993, 1996a,b,c; Carment and James 1997, 1998).[3] The ongoing gap in knowledge about intervention in ethnic strife undoubtedly reflects the position of this problem at the intersection of comparative and international politics: a

that traditional divide.

Ethnic conflicts are "quintessential political conflicts involving incompatible preferences over distributional outcomes" (Mozaffar 1999: 47). Thus ethnic intervention is defined here as economic or political interference by one sovereign state in the internal affairs of another for the stated purpose of assisting an ethnic group residing in that state. In other words, intervention as studied here is redistributive in its goals and favors one ethnic antagonist over others. This chapter seeks to identify domestic determinants of ethnic interventionism by third-party states, which reflects a growing awareness that interstate and even system-level factors can go only so far in accounting for the development of individual cases.

Recent literature on ethnic conflict, perhaps in reaction to the upheavals at the outset of the 1990s, outlines a host of causes for third-party interventions. Most of the factors noted point to characteristics within the conflict's host-state, an especially interesting tendency because the sheer number of conflicts in progress at about the same time would seem to encourage interest in more encompassing explanations. Hypotheses about host-states include the depth of ethnic cleavage or animosities, institutional breakdown and resultant security dilemmas that provoke third-party involvement, opportunistic "ethnic elites" who successfully lobby for outside assistance, and so on (Lake and Rothchild 1998; see also Kaufman 2001).[4] While such propositions have the potential to shed important light on the ways in which ethnic conflict becomes internationalized, the respective arguments cannot account for why some states are more prone than others to intervene in ethnic wars outside their borders. Prominent examples would include Pakistan's interference in Kashmir and Rwanda's interference in the Congo. To answer questions about why the propensity toward intervention varies among members of the international polity, it will be useful and even essential to examine characteristics within intervening states.

Two broad schools of thought exist on ethnopolitics in general and the domestic determinants of ethnic interventionism in particular: affective versus instrumental (Gurr 1992: 16–17; Wieland 2001: 209). Each is introduced in turn, with more detailed summaries appearing at a later point.

According to the affective school of thought, ethnic allegiances between one state and an embattled group in another will encourage intervention. While such tendencies exist, the empirical record demonstrates that cross-border ethnic ties do not always "bind"—these ties inspire third-party intervention in some cases but not others. Although states like Serb-dominated Yugoslavia have intervened repeatedly on behalf of Serb minorities elsewhere, others, such as China, generally have refrained from intervening on behalf of their ethnic counterparts abroad (Yu 1999). Furthermore, a state may show significant variation both over time and in relation to different diaspora; Somalia serves as a prominent example (Saideman 1998, 2001b). This difference becomes even more interesting when cast in terms of opportunity versus willingness (Most and Starr 1989; Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995). As a Great Power, China has ongoing opportunities to intervene with military force but generally does not, while "Serboslavia," a weak state, interfered destructively with its neighbors on multiple occasions over the last decade.

in ethnic wars to obtain access to valued resources or to create diversion or "rally around the flag" effects when they face defeat at home. However, this argument cannot explain why leaders of many other states refrain from opportunistic interventions or utilize alternative methods of regaining popular support when faced with internal challenges.[5]

Both schools of thought seem to beg the question: why do affective ties or elite incentives lead to a foreign policy of intervention in some states but not in others? This puzzle may be solved, at least in part, by adding an institutional component to the study of ethnic interventionism. In other words, it is useful to consider the possibility that affective ethnic ties and elite incentives are filtered through domestic institutions to yield differential foreign policies with respect to ethnic conflicts in other states. This study develops a model of domestic determinants of ethnic interventionism and presents preliminary evidence in the form of focused case studies to assess its predictions.

Determinants of ethnic interventionism include: (1) ethnic domination versus diversity—the extent to which institutions of the state are in the hands of a single ethnic group; and (2) high versus low institutional constraints—the extent to which leaders enjoy discretionary power over state policies (Carment and James 1995, 1996, 2000).[6] The model yields a prediction for each type of state with respect to interventionism: (1) ethnically dominant, low-constraint states are predisposed to bellicose policies of ethnic intervention; (2) ethnically dominant, high-constraint states are prone to policies of sporadic ethnic intervention; (3) ethnically diverse, low-constraint states are likely to pursue pacific intervention through diplomacy; and (4) ethnically diverse, high-constraint states are likely to engage in realpolitik policies toward interventionism.

This chapter proceeds in six further parts. The first part provides an overview of the existing literature on ethnic interventionism. The second part presents a model used to identify states that are more or less likely to intervene in conflicts outside their borders. In the third part, predictions for foreign policy as related to ethnic intervention are generated for states on the basis of the preceding model. In the fourth part, focused case studies are used to illustrate the model's predictions. The fifth part relates the findings just noted to the hypotheses about escalation that are the focus of the volume as a whole. In the sixth part the results of the analysis are summarized and directions are offered for further research.

Perspectives on Ethnic Interventionism

Recent waves of theorizing on ethnic interventionism have focused primarily on the state in which the conflict takes place. The working assumption is that ethnic conflict is generated internally and then externalized or "internationalized" as the conflict draws in external actors (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Brown 1996a,b,c; Lobell and Mauceri, this volume). Several hypotheses are put forward about why this occurs. One idea is that ethnic conflict may weaken state structures, which in turn encourages intervention by outside actors who hope to obtain resources or influence the outcome of the strife to their advantage

Another hypothesis is that ethnic conflicts create harmful side effects (or, in the language of economics, "negative externalities"; Sandler 1997) in the form of regional security dilemmas that neighboring states attempt to resolve through intervention (such as Rwanda's intervention in Zaire; Posen 1993). A more liberal view, by contrast, would infer that third parties intervene in ethnic conflicts in reaction to gross violations of human rights and produce "good offices and mediation, peace making and peace keeping, protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance, and stigmatization of regimes deemed guilty of flagrant violation of international norms" (Esman 1995: 21).[7] NATO's intervention to prevent the Yugoslav government from ethnically cleansing Kosovar Albanians in 1999 may serve as evidence for the liberal point of view (Carment and Harvey 2000; see also White 1995 on British humanitarian relief, as a specific example, in the former Yugoslavia).[8]

One very useful summary of the external dimensions of internal (and frequently ethnic) conflicts is provided by Brown (1996c: 592, 596–99; see also Kaufman 2001: 40–41). In a more general treatment of the actions of neighboring states in internal conflicts, Brown identifies five kinds of intervention that are linked to respective motivations. At one extreme is humanitarian intervention, where refugee problems, for example, provide the rationale for getting involved. At the other extreme are opportunistic interventions and invasions, which come about as a by-product of the intervening state's experience with instability and warfare spilling over from its neighbor (Brown 1996c: 592). Examples of opportunistic interventions and even invasions, which generally appear in line with a more realist point of view, "are plentiful": South African support for insurgents in Mozambique and Angola in the 1980s; Angola versus Zaire, and Sudan and Uganda, respectively, against each other; Pakistan's assistance to insurgents in India's Punjab and India's support for insurgents in Pakistan's Sindh; and the Syrian invasion of Jordan during the latter's civil war in 1970 (Brown 1996c: 598–99). In all of these instances the intervening or invading state pursued some combination of political, economic and military interests.

While the preceding discussion sheds important light on the proximate causes, timing, and pathways of ethnic interventions, they cannot explain why some states are more likely than others to intervene in conflicts outside their borders. This is because the target state is at most a part of the story; the decision to intervene, in the end, must come from within a potential third-party state. To answer the question of who is disposed toward third-party action, we must explore characteristics of the intervening states themselves. As noted earlier, the two basic approaches toward the study of interventionist foreign policy are affective and instrumental.

Instrumentalist explanations hold that ethnic conflict spreads with purpose rather than inevitability (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Heraclides 1991; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Snyder 1993; Gagnon 1994/1995; Tishkov 1997; Weingast with de Figueiredo 1999; Kaufman 2001; Ross 2001). Instrumentalists view external intervention as neither a direct outcome nor a by-product of centuries-old hatred. Instead, the emphasis is on benefits that accrue to leaders who engage in ethnic interventionism. Political leaders are expected to respond like rational

(Meadwell 1991, 1993). Priorities among these objectives, of course, will vary from one leader to the next and perhaps even for the same decision-maker over time. In this formulation, political elites faced with a leadership challenge may engage in adventurous foreign policies to create a diversionary effect as a means of shoring up domestic support (James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Miller 1995; James and Rioux 1998; Weingast with de Figueiredo 1999).

Further understanding may lie in systematic assessment of the politics of cross-border ethnic affinities. Although instrumentalism may account for why elites themselves engage in interventionist policies, affective ties—based on emotion and ascriptive criteria—are crucial for explaining why "ethnic rescue" can be such an effective political strategy for elites (Smith 1986: 75; see also Chazan 1991; Connor 1994; Brown 1996c). Ethnic ties exist as a result of significant cross-border perceptions of a shared past and common destiny. Today it is almost a truism that ethnicity is one of the primary social identities around the world (Stack 1997; Dombrowski 1998; Ross 2001). True or not, this universal perception almost certainly is self-reinforcing. Indeed, ethnic identities increasingly trump state identities where the two are incongruent; as primordialists point out, there is a limit to the "plasticity" of ethnic identity (Kaufman 2001: 24; see also Stack 1997, 2000). Ethnic or confessional identities become more salient and even inclusive as national systems of order collapse (Zartman 1997: 4). Even more compelling is the imposition of identity by extremist members of an opposing group; under conditions of intense conflict, opting out of a particular ethnic designation may simply prove to be impossible (Kaufmann 1996: 144). The political importance of such identities—particularly when they span state borders—should not be underestimated. Cross-border ethnic ties involve a range of emotional linkages, including shared grievances, language, customs, religion, principles, racial–cultural affinities and common humanitarian concerns. Due to the power of these linkages, conflicts involving a group's co-ethnics may be imagined to involve the group itself. Intervening on behalf of the group's co-ethnics in crisis may therefore be an effective means of obtaining the political support of this group.

While certainly important, even these insights concerning the rise of transnational group identification still do not explain why some states are more likely than others to intervene on behalf of their co-ethnics abroad. Some interesting ideas and empirical evaluations from Saideman (1997, 1998) on secessionism and irredentism, respectively, can be used to provide structure for further discussion of this issue. As will become apparent, ethnic ties are significant in accounting for third-party conduct, but other factors enter into the equation as well.

Saideman (1997) demonstrates that ethnic allegiances are an important factor in motivating interventions in secessionist conflicts abroad. In particular, vulnerability to secession does not seem to be a determining factor with respect to support for the government of a state versus a secessionist movement in the following cases: the Congo crisis (1960), the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) and the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991–1995). A review of potential interveners ($N = 46$) across these observations produces the following key findings, among others: states vulnerable to secession supported secessionists versus host-states in

secession are, in turn, 3 an 7 (Saideman 1997: 747). In contrast with this very weak connection between vulnerability and self-restraint with respect to support for secessionists (which is at variance from conventional treatments such as Jackson and Rosberg 1982), consider the following result: among states with ethnic ties to secessionists, 21 supported the secessionists and one supported the host-state, while among states with ethnic ties to host-states, 15 supported the host-state and only one supported the secessionists (Saideman 1997: 748).[10] The underlying message of these findings is clear: vulnerability to secession does not seem to deter a potential third party from intervention, while ethnic ties seem to matter a great deal in figuring out which side will receive support if it is provided.

Irredentism, the natural complement to secessionism in conceptual terms, is found to result from "competition for support of groups who have ethnic ties in neighboring territories" (Saideman 1998: 52; see also Saideman and Ayres 2000). This basic insight accounts for why irredentism is not a constant factor in cases where ethnic ties always are present. The key to the timing of irredentism is the need for support from essential constituents. The cases of Somalia (1960–1980) and Serbia (1991–1997) are used by Saideman (1998: 56) to demonstrate this point. In Somalia, a noteworthy effort toward a Pan Somalia comes in 1963–1964, right before the March elections. Competition focused on the clans with connections to ethnic Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia. By contrast, in the late 1960s, electoral pressure subsided. While it governed a still-democratic regime, the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL) faced decreasing competition in the elections of 1967 and 1969 because the opposition became weaker and ultimately disintegrated. After the election of 1969, for example, the SYL and its coalition partner held the vast majority of seats, which greatly reduced pressure for irredentist policies (Saideman 1998: 72). The same variation over time is seen for Serbia: the Serb government at one time offered considerable support for Serbs in Croatia, for example, when it faced serious political competition from the extremist Serbian Radical Party in 1991–1992, but actually imposed his own sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs in summer 1994. The major opposition parties approved of a peace plan and Milosevic, by that time under heavy pressure from economic sanctions imposed by the major Western states, faced no significant lobby in favor of irredentism (Saideman 1998: 83–84). In sum, the Somali and Serbian cases are instructive in showing that variation in political competition can explain the sometimes inconsistent nature of irredentism.

Why, then, do ethnic ties lead to interventionist foreign policy in some cases but not others? When do cross-border ethnic ties influence state foreign policy? In general terms, the answers offered by this chapter are as follows: when ethnic ties exist, the institutional constraints and ethnic composition of a state play the primary roles in determining whether that state will attempt to intervene on behalf of its co-ethnics abroad. Our model draws on the insights from Saideman—in particular, that ethnic interventions are driven significantly by domestic factors—and hypothesizes the ways in which two such factors (ethnic composition and level of institutional constraint) interact to produce a certain type of ethnic foreign policy. Importantly, whereas Saideman's analysis aims to identify the conditions under which states follow active irredentism, this model uses the same case studies to test

While affect and instrumentalism are critical components in this process, these factors are filtered through domestic institutions that largely determine whether and in what way ethnic ties influence foreign policy formation.

The Model

This section presents a model that can be used to predict a state's disposition toward its co-ethnics abroad. The section begins by exploring how ethnic composition and domestic institutional constraints are expected to influence a state's propensity to intervene on behalf of its ethnic brethren. Interactions between these two variables are analyzed in the context of a two-by-two matrix. The model depicts four ideal types of states, each of which is associated with a distinct ethnic foreign policy. These predictions subsequently are tested.

Ethnic Composition: Domination versus Diversity

Under conditions of cross-border ethnic ties, leaders interested in gaining and retaining political power, and a conflict between a state's co-ethnics and their host-state, what policy is the state expected to adopt toward its co-ethnics?[11] To answer this question, it is essential to consider the ethnic composition of the intervening state—specifically, that of the ruling elite. A state's ethnic composition may take many different forms. In the interest of parsimony, two ideal types are considered here: (a) ethnic domination and (b) ethnic diversity.

Ethnic domination occurs where a single ethnic group enjoys political control over the state such that elites can improve their position—and that of their ethnic group—without the support of other ethnic groups. Ethnic foreign policy can assume a special significance in the domestic arena. This is because both agenda-setting powers and jurisdiction over foreign policy are in the hands of elites who have incentives to emphasize and reinforce ties with their ethnic group—generally the dominant ethnic group in the state and thus the main domestic constituency. In most ethnically dominated states, political competitors may only defeat the ruling elite by positing stronger linkages between themselves and the principal ethnic constituency. This can initiate rounds of "ethnic outbidding," as the ruling elite responds to these challenges by introducing issues and policies that suggest an even greater loyalty to their ethnic constituency (Horowitz 1985). This process usually results in redistributive policies in favor of the dominant ethnic group, even on issues in which the group has only a marginal interest. Somalia, for example, is the most ethnically homogeneous state in sub-Saharan Africa, yet clan-based competition for power is the norm, with highly destructive effects over the long term (Brown 1996b: 15).

Leaders of ethnically diverse states, by contrast, generally cannot rule without the support of other ethnic groups. Consequently, the leaders of such states are likely to prefer policies that appeal to more than one ethnic group as a means of attracting interethnic political support (Saideman 2001b: 25). In this way, elites

identities. All other things being equal, ethnic outbidding is less likely to occur in such states because elites are aware that competing excessively for the favor of one ethnic group may alienate other ethnic groups, who could form a coalition to oust the leadership. Policies and political stances therefore are likely to involve significant interethnic compromise; the ongoing brokerage politics of the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States would be a prime example. Ethnic intervention is not ruled out for diverse states but, regardless of regime type, this behavior is expected to be a product of special circumstances rather than an ongoing feature of foreign policy.

Institutional Constraints: High versus Low

Domestic institutions are a second major determinant of elite policy-making. Institutional constraints are defined as the broad, underlying patterns of political authority and constitutional structure of the state (Gurr 1974, 1990; Morgan and Campbell 1991). For the purposes of this analysis, institutional constraints will denote the extent to which these structures limit the actions of elites in accordance with the preferences of citizens, broadly defined. These constraints then may be equated with democratic institutions, which include (a) regular, free, and fair elections; (b) universal voting franchise; (c) referenda on matters of high constitutional importance; (d) constitutionally guaranteed and enforced civil liberties; (e) an independent judiciary; and (f) various checks and balances on executive decision-making, such as federal structures, shared authorities, congressional or parliamentary override and procedures for executive impeachment.

Analysis of foreign policy in the context of domestic institutions might seem wrong-headed from the outset. After all, unlike domestic policy, foreign policy is presumably more resistant to the vagaries of public opinion, especially during periods of interstate conflict and war. However, if elites must compete for power in the electoral arena, the masses can be expected to influence elite decision-making, regardless of issue-area (Tsebelis 1990: 167). (One example is the previously noted diversionary model of conflict.) Given that possibility, two types of political institutionalization are considered in this analysis: (i) low institutional constraints—commonly associated with authoritarianism or totalitarianism; and (ii) high institutional constraints—usually associated with democracy.

Leaders in many states have no popular mandate, but instead rule on the basis of force or coercion, elite pacts, heredity, or even divine authority. These elites enjoy low institutional constraints by virtue of the fact that their power does not depend upon the support of the population at large. Elite decision-making in such states is relatively unconstrained by popular opinion or constituent interests. States with low institutional constraints include military dictatorships such as Chile under Pinochet, monarchies and revolutionary republics of the contemporary Middle East, and one-party totalitarian regimes such as the former Soviet Union and China today. Where such regimes exist, policies result from elite bargaining over the distribution of resources—lower levels of government operate primarily through coercion or patron–client relations. Leaders of such states may pursue

own interests and those of their patrons than to serve the interests of the state as a whole—even when doing so entails weakening the state through war or international sanctions (Lake 1992). While institutional constraints may be low, either intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic factional pressures could produce intervention.

Where leaders, by contrast, face high institutional constraints, they are accountable directly to the people (or at least an identifiable and presumed majority coalition), who can either punish or reward elite behavior through regular statewide elections. In a federal system, for instance, the relationship between elites and masses consists of a two-tier game involving legislative and electoral politics. These institutions largely determine the extent to which the state's ethnic composition—and the interests of its various ethnic constituencies—plays a role in elite decision-making. Whatever the state's ethnic makeup, its elites will have powerful incentives to curry favor with the masses. The leaders of such states therefore are less likely to pursue unnecessarily reckless policies—either foreign or domestic—that put the interests of the state and its citizens as a whole at risk. The same cannot be said of leaders of low-constraint states, where the interests of the masses are far less influential in elite policy-making.

Interaction Effects: Predictions for Foreign Policy

A Typology of States

Which states are most likely to adopt belligerent or adventurous foreign policies? A state's foreign policy is generally a function of multiple factors, which can be either internal or external to the state in question (Morgenthau 1957; Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979; Gurr 1980; Snyder 1991b). For example, a state may adopt a bellicose foreign policy when social or economic pressures threaten to overwhelm its political institutions. Interventionist policies also may be motivated by a leader's "gamble for resurrection" in the face of defeat or usurpation (Weingast with de Figueiredo 1999). Conversely, cross-border ethnic affinities may draw one state into the internal conflict of another in order to "rescue" its ethnic compatriots in crisis (Van Evera 1994). Finally, ethnic conflicts produce "cleavages" that external actors can exploit to increase their security and gain access to valued resources (Carment and James 1995, 1996).

Although propositions such as these can address when interventions take place and why they unfold as they do, an exclusive focus on the triggers of interventionist policies excludes consideration of deeper, perhaps even structural, enabling conditions. Moreover, these explanations do not address the question as to why some states are more prone to interventionism than others. The model presented here is founded on the idea that such questions can be answered only through structural analysis of the intervening state itself (Brass 1991; Kohli 1990).

As noted earlier, the structural factors most relevant to ethnic foreign policy include: (1) ethnic composition of the state; and (2) the extent to which leaders are constrained by their ethnic constituencies. These variables interact to produce different policy "win-sets" at the state level (Putnam 1988). A win-set is



Figure 2.1 Domestic determinants of ethnic intervention.

defined here as all of the successful foreign policy strategies that would "win," or satisfy the minimum number of people or institutions the leader needs to gain or retain power. Interactions between the variables are depicted in figure 2.1, which conveys four ideal state types, each of which is associated with a distinct foreign policy orientation (see figure 2.1).[12] Briefly, incentives to adopt ethnic foreign policies are minimal for high-constraint, ethnically diverse states (which have the smallest win-sets), and maximal for low-constraint, ethnically dominant states (which have the largest win-sets). The expected foreign policy profile for each state type is elaborated here.

Foreign Policy Profiles

Leaders may be confronted with the need to prove their status as the "best nationalist" from either (i) in a dictatorship, a mass- or elite-led social movement with revolutionary potential; or (ii) in a democracy, electoral considerations. In both instances, of course, ethnic interventionism could occur either in response to observed pressure or a belief that such forces must be headed off. The profiles that follow assess the interaction effects that make each of the preceding processes more or less likely to occur.

Dominant-Low (I_a): Belligerence

With low institutional constraints, elites have considerable discretion in the formation of foreign policy. Many of these elites will have come to power through force (e.g., Somalia at the end of the 1960s) and frequently owe their position to the support of the relatively small proportion of the general public who actively prop

or foreign actors such as governments and multinational corporations). With a limited constituency to satisfy, all other things being equal, these leaders have larger policy win-sets and are thus relatively unconstrained in their decision-making. Checks on executive authority—when present—tend to be "on paper only." The de facto versus de jure operation of the Soviet regime could be cited as the archetypal example. Power tends to be concentrated in the hands of a numerically small elite with relative immunity to domestic pressures. Foreign and domestic policies can be expected to appeal to the dominant ethnic group (and especially those with military standing), but not in a way that would threaten the power base of elite members. The interests of the masses thus are subordinated to those of elites.

Elite foreign policy is influenced primarily by the identity of the constituency. When leaders depend upon economic elites, multinational corporations or international organizations, their foreign policies are more likely to resemble that of the security- and wealth-maximizing states envisioned by structural realists (James 2002). These rulers have longer time horizons and are therefore less likely to engage in rent-seeking or belligerent foreign policies that yield only short-term gains. Indeed, they may include a number of standard realist factors into their decision-making calculus, such as absolute and relative capabilities, alliance structures, and so forth.

When elites depend upon the support of an ethnic group, however, foreign policies are much more likely to take on an ethnic component. Leaders retain or gain power by demonstrably giving precedence to the interests of this group. Political challengers then may attempt to usurp power by demonstrating an even greater willingness to champion the interests of the dominant group. This process of ethnic outbidding may lead to an ethnically oriented foreign policy as elites attempt to protect themselves from charges that they have "sold out" their ethnic constituents. Intervention and even invasion may take place as a means toward undermining efforts by rivals to seize power through either elite-based conspiracy or mass mobilization. Thus a ruling elite could choose to intervene on behalf of its co-ethnics across a border even when broader economic or security interests are ill-served by doing so. In such cases domestic considerations therefore trump the interests of the state as a whole. Consistent with this prediction, the empirical record shows that the propensity to intervene in ethnic conflicts increases with the ethnic homogeneity of the intervening state (Horowitz 1991; Carment and James 1995).[13]

Diverse-Low (I_b): Passive Lobbying

Leaders of ethnically diverse, low-constraint states, by contrast, are unlikely to pander to the interests of any one ethnic group. This is because the expected payoffs from ethnic politics are quite small at best and perhaps even entail probable losses from the outset. For example, if the military and bureaucracy are controlled by different ethnic groups, or if the ruling elite is multiethnic, then policies that serve any single group could threaten the regime status quo—a kind of internal "balance of power." Moreover, although groups may negotiate informally over state resources, there is an understanding that open politicization of ethnic

cies in neighboring states—could well provoke ethnic violence within the state itself, thus weakening state institutions and possibly upsetting the regime.

Ethnic interventionism is expected to take the form of passive lobbying. Leaders are likely to forego risky foreign policies in favor of nationalist rhetoric or token gestures aimed at placating the ethnically dominant group without doing damage to the state's international reputation or its broader economic and security-related interests. For example, elites may be rewarded for strong public statements that affirm the precedence of the dominant ethnic group in the state, while acting in a way that seeks to maximize overall wealth and security for the state. In such states, the leadership's "bark" is generally worse than its "bite."

Dominant-High (II_a): Sporadic Intervention

Leaders in ethnically dominant, high-constraint states are expected to ignore the interests of the primary ethnic group at their own peril. Since replacement is a real possibility, elites are constrained highly by mass sentiment. When the majority of the electorate belongs to a single ethnic group, leaders are vulnerable to challengers' claims that they have betrayed the interests of this crucial constituency. Leaders therefore must protect themselves from political attacks that play on issues of nationalism, historical injustice, ethnic grievances and internal or external threats to the "purity" of the nation. Whether real or mythical in nature, the past is more than just a prologue to the politics of today.

Ethnic outbidding occurs in ethnically dominant, high-constraint states as political elites compete for the support of the key constituency. The process goes in the same direction as in ethnically dominant, low-constraint states, but the masses "lead" and elites "follow." The electoral support of the primary ethnic bloc is crucial to gaining and retaining power. Awareness of that point means that elites respond to surges of nationalism at the grassroots level out of fear that they otherwise will be replaced. Thus a kind of intermittent hypernationalism can emerge as elites attempt to outbid one another for the support of this group.

Ethnically dominant, high-constraint states are likely to engage in sporadic rather than persistent ethnic interventionism. The leaders of such states depend upon support from a large proportion of the public through regular, free and fair statewide elections. People vote not only with their hearts but also with their pocketbooks, so foreign policies that weaken the state by producing international sanctions, war or other costly outcomes may result in elite turnover (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Ethnic intervention is expected to be sporadic as the tendencies toward outbidding normally will be subordinate to the need for good politico-economic management. When specific circumstances combine to make other options unattractive, however, intervention comes into play. A sense of crisis and limited alternatives both at home and abroad will be needed to evoke a forceful ethnic foreign policy.

Diverse-High (II_b): Realpolitik Policies

Elites in ethnically diverse, high-constraint states have extremely narrow policy win-sets. The leaders of such states must satisfy a broad constituency that also is ethnically diverse and therefore entails many different—and often

straints oblige these leaders to retain at least a plurality of popular support in order to gain and (especially) maintain political power. These two restrictions greatly limit the range of policies elites can adopt that will satisfy the requisite number of constituents for retaining office. Cognizant of this, leaders of such states are unlikely to pursue policies—formal or informal, foreign or domestic—that serve the interest of any single ethnic group at the perceived or real expense of others. Leaders also must appeal across ethnic groups to obtain sufficient support for office, so they instead will adopt policies that enjoy broad, interethnic support.

For similar reasons, leaders of ethnically diverse, high-constraint states are unlikely to pursue ethnic interventions. Electoral considerations and the attendant need to maintain interethnic support at home will cause elites to downplay ethnicity as a source of foreign policy. Ethnic interventions are likely to occur only when there are no strong preferences among any of the state's ethnic groups or where there is a general consensus that the state has strong realpolitik-related reasons for involvement abroad. In sum, leaders of ethnically diverse, high-constraint states are unlikely to intervene on behalf of co-ethnics in other states, particularly if doing so fails to serve the state's overall economic or security concerns. The rulers of such states have incentives to respond to the interests of a broader cross-ethnic constituency (which usually entails the citizenry as a whole) over those of a single ethnic group that may have a special interest in the fate of their co-ethnics abroad.

Figure 2.1 summarizes the foreign policy predictions for the four state types. Since leaders of Type I_a states must satisfy relatively few constituents, belligerent ethnic interventions may easily be preferred. Types I_b and II_a fit between the extremes. Type I_b states are inhibited because of ethnic diversity, while Type II_a states are constrained by institutions, although rhetorical outbidding may increase II_a propensity toward an ethnic foreign policy. Elite policy win-sets are narrowest for Type II_b state, the leaders of which are most likely to eschew ethnic interventions.

From this analysis, a general hypothesis emerges about relative likelihood of intervention:

General Intervention Hypothesis (GIH). The potential for intervention in ethnic conflicts varies with the structural characteristics within the intervening state itself: ethnically dominant, low-constraint states (Type I_a) have the highest disposition toward intervention and are inclined toward belligerence; ethnically dominant, high-constraint states (Type II_a) are likely to engage in sporadic interventionism; ethnically diverse, low-constraint states (Type I_b) are inclined toward passive lobbying for their co-ethnics in neighboring states; and ethnically diverse, high-constraint states (Type II_b) are least likely to adopt ethnic foreign policies and tend toward realpolitik policies.

Figure 2.1, which focuses on domestic determinants, is not intended to explain every aspect of ethnic interventionism. Clearly, there are factors beyond those enumerated in the GIH that influence the propensity to intervene and tactics employed, along with the timing, intensity, and course of such interventions (Kaufman 2001: 6).[14] Despite such limitations, this model is expected to shed

interventions than others.

Case Illustrations

Overview

Two case studies will be used to offer a preliminary sense of how the model works in application. The cases, Yugoslavia/Serbia and Somalia, provide a total of three "observations" in the sense described by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 117). While Serbia remains a Type II_a state throughout the period of study (i.e., from 1990 to 1995), Somalia shifts from Type II_a to Type I_a (i.e., from 1960 to 1978, with the transition in 1969). Thus, a total of three observations exist and, as will become apparent, they are sufficient to produce significant variation in the dependent variable, that is, ethnic interventionism.

One limitation to the cases selected is with respect to ethnic composition, which remains a constant across all three observations. Thus the purpose of the present chapter is to focus on variation in institutional constraints and use the evidence that follows to facilitate further theory building (Fox 1999: 442); ethnic composition will play a role in future research that takes the form of aggregate data analysis (Carment et al. 2002). In sum, analysis of the three observations is intended less as a formal testing of the model than as an illustration of how it can be applied in a preliminary way to account for ethnic interventionism.

In post-communist Yugoslavia, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government at first actively supported Serb rebellions in Bosnia and Croatia but later abandoned its co-ethnics under the pressure of economic sanctions. (This case is complicated somewhat by the fact that Yugoslavia's substate borders became interstate borders during the course of this conflict.) Yugoslavia may be considered an ethnically dominant, high-constraint state throughout the 1990s. Thus its leaders would be predicted to intervene sporadically on behalf of Serb minorities abroad. The period of the case study of Serbia is from the transition out of communism in 1990 to the Dayton Accords of 1995.

The second case is that of post-independence Somalia, which embarked on successive irredentist projects in Ethiopia. Somalia is categorized here as both an ethnically dominant, high-constraint state (1960–1969) and an ethnically dominant, low-constraint state (1969–1978). These designations suggest that Somali leaders would be likely to intervene sporadically in the first period and with belligerence in the second period on behalf of co-ethnics over the border. Although it may be objected that Somalia is ethnically diverse due to its clan divisions, it may be considered homogeneous in the sense that its inhabitants are all ethnically Somali, speak the same language, practice the same religion, and, most importantly, identify with ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The period of the case study of Somalia is from independence in 1960 to defeat in the war with Ethiopia in 1978.

Prerevolutionary Yugoslavia is classified as an ethnically diverse, low-constraint state, or Type I_b. Yugoslavia's six ethnic republics—Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro—shared power. Its leaders responded in 1974 to complaints of Serb chauvinism by transforming the republic from a centralized state to an explicitly federal structure that included the six republics and two autonomous provinces inside Serbia—Kosovo and Vojvodina. It may have been due partly to this delicate interethnic balance that the Yugoslav government refrained from intervening in other states' internal affairs, although the imposing power of the USSR within the near abroad also must be recognized for its obvious importance.

These confederal structures gradually devolved to Yugoslavia's constituent republics in the decade following Josip Tito's death in 1980. This phase proved crucial to development of particularist identities and competing visions of Yugoslavia's future. The growing divisiveness of the Yugoslav state also may be traced to the rise of Serb nationalism and gradual Serb domination of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in the 1980s. Yugoslavia's economic failures later discredited liberal reformers who believed that its constitution and economy could be restructured within existing political arrangements. Against a backdrop of economic collapse, nationalist leaders gained tremendous popular appeal and easily overwhelmed their antinationalist counterparts. Croatian and Slovenian national leaders touted the virtues of national independence as a means of integrating into the Western economic and political structures; meanwhile, Serb nationalist elites railed against Serb underrepresentation in Yugoslavia's political institutions. For example, in 1986, a "Memorandum" from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences called for a more centralized system in order to address economic problems and hurled accusations about an anti-Serbian conspiracy (Kaufman 2001: 179).

Politics in post-communist Yugoslavia thus took on an ethnic character that had been established in the period leading up to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, ethnocentric leaders, each of whom had powerful political incentives to cater to the "national interests" of their respective constituencies, gradually replaced Yugoslavia's pro-federal elites. Croatian and Slovenian leaders therefore favored national independence as the surest route to prosperity for Yugoslavia's richest republics. At the same time, Serb national leaders strove to contain these secessionist impulses in the interests of preserving a federation in which the Serbs had a controlling stake, with the potential for income redistribution and similar kinds of ethnically oriented policies. Serb leaders portrayed Slovenian and Croatian secessionism as a conspiracy against the Serbs and resistance to these actions as essential to Yugoslavia's (read "Serbia's") national interests. In particular, Slobodan Milosevic used state-controlled media in the late 1980s to fuel Serb resentment against other ethnic groups; Muslim Albanians, for example, became identified with a renewed Islamic menace to Serbs (Kaufman 2001: 180).

January 1990, witnessed the effect end of the Yugoslav Communist Party, as Milosevic's efforts to grab power ultimately caused the Party Congress and later

for public support as leader of the Serbian Socialist Party and elections took place as scheduled in fall 1990 (i.e., high-constraint). Aside from autonomous Kosovo in the far south (with a 90% Albanian population), ethnic Serbs made up the overwhelming majority of those living in Serbia (i.e., ethnically dominant). Thus Serbia at that time would represent a Type II_a state and it maintained that status to the end of the case study period and beyond.

Propaganda campaigns heated up in all of Yugoslavia's republics, most notably in Serbia and Croatia. The spring 1990 elections in Croatia and Slovenia produced nationalist governments "fully as obstinate as Milosevic's" (Kaufman 2001: 182). Meanwhile, Kosovo and Slovenia declared "sovereignty" in summer 1990, further adding to disintegration and disarray in what once stood as Yugoslavia.

Tensions continued to mount among the republics in early 1991 (Djilas 1995: 91–95). On June 26, 1991, the leaders of Yugoslavia's six republics held a series of meetings intended to prevent the escalation of tensions into interethnic war. The chief antagonists, Slovenia and Serbia, showed little willingness to compromise. Soon thereafter the Croatian government adopted a constitution that gave Croatia sovereign authority over ethnic Croats as well as all other nationalities living in Croatia: The constitution did not explicitly recognize the large Serbian minority within its borders (Cohen 1992). Slovenia and Croatia also declared that, without some inter-republic agreement on a new federal formula, they would soon terminate their association with Yugoslavia. In response to these events, Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, a Serb, promised assistance to the large Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia in the event that the republics achieved independence.

Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croatian Liberal, then ordered the Yugoslavia Army to take control of all international borders. On June 25, 1991, the European Community and the United States announced that they would not recognize republics that attempted to secede (*The New York Times*). Slovenia then declared independence anyway and prepared to confront the Yugoslav Army at the border. In fear of Serb retribution, Croatia did not come to Slovenia's aid during the conflict, which meant that Slovenian forces had to face the JNA alone. Despite this fact, Slovenian forces managed to defeat the JNA in a just ten days.[15] In addition to an excellent level of preparation by the Slovenes, the JNA also had to cope with a lack of commitment from Milosevic, who clearly preferred to see Slovenia (about 90% Slovene) leave once and for all (Kaufman 2001: 191).

After that setback, the JNA then moved toward Croatia—75 percent Croat, but also 12 percent Serb. Sporadic fighting in the Serbian-held enclaves of Krajina and Slavonia already had got underway. By this time, Croatian forces had built up their strength to a level of 200,000 troops, 350 tanks, and 400 artillery pieces; the JNA had 138,000 troops on active duty, 400,000 in reserve, 1,850 battle tanks, and 2,000 artillery pieces (Ramet 1992b). Yugoslavia's internal border skirmishes had transformed into a full-scale civil war. Intense warfare, which included atrocities by both sides, ultimately produced a cease-fire in January 1992 with the Serbs in control of most of the Croatian territory they had wanted (Kaufman 2001: 192).

recognition and received it on January 14, 1992, which accounts for the timing of the cease-fire just noted. Tellingly, Milosevic's stance regarding union with Serbians in Croatia softened considerably at this point. He hailed the nascent UN intervention as the beginning of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis (Ramet 1992a,b). Of course, given Milosevic's well-documented dislike for the Croatians, it is more likely that he approved of the international organization's involvement because it entrenched the status quo in a situation where his war aims had been largely met.

War at its worst emerged in Bosnia. Bosnia voted overwhelmingly in a plebiscite to secede from the federation on March 2, 1992. Bosnian Serbs boycotted this plebiscite. Serb-dominated Yugoslavia claimed to be responding to a matter under its sovereignty. Indeed, Milosevic's overriding concern during this time became management of the unpredictable zealotry of Bosnian Serb leaders (who, ironically, he had funded and organized); "ethnic cleansing" threatened to attract significant outside military intervention. State survival thus emerged as Milosevic's primary goal during the conflict (Gagnon 1992). Under the pressure of economic sanctions, Serbia finally discontinued even covert assistance to its co-ethnics in Bosnia and Croatia.

More strikingly, Milosevic's government declined to intervene on behalf of Krajina's Serbs when Croatia moved to reconquer this territory in 1995; Serbia even pushed its co-ethnics to accept a negotiated settlement to the Bosnian war. Ironically, the Serbs became "victims of their own tactics"—driven out of long-established communities in the Krajina and western Bosnia-Herzegovina—in 1995 (Kaufman 2001: 192).

Milosevic's gradual retreat from interventionism during the mid- to late 1990s largely reflected the mounting domestic costs of interventionism. At first, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government attempted to preserve the federation by intervening on behalf of Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia. However, after the two republics achieved statehood, and the cost of sanctions against the Serbian regime began to mount, interventionist policies became less desirable. World opinion had shifted against the Serbs. Milosevic ultimately was forced to abandon the Serb minorities in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to have some chance at removal of the sanctions. Thus he signed the Dayton Accords, which mark the effective end point of this case study, out of necessity—leadership survival ultimately took precedence over more sustained ethnic interventionism.

This case can be divided into phases that collectively offer support to the model's prediction of sporadic interventionism for a Type II_a state. Tepid and unsuccessful irredentism by Serbia takes place with respect to Slovenia in mid-1991, followed by a more intense effort against Croatia from mid-1991 to January 1992 that produces territorial gains and results in a ceasefire. Irredentism resumes in spring 1992 and reaches its highest level of ferocity with respect to Bosnia, with large-scale fighting brought to a close in 1995 only as a result Western pressure. At that point, Serbia abandoned efforts to retrieve co-ethnics in Krajina and western Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia's "inconsistent" irredentism is consistent both with its status as a Type II state and the analysis of Saideman (1998; see also 2001b) in terms of political

ethnic interventionism; it clearly coincides with higher levels of political competition or ethnic outbidding. One contribution of the model developed in this chapter is the expectation that, in a state designated as ethnically dominant and high-constraint, intervention should be sporadic; it is natural to expect political competition (i.e., Saideman's key variable) to rise and fall in such a state—one reason why ethnic interventionism also might vary—along with other variables. This stands in contrast to a Type I_a state, in which the permissive conditions for ethnic interventionism always are in place. The essence of the Type II_a state, in other words, is variation in behavior—and that comes through strongly in the case of Serbia.

Postindependence Somalia

Somalia is one of Africa's most ethnically homogeneous states. Somalis speak the same language, follow the same religion, and believe themselves descended from common ancestors. Despite its national homogeneity, however, Somalia features a multitude of subnational clan-based identities.[16] In an attempt to overcome the fractiousness of their clan-based culture, Somali national leaders framed a constitution that made the nationalist struggle the central feature of Somalia's political and social history. By all accounts, this strategy succeeded; despite numerous clan divisions, the goal of achieving a Greater Somalia "united the vast majority of [Somalis] throughout the republic's existence" (Somerville 1990: 67). (Greater Somalia generally is conceived of as including Somalia as well as the missing Somali communities in Ethiopia, the French Territory of Afars and Isaacs (Djibouti) and Northern Kenya.) Although Somalia had pledged to respect its postindependence borders in various UN agreements, its 1960 constitution set forth the realization of Greater Somalia as a primary objective (Sauldie 1987: 17). Thus an overarching national identity and democratic institutions make postindependence Somalia an ethnically dominant, high-constraint state and the leaders of this Type II_a state would be predicted to engage in sporadic intervention on behalf of Somali communities in neighboring states.

Shortly after Somalia's independence in 1960, border clashes broke out between Somali tribesman and Ethiopian forces. Internal instability and the threat of international sanctions led Somali leaders to moderate their stance toward revanchist goals, particularly in light of warnings against such projects by the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[17] Somali leaders instead supported the secessionist Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in Ethiopia's Ogaden region under the guise of promoting "self-determination" for ethnic Somalis, since both the UN and OAU recognized that goal as a legitimate basis for struggle. With an eye toward winning elections, Somali leaders thus followed a Janus-faced policy: They publicly denied support for irredentism in order to curry the favor of the international community, but provided covert assistance to co-ethnics abroad in order to respond to the nationalist sentiments of their domestic constituency.

the election of March 1964. It broke off relations with Kenya, at the time a British colony, and supplied "arms, training and propaganda assistance to Kenya's Somalis" (Saideman 1998: 71). These actions occurred in spite of the risk of losing British subsidies, but it is important to note that Somalia did not follow up with direct intervention in Kenya. It did intervene in Ethiopia in October 1963, but backed off when Ethiopia's forces repelled Somali soldiers (Saideman 1998: 71).

Soon after the 1969 elections, the army launched a coup against the democratic government and installed a military regime headed by General Said Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council. Somalia now moved in the direction of an ethnically dominant, low-constraint state, or Type I_a. Early in the regime, Barre pursued policies consistent with those in place before he came to power; in fact, he attended a meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1971 and did not mention the Ogaden dispute to his Ethiopian hosts (Saideman 1998: 75). Clan differences, however, began to exert pressure and encourage outbidding. The "convenience of using clan ties to build support" took hold; Barre reinforced connections with the Darod clan-family to create a stronger coalition (Saideman 1998: 75). Moreover, his administration relied increasingly upon the support of the secret police and the military, which continued to be dominated by the Darod clan-family. The Darod family had ethnic kin in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and consequently a vested interest in national unification as well. These characteristics combine to yield the prediction that, once the military regime had gone fully through a transition period out of democracy, it would tend to pursue policies of belligerent irredentism.

Consistent with this proposition, Somalia's foreign policy took on a decidedly more aggressive tone in the post-coup period. In just a few short years, Barre's generals and clan allies embarked on a military solution to the issue of Greater Somalia. Ethiopia's 1974 revolution stimulated competing regional nationalisms, which afforded Somalia the opportunity to realize its long-held aim of national unification (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). By early 1977, Somali secessionist forces had taken advantage of Ethiopian troop movement from the Ogaden to Eritrea. Ethiopia now faced a war on two fronts. On February 21, 1977, independent sources in Nairobi reported that hostilities had broken out in the disputed Ogaden frontier, but could not confirm involvement of Somali forces, which Somalia denied.[18]

In mid-June, 1977, the WSLF reported that it had killed 352 Ethiopian soldiers and captured 176 in a skirmish in the mountains near Harar. Several small towns in the Ogaden subsequently were captured, but Ethiopia had yet to react to what was now in plain view: Somalia's forces, not just the WSLF, had been carrying out these attacks. On July 23, Ethiopia claimed that Somalia had launched an all-out attack against territory on its border. Although Somalia continued to deny involvement (until February 13, 1978, when it openly committed regular forces), U.S. spy satellites later confirmed "this was no simple desert skirmish on the order of previous Ethiopia-Somali confrontations" (Legum and Lee 1979: 32). An unprecedented number of tanks, aircraft, and army battalions were in evidence, although the exact number of armaments is not known. Ethiopia responded in two ways: it first sent representatives to appeal to the

military assistance. In response, the Soviet Union flew in more than 15,000 Cuban troops and a considerable number of arms, which badly routed Somali forces. On March 15, 1978, the Somali regime announced that it would accept a ceasefire to the conflict.

Somalia's evolving foreign policies tend to confirm the model's predictions. As an ethnically homogeneous democracy, in the early 1960s Somalia pursued a Janus-faced policy vis-à-vis Somali minorities in other states. Somali leaders required a broad electoral mandate, so they could not afford to jeopardize the national economy by pursuing revanchist policies that would alienate key trading partners and outside aid organizations. At the same time, the bulk of Somalia's constituents belonged to the two biggest clans, which had ethnic kin in neighboring countries. In order to appeal to both elements within the international community and nationalist sentiments of their constituents, Somali leaders provided covert assistance to their co-ethnics over the border while publicly renouncing the goal of Greater Somalia. In sum, Somalia's inconsistent stance during this time is largely in accord with the model's expectations, namely, the state practiced sporadic ethnic interventionism.

After the 1969 military coup, Somalia became an ethnically dominant, low-constraint state. Thus Somalia's military government would be expected to support more bellicose policies vis-à-vis co-ethnics in neighboring states. In fact, Somalia's ethnic foreign policy did become more aggressive during this period as General Barre openly committed Somali troops to support the secessionist movement in Ethiopia. UN and OAU threats of sanctions stifled persistent and overt irredentism by Somalia's democratically elected leaders but could not deter the military regime. The military regime pursued the interests of its narrow constituency in the face of significant military and economic costs.

One question that arises, now that all three observations have been covered, is where to draw the line between persistent (i.e., Type I_a) and sporadic (i.e., Type II_a) interventionism. An upward trend line, toward higher levels of interventionism, and a willingness to proceed to the point of potential regime destruction from involvement in interstate conflict, would seem like the natural criteria to use. Somalia shows this kind of trend and commitment as related to ethnic interventionism for the latter, but not the former, of its two observations in the case study. Serbia, by contrast, shows neither of these characteristics during its period of observation; there are "ups and downs" in ethnic interventionism and a withdrawal of commitment by Milosevic when the specter of regime collapse became imminent. Thus both a monotonic increase in interventionism, plus a willingness to support co-ethnics abroad beyond any "safety zone" for the regime itself, emerge as the criteria for belligerence as described by the model.

Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict, as the title of the present volume reinforces, is neither something wholly in or between states. Understanding ethnic conflict requires a focus on both factors operating within a state and beyond its borders. This certainly is true

in terms of the characteristics of potential intervening states. The volume as a whole, however, focuses on the characteristics of target-states and other factors beyond the borders of a state that might engage in ethnic intervention. The volume's four central hypotheses pertain to the causes of escalation for ethnic conflict. At this point the implications of the Yugoslav and Somali observations for each of the four hypotheses will be covered in turn.

The first hypothesis is that weakened state structures invite external predation, that is, conflict escalation. The Serbian case supports the hypothesis, while the Somali one does not necessarily contradict it. Serbian meddling in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia at various times in the early 1990s took place in the context of a disintegrating political structure, as the Yugoslav federation fell apart rapidly and with nothing obvious in its place to moderate ethnic cleavages. As a result, a demagogue such as Milosevic found it relatively easy to ride waves of ethnic enmity; intense interventions took place in both Croatia and Bosnia. The Somali case does not contradict the hypothesis because the state structure of Ethiopia in the late 1970s (i.e., at the time of invasion) probably had very little downward "elasticity." As one of the poorest countries on earth, Ethiopia's state structure stood in a constant state of readiness for collapse. Thus it might not need to weaken further at any given time to attract attention from predatory states, although Ethiopia's revolution and subsequent civil war increased Somalia's opportunity to use force in attempting to change the status quo.

The second hypothesis is that international governmental (and nongovernmental) organizations will serve as vehicles for external meddling by states that are attempting to intervene on behalf of ethnic brethren elsewhere, which in turn produces escalation. This hypothesis is not supported by the case studies. Both Serbia and Somalia engaged in unilateral intervention. Furthermore, international organizations such as the OAU, NATO, and UN tended to play a dampening role in each conflict.

The third hypothesis is that a shift in the ethnic balance of power within a state will produce escalation. This hypothesis is supported strongly by the Serbian case, in which secession by Slovenia, for example, produced a new power distribution among the remaining components of Yugoslavia. A clear shift toward Serbia took place and increased its potential to engage in ethnic war, with Bosnia as the most horrific example. Moreover, once outside the federation, neither Slovenia nor Croatia came to the aid of the other when attacked by Serbia—a lack of power balancing that certainly encouraged the latter in its efforts toward irredentism.

The fourth and final proposition bears on regional and global integration: the more integrated the target-state, the greater the likelihood of ethnic conflict escalation as a form of "backlash" against rapid and intimidating change. This proposition would seem to be supported by the Serbian case, but with a twist: The collapse of the Soviet empire at the end of the 1980s opened up Eastern Europe to rapid change, including market forces, and the resultant period of largely unsuccessful economic restructuring did nothing to encourage political stability. The interesting twist, as noted above, concerns the target states of Croatia and (especially) Slovenia. These prosperous regions had wanted out of Yugoslavia for

Serbian irredentism, in addition to the obvious matter of ethnic retrieval, must have been the latter's plans for significant income redistribution if the secessionists could be brought back into the federation. Thus, paradoxically, economic shocks played a role in the escalation of ethnic conflict, but as a mechanism reinforcing irredentism by a relatively poor state against those deemed wealthier and more privileged. Thus the hypothesis works for the Serbian case, but only if the roles of target- and intervening state are reversed. The Somali case, by contrast, appears independent of either global or regional forces of integration. Events in East Africa in the late 1970s (i.e., at the time of the most intense interventionism) took place at a time where both Ethiopia and Somalia continued to be on the periphery of the economic world.

Conclusions and Further Research

This chapter attempts to explain why ethnic ties produce bellicose foreign policies in some cases but not others. With this in mind, we have set out a model to explore systematically the ways in which two domestic characteristics in particular may be expected to influence foreign policy formation. The model introduces variation in institutional constraints and ethnic composition and yields four distinct foreign policy predictions in the General Intervention Hypothesis vis-à-vis co-ethnics in neighboring states. The three observations contained within the case studies of Yugoslavia and Somalia offer tentative support to the GIH's predictions about Type I_a and II_a states.

Evidence from the Somali case suggests that ethnic uniformity and low institutional constraint represent a dangerous combination. This is evidenced by the aggressive irredentism of Said Barre's military government in the 1970s, which acted without constraint by any wide spectrum of popular opinion. Ethnic interventionism also can arise with high institutional constraints, but it is sporadic in nature. Somalia from independence through the 1960s, and post-communist Yugoslavia, demonstrate this point. Leaders from both states pursued interventionism on behalf of co-ethnics abroad, but not with consistency.

This chapter represents only an intermediate stage in the study of the internationalization of ethnic conflict in general and interventionism in particular. Further research is needed to produce and test a model of ethnic interventionism that includes characteristics of potential interveners and targets, along with system-level factors. For example, what role might geography play? Does the concentration of the ethnic group matter? Specifically, is intervention more likely when the ethnic enclave is contiguous to the potential intervening state? Questions such as these await further investigation.

With particular reference to this chapter, it should be noted that two of the types from the model—low-constraint, diverse states (I_b) and high-constraint, diverse states (II_b)—have not as yet been introduced into empirical analysis. These types should be investigated in order to see whether the interaction effects based on ethnic domination versus diversity, as put forward by the model, really are in evidence. In sum, the study of ethnic conflict continues to present many

as a high priority in such a troubled world.

Notes

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1. With respect to definition, an ethnic group is ascriptive and exclusive; its continuity depends on the maintenance of a boundary based on values and identity (Barth 1969: 14). Each ethnic group within a state is identified on the basis of one or more of six criteria: race, kinship, religion, language, customary mode of livelihood and regionalism (Rothschild 1981: 86–87; see also Horowitz 1985; Connor 1987; Esman 1994: 16; Kaufman 2001: 16; Ross 2001: 73 and Wieland 2001: 208). For an interesting treatment of the idea of an ethnic group as a "concept of action," with religion in at least some instances as the "ethnicenter," see Wieland (2001: 207, 212–13).
2. This point is made at a more general level with respect to ethno-religious conflict by Fox (1999: 431): "the field still lacks a comprehensive, dynamic and especially testable theory."
3. During the Cold War, when superpower bipolarity shaped the international political system, the dangers of intervention and the tendency for peripheral conflicts to acquire an East–West dimension militated against overt involvement by major powers or clients. On balance, however, it may be inaccurate to assign too much importance to the elements of order within the Cold War as a dampener on ethnic strife. Many crises, for instance, took place during the so-called long peace between the United States and USSR after World War II (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1991).
4. Brown's (1996a: 14) excellent review identifies four categories of factors: structural, economic/social, political, and cultural/perceptual.
5. As Zartman (1997: 13; see also Saideman 2001b) points out, "some external parties may well have an interest in continuing the conflict, and others may have an interest in one side in the conflict."
6. For a parallel but somewhat conflicting discussion of ethnic heterogeneity and political competition, consult Saideman (2001b: 25–26).
7. For an exhaustive listing of the kinds of activities in which mediators can and do engage, see Kaufman (2001: 40–41).
8. Alvarez (2001: 26), however, sounds a more skeptical note: "recent examples [such as Rwanda] illustrate the continued unwillingness or inability of the global community to actively address itself to the problem of genocide." See also Kaufmann (1996: 136).
9. Five observations are classified as support for both the host-state and secessionist state or neither, that is, ambivalence or neutrality (Saideman 1997: 747).
10. In seven observations the potential intervening state is deemed to have ethnic ties with both the secessionists and the host-state. In these instances, four intervening states support both or neither, one supports the secessionists and two support host-states (Saideman 1997: 748).
11. One issue to consider at this point is that ethnicity is multifaceted, as noted at the outset of this study, so it might seem inappropriate to view ethnic ties as "all or nothing." In practice, however, this dichotomy is likely to be relevant. Kaufman's (2001: 28) analysis of symbolic politics in cases of ethnic conflict reveals that people respond to the "most emotionally potent symbol evoked." Symbols have both

thinking, as opposed to a more nuanced approach toward designation of ethnic status. A compelling example of this kind of cognitive processing is provided by Saideman (2001b: 111): "the Serbs, for the past hundred years or so, have considered anyone who converts from Christianity to Islam to have not only changed their religion, but their race as well."

12. The four boxes represent ideal types of states for purposes of illustration; it is understood that not all states fall neatly into these categories.
13. Consider the case of Germany which, because of its relative ethnic uniformity, traditionally acted on territorial-irredentist impulses (i.e., Danzig, the Sudetenland) with relatively little internal opposition. Germany's remarkable postwar economic recovery also can be traced, at least in part, to the ability of its leaders to build a consensus around fundamental political issues.
14. A model that combines macro- and micro-level factors into an overall explanation of ethnic intervention is beyond the scope of this study. Efforts in that direction, along with data-based evaluation, are in progress (Carment, James and Taydas 2002). For an impressive example of a combined macro–micro model that explains system transformation, see Kaufman (1997).
15. At this time Slovenia had yet to gain recognition as an independent state, but German recognition essentially was in place by December 1991, before the European Union's (EU) agreed-upon time of January 1992. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the autonomous actors are regarded as states in the *de facto* sense of the word.
16. For a more complete description of clan structure in Somalia, consult Saideman (1998).
17. Extensive evidence supported the Ethiopian position in the conflict. First, previous treaties, conventions and agreements had been ambiguous, confusing and ineffective. Second, the Somali case lost much of its edge after the Republic signed (along with 33 other African states) the Charter of the OAU in 1963. Ethiopia had taken the lead in creating the OAU, affirming its position as leader of African decolonization and independence and denying Somalia the opportunity to find broad African support for its territorial claims (Henze 1991).
18. Somalia's lack of intervention at this time on behalf of Somali co-ethnics in Kenya and Djibouti creates a puzzle when contrasted with the persistent efforts directed toward recovery of the Ogaden region. The most likely explanation here is threefold: (a) Ethiopia posed a better target at the time in terms of power-related considerations; (b) failure in the Ogaden prohibited further efforts toward irredentism as a result of internal disarray and reduced capabilities; and (c) the ruling elite's power base did not represent those with ties to Djibouti and Kenyan Somalis.

CHAPTER 3

Modeling the Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland and South Africa

Neal G. Jesse and Marc V. Simon

Prologue: The Difficulties in Predicting the Internationalization of Conflict: A Comparison of Northern Ireland and South Africa

Northern Ireland and South Africa are two of the longest and most notorious examples of ethnic conflict. The Catholic and Protestant communities of Northern Ireland, tied together under British rule institutionalized in 1920, have fought continuously. The conflict has not only been destabilizing for Northern Ireland, it has also been a constant source of trouble for the British government and has attracted the attention of prominent countries such as the United States. The 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement seeks to end the sectarian hostility and put into place a local government supported by both communities. What is interesting is that despite the length and severity of violence in Northern Ireland, the conflict has been contained within the borders of the United Kingdom. Conversely, the ethnic conflict in South Africa has both drawn in a number of international actors, ranging from other nation-states to the United Nations to international organizations such as Amnesty International, and spilled over into neighboring African countries. From its colonization by the British until the establishment of majority rule in 1994, South Africa was ruled by a White minority that constituted less than one-fifth of the entire country's population. During that time the Black population (roughly 70% of the population) struggled without fundamental political, civil, legal or economic rights. The separation of the White and Black communities, enshrined in the legal centerpiece of Apartheid, and the government's brutal repression of Black demonstrations eventually turned South Africa into an international pariah.

The conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa are similar in two respects. Both are the product of colonization and both occur within a developed country. What explains the difference in the internationalization outcomes of these two ethnic conflicts? Why did the long-running tension between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland not spill out beyond its border? How did the Black population of South Africa manage to draw in

diffuse the conflict through military aggression?

We outline this chapter in the following manner in order to address these questions. In the first section we present a broad overview of models that scholars have utilized to study diffusion and escalation in ethnic conflict. We draw from these studies a set of general predictions about the role of the state structure, the intervention of NGOs and IGOs, the shifting balance of ethnic power and globalization. In the second section we relate the deductions from the models to the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa. We show how models can help us explain the difference in outcomes in the two cases. Specifically, we examine how in Northern Ireland the ability of Great Britain to deter foreign involvement, particularly from NGOs and IGOs, effectively capped any substantial diffusion or escalation. On the other hand, the government of South Africa participated in the diffusion of the conflict, primarily through warfare with neighboring countries, thus drawing in NGOs and IGOs and leading to greater escalation. In the last section of this chapter we provide concluding remarks regarding the general applicability of models and possible ways to refine them in the future to better understand diffusion and escalation in ethnic conflict.

Section I: Models of Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict

A vast literature of theoretical models of civil conflict, mobilization, intervention, escalation, contagion, and diffusion exists in the subfields of both international relations and comparative politics. In addition, statistical and other studies of civil conflict have yielded insights that apply well to ethnic conflict. In this section we review many of these models and findings and discuss their implications for the four frameworks outlined in chapter 1 of this volume.

Escalation and Diffusion of War

Schelling's (1966) classic research on escalation, as well as Smoke's (1977) elaboration of this work, identifies two important processes that are applicable across all conflicts. Escalation has a rational or strategic element; it occurs as the result of moves and countermoves, as actors engage in overt or tacit bargaining over the costs of conflict that they are willing to bear. Actors engage in threats and promises, and struggle with the issues of credibility and commitment. The other component of escalation is the less rational action–reaction process often portrayed in the brinkmanship analogy, where adversaries in a boat begin rocking in an attempt to influence the other. As the boat rocks higher and higher, it becomes more uncertain whether the next one who rocks the boat will cause it to overturn, drowning both people. So each rational decision to escalate a conflict also threatens to create an action–reaction process that may lead the conflict to spiral out of control. The risk of uncontrolled escalation certainly applies to ethnic conflicts, which can spiral to genocidal levels or spread to engulf more states.

conflict into two parts (see Siverson and Starr 1991). First, variation in the type and frequency of interaction opportunities can increase or decrease the likelihood of internationalization. Second, the decision process by which people make choices can lead to internationalization. In short, actors must have the opportunity and willingness to intervene (escalate) or to make a conflict spill over (diffuse). Statistical findings show that interaction opportunities are important. Siverson and Starr (1991: 58; Starr and Most 1976) show that diffusion is dramatically more likely when a state has a "warring border nation" or "warring alliance partner." Henderson's (1997) study shows that even if there is not a common border, ethnic and religious linkages between groups in different countries increases the chances of war escalation or diffusion. For example, it is clear that the Irish American community has played an active role in promoting the Irish Republican views in the United States. From early Irish American support of Fenianism to the senior Irish American politicians known as the "four horsemen" of the 1970s to the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) to President Clinton's involvement and beyond the ties of identity between the Irish and Irish Americans have provided the potential for an enormous escalation of the conflict.[1]

Thus, building on framework 4, which emphasizes interaction opportunities, we can conclude that the proximity of an ethnic conflict to other ongoing conflicts increases the likelihood of escalation and diffusion.[2] And consistent with framework 2, we can predict that the stronger the linkages between the actors in the ethnic conflict and other actors in the regional or global system the greater the likelihood of internationalization.[3]

Intervention into Civil Conflicts (Escalation)

Scholars who have studied instances of military intervention by one state into the civil conflict of another state (e.g., Mitchell 1970) have tended to examine factors in the target that attract intervention (the focus of frameworks 1 and 3), factors in the intervener that lead it to intervene, the linkages between groups in the target and the intervener (framework 2), and factors related to the international system (framework 4).[4]

During the Cold War, most research in this area focused on the role of the superpowers as the major interveners (Kolko 1969; Pearson 1976; Vasquez 1985; Spechler 1987; Tillema 1989). Other scholars examined system-level questions such as the changing likelihood of intervention during periods of the hegemonic cycle (Raymond and Kegley 1987), or the effect of alliances on intervention (Kaplan 1964; Siverson and Starr 1991). The link between domestic groups and interveners was also part of many studies (Mitchell 1970; Rasler 1983). Since the end of the Cold War, the perception that factors in the target-state are important has increased.

Statistical studies of factors in the target-state have produced an array of findings (Rasler 1983). These include the following: the economic development level of the target has no influence on the probability of intervention (Gurr and

effect on the likelihood of intervention (Pearson 1974b); civil conflict increases the probability of intervention (Gurr and Bishop 1976; Weede 1978); interveners are more likely to support the target government rather than opposition groups (Pearson 1974a,b); intervention increases the intensity and duration of the conflict in the target-state (Gurr and Duvall 1973; Pearson 1974a; Rasler 1983); and intervention tends to increase government repression against opposition group (Pearson 1974a).

For ethnic conflict, we can conclude that the existence of an ethnic conflict will tend to attract intervention (escalation); and that if intervention occurs, it will tend to prolong the conflict and lead to greater human rights violations. Interveners may tend to favor the government, but this might be an artifact of the Cold War period of these studies.

Framework 1 (weakened state structures) and framework 3 (changes in the ethnic balance of power) offer ways to think about how factors in the ethnic conflict lead to escalation and diffusion. We note that the incentives for internationalization portrayed in these frameworks fit with older ideas. For example, Rosenau (1964) suggested that the international consequences of internal wars are greatest when uncertainty about those conflicts is high—thus they are greater near the end of fighting, and less during periods of stalemate. Weakened state structures clearly bring about such uncertainty as well. Modelski (1964) notes that the losing side in a conflict has greater incentive to appeal for external aid; shifts in the ethnic balance of power are likely to generate such appeals.

Formal Models

Scholars have used different types of models to formalize conflicts so that they can make generalizations about their process. For example, "dynamic" models help to identify periods when uncertainty is high, stalemates exist, or one side is on the verge of losing. Game-theoretic or "strategic" models help explain the incentives that lead individuals, ethnic groups, or governments to make decisions that might internationalize a conflict.

Dynamic modelers (e.g., Jackson et al. 1978; Tsebelis and Sprague 1989; Karmeshu and Mahajan 1990; Simon 1994, 1999) examine the changing levels of hostility in a conflict over time, much as a biologist might examine the changing levels of predator and prey populations of animals over time. The search for patterns using this approach has yielded some basic insights. First, it is possible for an ethnic or other civil conflict to exhibit a cyclic rise and fall of hostility over time, so we cannot conclude that a short-term escalation by one side will continue to spiral out of control—or that the side that appears to be "winning" the conflict at the moment will win in the end.

The pattern of the conflict depends on underlying factors related to the state and opposition groups in conflict. Key factors include the general level of discontent, the size of populations that can potentially be mobilized, and the extent to which each actor is "hawkish," that is, its tendency to respond with aggression to a provocation by its opponent. Dynamic modelers believe that events can

levels that make a stable conflict become unstable, and thus increase the likelihood of internationalization (Granovetter 1978; Salert and Sprague 1980; Denardo 1985).

Strategic models help us understand when and why individuals and groups decide to participate in ethnic conflicts, and thus why they escalate and deescalate over time. These models can therefore tell us a lot about the underlying factors that affect a conflict pattern. An understanding of these models requires a look at the mobilization literature.

Mobilization

A central question in any civil conflict is how to overcome the disincentives that exist for individuals to participate in such a risky activity. The free-rider problem is pervasive: potential rebels must ask, "Why should I fight for change and risk injury, prison, or death, when I can let others fight and still get the benefits if they succeed?" Scholars of revolution have examined this collective-action problem from a variety of perspectives. Their use of strategic, game-theory, and related models have yielded many insights that can be applied to ethnic conflict.

The prisoners' dilemma game is a practical tool used to understand the collective-action problem. In this game, two people commit a crime, such as a bank robbery. The police capture the two suspects, and interrogate them in separate rooms. Each is given a choice: confess to the robbery and testify against their partner, and they will go free. If they keep quiet and their partner testifies against them, they will get 20 years in prison. The suspects also know that if they can both keep quiet, the police can send them both to jail for only 1 year on a minor charge for possessing an illegal weapon. If both confess, they get 10 years in jail, since they have both cooperated with police and a trial is avoided.

Each suspect must decide what to do without communicating with the other. The question of trust is paramount. Each asks, "Can I trust my partner to keep quiet?" Because trust is in doubt, each is tempted to act on self-interest. The nature of the game gives each an incentive to testify against the other. This is because no matter what the other does, you are always better off confessing. If your partner keeps quiet, you go free, instead of spending a year in jail. If your partner testifies, you go to jail for 10 years instead of 20. Since both suspects face the same incentives, the police are likely to be successful in obtaining two confessions. Thus the suspects each spend 10 years in prison, whereas they could have spent only 1 year each had they cooperated with each other. However, each prisoner was afraid of being the "sucker" who kept quiet while the other testified.[5]

In the context of collective action, players have the choice of cooperation by joining a rebellion, or being a free-rider by refusing to participate. The problem for those who want to mobilize people to participate in ethnic conflict is that the situation has the same incentives as the prisoners' dilemma game. This makes people choose to be free-riders. Thus an ethnic group that faces a threat must overcome these disincentives—or solve the prisoners' dilemma/free-rider problem—in order to recruit.

ethnic group, and here the model predicts increased conflict. If the game is being played not by individuals but by two ethnic groups, each ethnic group faces a choice of compromise or fight. Each fears being the sucker who compromises while the opponent fights; thus each chooses the path of confrontation, which intensifies the ethnic conflict. However, in order to carry out the confrontation, the leaders of each ethnic group must mobilize followers, and therefore must solve the individual level free-rider problem.

Solutions to the prisoners' dilemma game/free-rider problem focus on finding ways to convince people that they are not going to be the sucker (who joins while nobody else does), or that they are not better off being a free-rider (who lets others do the fighting). Mark Lichbach (1995) provides the most comprehensive treatment of solutions to this general collective-action problem. Most of the dozens of solutions he identifies relate directly to our four frameworks, and thus affect escalation and diffusion. One of Lichbach's most important insights is that one can view an ethnic conflict as a struggle between groups that are each trying to solve their own collective-action problem while exacerbating that of their opponent. Therefore, it is useful to consider how our four frameworks are related to these solutions to the free-rider problem. For space considerations we list and discuss only seven general solutions:

1. Raise the value of cooperation. Give those who participate something more than those who don't—use what we call "selective incentives" for joining or cooperating. Incentives can be tangible—like jobs, additional pay, or food; or intangible—like greater prestige within the community.
2. Raise the costs of not cooperating. Impose punishments on those who do not participate. One way this can be done is to create a higher authority with the power to enforce laws or contracts. So you pay fines, face violence, or go to jail for not paying taxes or evading military service.
3. Build trust. Win the hearts and minds of those you are asking to join by making and keeping promises, refusing to take advantage of them when you easily could, by getting cooperation on smaller issues before asking for help on bigger ones.
4. Increase the probability of winning. When the chances of winning the conflict are remote, few people want to take the risks of joining. When it looks like victory is possible, people are more willing to jump on the bandwagon. Both sides try to convince potential recruits that victory is coming soon.
5. Increase the probability that an individual can make a difference. Asking people to join because of the specific skills and talents that they can contribute is often more effective than asking for general help.
6. Emphasize common values and ideology. Emphasize shared ethnic, religious, political, cultural values or ideologies when asking people to join. Use unifying symbols (flags, anthems, rituals) to get people to identify with the cause of the movement.
7. Create a crisis. This follows from the economic idea that making the collective good scarcer will increase demand for it. For example, intense attacks by one ethnic group make it more crucial that the other group pulls together

group vulnerable will encourage people to join that group. Crises often create deadlines that help as well; one can ask people to "join now before something really bad happens."

The Relation of Models to the Four Frameworks

Now we examine how these solutions, as well as the other factors discussed in the intervention and modeling literature reviewed earlier, relate to the four frameworks for understanding escalation and diffusion in this volume. First, weakened state institutional structures where there had been a preexisting ethnic contract will exacerbate the state's collective-action problem while ameliorating that of a challenging ethnic group. People will be more willing to join the rebel group and less certain about joining the state because the probability of winning has changed. Also, the state will be less capable of delivering rewards and punishments in order to recruit followers, and it may lose trust among its followers. This may also create a crisis atmosphere that could help both groups recruit. However, the overall effect is to help the challenging ethnic group. This change creates more uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, and gives the state, which fears it will lose more incentive to seek help from an intervener. Thus escalation is more likely. If the state does not represent one ethnic group but has kept the peace between competing ones, each competing ethnic group now has a greater ability to recruit followers, and also incentive to ask for help from outsiders in order to avoid being the "sucker" that compromises while the other side fights. Again, escalation is more likely.

Second, the role of NGOs and IGOs in reducing state sovereignty and empowering domestic actors can exacerbate the collective-action problem of both ethnic groups and the state. Human rights NGOs may, by their monitoring activity, reduce the ability of the state and ethnic groups to coerce people into joining its security forces. Humanitarian NGOs, by providing food and aid, make it more costly for belligerents to recruit followers using selective incentives. NGOs can often recruit local supporters precisely because they are able to offer individuals the opportunity to make a difference; this leaves fewer people for others to recruit. When IGOs provide peacekeeping troops or security, this defuses a crisis atmosphere and increases the supply of the collective good of security, making it harder to recruit. Overall, then, NGO and IGO involvement will tend to reduce escalation and diffusion. However, because the IGOs and NGOs put many foreign nationals in a dangerous situation, escalation to protect them may be more likely. Also, because NGOs and IGOs increase interaction and information flows with neighboring ethnic groups, diffusion might become more likely, particularly if a crisis is perceived to exist.

Third, any changes to the ethnic balance of power that could affect the distribution of resources will directly affect the ability of the affected parties to provide rewards and punishments to recruit followers. In addition, to the extent that the change makes one group stronger and another group weaker, it will affect perceptions about the likelihood of victory, further helping the stronger group.

if this group is supported by the government, it is more likely to receive such help. Thus escalation is more likely.

Fourth, the degree of economic, social, and cultural integration within the regional or global system must be analyzed as to its effect on resources and identity in order to understand its effect on mobilization. In terms of identity, ethnic groups already possess the advantage of common values, ideology, and culture that makes it easier for them to recruit followers. If the country is becoming more penetrated by globalization, or more integrated in the global system, this tends to threaten some of the values and ideologies of some (traditional) ethnic groups. This threat allows the groups to use their common ethnic values and ideology to more efficiently recruit supporters. It also allows ethnic groups to increase the distrust of those connected to the foreign penetration—often people connected to government or industry. This makes it more difficult for the state to recruit from among the traditional ethnic groups, which can weaken the state's institutional structures and lead to escalation as described in framework 1. Also, globalization increases the interaction opportunities with potential interveners, making escalation more likely. However, globalization creates domestic winners and losers in terms of economic resources. If the government wins in this area, it has resources to provide incentives and punishments to maintain its support. Thus the effect of globalization depends on the balance of these two factors—the increase in resources versus the increase in ethnic identity. If these effects are out of balance, one side will be strengthened and the other weakened; this can change the ethnic balance of power, and produce diffusion and/or escalation as in framework 3.

To summarize, models of the internationalization of ethnic conflict predict that a weakening state structure (framework 1) should lead to an increase in escalation, the involvement of NGOs and IGOs (framework 2) should lead to a reduction of diffusion and escalation, a change in the ethnic balance of power (framework 3) should lead to an increase in diffusion and/or escalation, and globalization/regionalization (framework 4) does not necessarily lead to an increase in diffusion or escalation, but could if gains/losses in resources are not balanced with corresponding gains/losses in identity.

Section II: Relation of Models to Northern Ireland and South Africa Case Studies

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland was torn by ethnic violence even before it gained the name of Northern Ireland. After French consolidation of the European Continent in 1540, English expansion turned from Europe toward Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Settlement of Ireland by English and Scottish settlers was rapid. "By 1641 Protestant settlers owned 41 percent of the land in Ireland and held a majority of seats in both house of the Irish parliament" (Ruane and Todd 1996: 20). The victory of Cromwell over the Irish in 1640 led to the confiscation of

Catholic supporters of James II. The Catholic population receded into that of a peripheral nationality on its own island.

A Catholic revival in the nineteenth century led to calls for Irish independence. Prior to World War I, Irish republican political struggles created what the English parliamentarians called the "Ulster crisis." In short, a discussion of whether Ireland should have Home Rule was debated on both sides of the Irish Sea. A small group of Republicans felt that the outbreak of World War I offered an opportunity to strike at British rule while the British were occupied on the European continent. The 1916 Easter Rebellion ended in defeat for the rebels, the British Execution of the republican leaders, and the subsequent turn toward terrorism by the new Irish Republican Army (IRA). The British prime minister, Lloyd George, was forced to adopt a policy of a "police war" in order to combat the republicans.

Britain eventually went to the negotiating table with the idea of partition as a solution to the violence. The idea was for the nine northeastern counties in the historic area of Ulster to remain a part of Britain while the remaining counties, all predominantly Catholic, would be given Home Rule under British dominion. Eventually only six counties in Ulster would be considered for partition and of those six Catholics were the majority in two, Fermanagh and Tyrone, and in the city of Derry. The British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, effectively dividing the north from the south. Negotiations in the remaining 26 counties in the South as to their status eventually led to Home Rule, a civil war, and eventual development of a new constitution and republic in 1937 (Moody and Martin 1967; Ruane and Todd 1996; Coakley and Gallagher 1999).

During this early period the conflict in Ireland did not diffuse outside of British territory. Britain contained the crisis to the Irish Island. But with the formation of the Republic of Ireland as an independent state and Northern Ireland as a part of Great Britain, the tensions in Northern Ireland could easily have become international (i.e., because Ireland had become a separate nation from Britain and Northern Ireland).

Trouble in Northern Ireland brewed for decades and flared up again in the late 1960s and was at its worst in the early 1970s. The sectarian violence inherent in such incidents as New Year's Day 1969 and Bloody Sunday 1972 exposed the continuing conflict between the Irish Catholic community and the British Protestant Community. The Chief Constable's Office in Northern Ireland reports that from the years 1969 to 1996 there were 3,212 fatal casualties from sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.[6] Roughly two-thirds of these fatalities were civilians. The greater part of the violence occurred from 1972 through 1976, or the time of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland. An average of over 200 civilians and more than 60 security officers (both military and police) lost their lives each year during this time. O'Leary and McGarry (1993: 36) figure that the responsibility for deaths from 1969 to 1989 can be distributed in the following manner: republican paramilitaries, 57.7 percent; loyalist paramilitaries, 25.3 percent; and security forces, 11.8 percent.[7]

The enormous violence in Northern Ireland led eventually to the negotiating table. The IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries declared a joint cease-fire in 1994

future of Northern Ireland. Despite a resumption of IRA-bombing in 1996, and the removal of Sinn Fein from the negotiating table, the talks moved forward with the participation of the British government, Irish government, and former U.S. senator, George Mitchell, as mediator. The talks also survived the IRA's new cease-fire in 1997, the re-inclusion of Sinn Fein, and the withdrawal of the Democratic Unionist Party. Eventually on April 10, 1998, all parties to the Agreement signed it.

What is remarkable about the conflict in Northern Ireland is that despite the length of the conflict, there was little to no diffusion of violence outside of the borders of Great Britain.[8] Moreover, there was almost no escalation of the conflict as only the government of the Republic of Ireland intervened, and even then it was a minimalist response, mainly contributing legitimization to the all-party talks preceding the Good Friday Peace Agreement. Former senator, George Mitchell, was there as a member of the U.S. government but he did not represent the U.S. government nor was he under any pressure to put a firm American stamp on the proceedings.[9] Rather, Mitchell's role was as a neutral, non-state related mediator. Neither IGOs nor NGOs intervened in any substantial manner in the conflict in Northern Ireland. The only exception is the Independent International Commission on De-Commissioning (IICD). The Good Friday Agreement specifies the role of the IICD as the main body overseeing the decommissioning of weapons (Wilford 1999: 296).

Northern Ireland also presents an example of the effect that a weakening (and at a different point in time, strengthening) state structure can have upon the internationalization of the conflict. When the Stormont Parliament fell in 1973, Britain reinstated direct rule of Northern Ireland. With the demise of the central (and local) government of Northern Ireland, the existing social contract that bound the Catholic and Protestant communities together in self-governance disappeared. The result was a societal decline into the period of "the Troubles" and a diffusion of the conflict, although not an international diffusion. The period from 1973 to 1998 was one of maximum diffusion of the conflict. The IRA began a bombing campaign on the English mainland and by the 1980s even attempted to kill Conservative prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Yet, this diffusion was only from Northern Ireland to the British mainland. A geographical diffusion occurred, as terrorist activity leapfrogged the Irish Sea and now took place on two islands. But an international diffusion did not occur. The conflict was still within the British nation-state.[10] Moreover, the targets of the IRA actions may have shifted from the Protestant community to the British government and populace, but the political goal was still the same: to force the British government to make concessions to the Republican cause. The main difference is that the IRA was taking the case to the actor who could reasonably make such a concession, that is, the British government.

An eventual reduction in the tension and violence started in the mid-1980s as the British government sponsored a series of conflict reduction negotiations. These negotiations included attempts at a binding agreement (e.g., the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985), all-party talks in 1996, the Mitchell Report (published in 1996) and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The Good Friday Peace Agreement put a new social contract into place. With a strengthening of the state

communities agreed to seek mutual cooperation. To this end the IRA and its political wing Sinn Fein halted their bombing campaign of the English mainland. Diffusion decreased and British intervention into the affairs of Northern Ireland decreased as well.

Northern Ireland is also a good example of the relevance of framework 3 (i.e., a shift in the ethnic balance of power). With the fall of the Northern Irish government in 1973 and a return to direct British rule, the balance of power in Northern Ireland shifted toward the dominant ethnic community, that is the Protestant community. The game-theory models predict that with a centralization of power internationalization would decrease. In fact, once Britain established that it had sole authority in Northern Ireland international intervention ceased. During the period of British direct rule not a single outside state or IGO/NGO stepped in to support the peripheral ethnic community (i.e., the Catholic community). Perhaps the only group to provide any support was the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna terrorist movement from the Basque Country in Spain as there is evidence that the ETA secretly coordinated weapon transfers with the IRA in the 1970s and perhaps 1980s (Irvin 1999).

South Africa

The case of ethnic conflict in the Republic of South Africa is exactly the opposite. Like Ireland, South Africa was colonized by a European power. The Afrikaners, the dominant White minority of Dutch descent, arrived in the seventeenth century and claimed the southern tip of Africa for themselves. The Dutch settlers fought with and eventually overcame the tribal populations of the area in the Kaffir Wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The original settlement at the Cape of Good Hope expanded outward as Dutch settlers (Boers) sought agriculturally rich areas in which to settle.[11]

During the Napoleonic wars, the Netherlands asked the British to protect their colony in southern Africa. Eventually the territory was ceded to Britain. British rule did not sit well with the Boers, leading to the bloody Boer War (1899–1902). The British won the war, but ceded political control of the territory over to the Boers. The National Party, founded in 1914, controlled the government and took a moderate and conciliatory stance toward the British. However, in the 1930s it fell under new leadership and began to pursue a militant Afrikaner nationalist path. The cornerstone of this policy was White supremacy, and its translation into policy became known as Apartheid. The election of the nationalist party to power in 1948 accelerated the disenfranchisement of Blacks, Coloreds, and Indians in South Africa.

The new government set about separating the two largest races. It reserved Bantustans, or homelands, for Black ethnic groups. Through a large number of parliamentary acts, the government excluded all non-Whites from power. Eventually, South Africa became two separate communities: a White community with a democratic government and a separate Black community without basic political freedoms and rights. Economically, South Africa was a rich nation, but

conditions of extreme poverty and depravation.

Internationalization of this ethnic conflict was widespread. Part of the international intervention into South African politics is due to South African military incursions into the rest of southern Africa. The government of South Africa launched numerous foreign policy initiatives outside of its own borders in an attempt to defend Apartheid. As an example, between 1980 and 1985 the Government of South Africa invaded Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Lesotho. The South African government also backed numerous dissident groups that caused serious disruption in Angola and Mozambique, and less serious disruption in Lesotho and Zimbabwe. Still further, the South African government attacked and/or disrupted the railways, roadways, and oil supplies of at least six neighboring countries.[12]

On the other hand, most of the foreign intervention was international reaction against Apartheid. Significant examples include the UN sanctions, EU sanctions, the cultural boycott, and in the 1980s, corporate divestment, and economic sanctions by local governments around the world, and the refusal of international banks to loan money to the South African government in 1985 (Hufbauer and Elliot 1990). Diffusion of the South African ethnic conflict was also prominent. Nelson Mandela made his case against the all-White government to every nation that would hear him and the African National Congress (ANC) presented Mandela's viewpoints around the globe. The ANC openly courted the aid of the Soviet Union before 1989.

The case of South Africa presents an example of how escalation occurs with the introduction of IGOs/NGOs into a preexisting ethnic conflict, an action related to framework 2 and consistent with formal models of the internationalization of conflict. For instance, a critical turning point in the struggle against apartheid came on June 16, 1976. The Soweto massacre and government crackdown on Black demonstrations led to many Blacks fleeing the country and joining the ANC in neighboring countries. This diffusion of the conflict alarmed a number of international organizations. The General Assembly of the United Nations imposed a global arms embargo on South Africa in 1977 and declared Apartheid a crime against humanity in 1984. Demands for disinvestment and sanctions against the South African government intensified in both the United States and Europe. In 1985 many Western banks refused to extend short-term debt to South Africa (Hufbauer and Elliot 1990). So while a number of countries had been imposing trade sanctions on South Africa for decades (e.g., India had been refusing South African exports since 1954; a number of Caribbean states terminated trade in 1960) only with the declaration of the United Nations did most nations reconsider sanctions against South Africa.

In particular, the United States has a long history of arguing against sanctions, and even blocking their implementation. For example, in November 1976 the United States, along with the United Kingdom and France, opposed the Programme of Action Against Apartheid that was supported by over 100 members of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The U.S. position was that negotiation and consultation were preferable to confrontation (Clifford-Vaughan 1978). The American government during the Reagan administration pursued

through the success of the White government both domestically and internationally. Thus, the United States argued against sanctions that it feared would destabilize the White government and possibly lead to further Soviet encroachment in southern Africa. However, under pressure from the international community, as well as domestic groups, the American Congress passed an override of Reagan's veto and put into law the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. The CAAA called for a number of economic sanctions including the banning of American banks from taking any deposits from South Africa.[13]

South Africa also shows the ambiguity of globalization on the internationalization of a conflict. Drawing from framework 4, one would expect that economic ties between the White government and the industrialized world, particularly through the international trade system, would diminish the likelihood of escalation of the conflict. One would not expect industrialized nations that trade with South Africa to become directly involved. In fact, while NGOs and IGOs played a significant role in opposing Apartheid, most nation-states did take some direct action. So, while almost all would say that international pressure on the South African government had a significant impact on weakening apartheid, the exact role of globalization cannot be easily determined. One could say that the reliance of the White Afrikaner on the economic and cultural gains from global trade made the South African government more susceptible to the international pressure. But did this trade dependence lead to any further escalation or diffusion of the conflict than what already existed? The answer is not clear.

It is also not clear how much global norms contributed to the eventual dismantling of Apartheid and the establishment of majority rule in 1994. International economic sanctions certainly limited South Africa's economic growth. The wave of democratization that swept over the world with the fall of communism also contributed to a rising demand for democracy in South Africa. But domestic conditions also played a significant role. Growing protest and unrest in the Black townships coupled with a growing number of powerful voices within the White community pressured the government for reform. The de Klerk government's acknowledgment that change would have to occur and its rescinding of segregation laws, as well as the suspension of armed conflict by the ANC, paved the way for the peaceful transfer of power.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we examined models of the internationalization of ethnic conflict in an attempt to better understand the process of diffusion and escalation. Most of the formal models are at best a simplistic representation of a very complex process. As such, their contribution to the wealth of knowledge on the topic of ethnic conflict will never lead to a final statement or absolute understanding. But given this realization, formal models can provide some insight into the process, particularly the strategic nature of the choice to escalate or diffuse a conflict.

Models of the internationalization of ethnic conflict seem to offer the greatest insight when a change in the structure of the game occurs (framework 1: change

Specifically, the framework suggests that a weakening of the state structure will encourage escalation, particularly from the state. We saw that this occurred in South Africa. We also saw the British government strengthen the role of the state in Northern Ireland in order to reduce diffusion and escalation. The frameworks also predict that a shift in the ethnic balance of power will upset normal interethnic relations, leading to escalation. We illustrated this with the case of South Africa where the rising Black protest movement encouraged international actors to impose economic sanctions on the government. We also illustrated this point by looking at how a resurgent Catholic community in the wake of "the Troubles" emboldened the IRA to seek donations from Irish Americans.

Formal models may not be an appropriate method to understand global processes or norms such as globalization (framework 4: globalization) or when external actors with specific goals are involved (framework 2: participation of NGOs and IGOs). In both cases the role of globalization is unclear. The role of NGOs and IGOs in South Africa is even a bit contrary to the predictions of formal theories. Formal theories predict that the introduction of NGOs and IGOs should reduce escalation and diffusion. In Northern Ireland the participation of Irish Americans (a form of NGO) was not only a form of escalation but probably encouraged further escalation (albeit that escalation did not actually occur). In the case of South Africa we saw the United Nations (IGO) and Amnesty International (NGO) react to the Black protest, but it is not clear whether this had any impact on diffusion or escalation. One could argue that international pressure helped resolve the conflict, particularly by putting pressure on the White government. It is harder to argue one way or the other that it had a substantive effect on diffusion and/or escalation. From this analysis we would suggest that new formal models are needed to address the role of NGOs/IGOs and the role of globalization in the internationalization of ethnic conflict.

Notes

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1. For a good understanding of the role of Irish Americans see Holland (1989).
2. From chapter 1, framework 4 is, "The degree of economic, social, and cultural integration within the regional or global system (especially reinforcing versus cross cutting interstate cleavages between/among ethnic groups)."
3. From chapter 1, framework 2 is, "The role of non-state regional and international actors (NGOs and IGOs) in reducing state sovereignty and empowering domestic actors."
4. From chapter 1, framework 1 is, "The weakening of state institutional structures, particularly where there has been a preexisting 'ethnic contract' " and framework 3 is, "Changes in the ethnic balance of power that have real or potential repercussions in the competition for the distribution of social, economic, and political resources."
5. For general game-theory models, ranging from the introductory to the advanced, please see Ordeshook (1986), Rasmussen (1989), Tsebelis (1990), and Dixit and Skeath (1999).
6. Guelke (1999) reports these figures.

especially that of the twentieth century, is Dixon (2001).

8. Sutton (2004) lists every fatality from the violence, including those killed in Britain, Ireland, and elsewhere in Europe and arrives at a fairly similar distribution of responsibility.
9. Mitchell's official position was "Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Economic Initiatives in Ireland." As Mitchell himself points out, this title was "long and vague enough not to be offensive to the British government, or to anyone else" (Mitchell 1999: 10).
10. An exception to this is the IRA storing of arms across the border in the Republic of Ireland.
11. For cogent accounts of the political history of South Africa see Abel (1995), Alden (1996), Lowenberg and Kaempfer (1998), O'Meara (1996), Thompson (1990), and Waldmeir (1997).
12. An excellent source detailing the diffusion of the conflict related to actions by the government of South Africa is Hanlon (1986).
13. A good source of information on economic sanctions on South Africa is Orkin (1989).

CHAPTER 4

Identities Unbound: Escalating Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan

Shale Horowitz

All of the major post-Soviet ethnic conflicts—those in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan—are directly rooted in the political disputes and events of the late Soviet period. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's regime, ethnic conflict diffused within the Soviet Union in predictable patterns. It sometimes erupted in Soviet Republics with strong reform nationalist movements, where these movements appeared to threaten the future status of ethnic minorities. This was the pattern in Georgia and Moldova. In Azerbaijan, the pattern was similar but reversed. The reform nationalist movement initially developed among the Armenian minority, who were supported by their ethnic brethren in neighboring Armenia. This prompted a nationalist countermobilization among Azerbaijan's ethnic Azeri majority. The Soviet Center intervened in all of these conflicts in a failing effort to preserve its rule.

Where ethnic conflict already existed in the late Soviet period, the Soviet collapse typically led to intensified fighting. The Soviet collapse also created many new states, and thus opened up many more possibilities for foreign intervention ("escalation"). In particular, Armenia and Russia intervened in the fighting in and around Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Russia intervened in Georgia and Moldova. Beyond the immediate post-Soviet period, new instances of escalation and novel outbreaks of ethnic conflict ("diffusions") were rare. The one case of new diffusion and escalation occurred in Tajikistan. Here the Soviet collapse made it more difficult for a neo-communist regime to continue to repress a nascent opposition movement, which was loosely organized around a reform nationalist agenda. The power struggle between neo-communist insiders and reform nationalist outsiders soon metastasized into a civil war along regional and ethnic lines. This war elicited intervention from Uzbekistan, Russia, and various factions in Afghanistan.

What factors best explain this overall pattern of ethnic conflict? It will be argued that the crucial policy choices cannot be understood apart from the regime types that developed in the Soviet Republics and successor states. In particular, the most important distinction was between neo-communist regimes primarily interested

accountable program of national revival and development. Regime preferences and methods were influenced by international ideological trends. Above all, internationally transmitted self-determination ideologies and foreign models of political, economic, and cultural development influenced the content and form of reform nationalist alternatives to the communist or neo-communist status quo.

Policy choices in the service of regime preferences, as well as the responses of affected ethnic minorities, were constrained by the ethnic balance of power. The ethnic balance of power is here taken to include the impact of actual or expected foreign intervention in the conflict. Policy choices were also influenced by the expected consequences of international economic integration. However, the expected cultural and political consequences of ethnic majority or minority self-determination were invariably at least as important as their expected economic consequences. As will become clearer when the case studies are analyzed, it is often difficult to determine the relative importance of expected changes in economic well-being, cultural autonomy and integrity, and political autonomy. For example, if ethnic majority elites successfully lead an anti-communist program of national revival, this involves interrelated economic, cultural, and political goals, and also affects their personal positions. Similarly, if ethnic minority elites fear losing their positions in local or regional government and state enterprise, this threatens all three objectives. The same can be said for the mass support bases of both types of elites. Among neighbors of the former Soviet Union, such as Romania, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, regime type, balance of power calculations, and international models had similar effects on decisions to escalate.

In the first section, this explanation is outlined by setting out the characteristics of the main strategic actors, and then by tracing the decisions of these actors through the typical phases of late Soviet and post-Soviet political development. The second section applies the framework to explain the diffusion, escalation, and termination of ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan.

Theory

The diffusion and escalation of ethnic conflicts are in the first instance explained by state and substate actor choices about whether and how to employ organized violence. These decisions depend on the actors' preferences and capabilities. Such actors also interact strategically. The choice that best accomplishes an actor's goals usually depends not just on their own capabilities, but also on the likely responses of other actors.

Some preliminary points can be made about actor types. First, it is helpful to distinguish state regime types in the very general terms of authoritarianism versus democracy. This is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. However, a basic distinction can be made between highly authoritarian and relatively democratic regime types (See chapter 2). In highly authoritarian regimes, the only preferences that matter are those of leaders and a relative narrow circle of allies and key constituents. Such authoritarian power elites are likely to care more for preserving

ethno-national group. If ethnic conflict is expected to endanger regime survival, and if active pursuit of widely held nationalist objectives makes ethnic conflict more likely, authoritarian leaders are typically willing to sacrifice or compromise the nationalist objectives. In relatively democratic regimes, on the other hand, leaders concerned with staying in power must respond to the preferences of majority coalitions. Democratic leaders may be more "careerist"—deferring to majority preferences and strategic calculation—or they may be more "ideological"—willing to impose their own interpretations of nationalist ends and means even at the risk of losing popularity. Thus, neither type of democratic leader will sacrifice fundamental nationalist objectives to avoid ethnic conflict—unless it is quite clear that the conflict would have self-defeating consequences for the nationalist objectives. These same considerations apply to policy decisions that would escalate or diffuse ethnic conflict.[1]

Second, substate actors must act subject to constraints imposed by state actors. When a state such as the former Soviet Union collapses, the successor states will attempt to impose new sets of rules on substate actors. These may or may not be similar to the Soviet-era rules. With the exception of Russia, which inherited the cores of the Red Army and other large Soviet armed formations, the ex-Soviet Republic successor states began with relatively small police and interior ministry forces. Where ethnic conflicts had already broken out, or where they eventually did break out, militias and paramilitaries tended to form locally, in order to supplement the inadequate forces of the Republic authorities. Ethnic conflict thus made it difficult for new central authorities to immediately disband the locally or regionally based militias and paramilitaries. In such cases, successor states had greater trouble imposing rules on substate actors.[2]

Consider now the four factors affecting the escalation and diffusion of interstate ethnic conflict: (1) weakening of state institutional structures; (2) changes in the interethnic balance of power; (3) effects of international economic, social, and cultural integration; and (4) the increased role of non-state international actors. For purposes of explaining escalation and diffusion of ethnic conflict in the post-communist countries, they can be boiled down to two. Consider the first two factors. The collapse of the Soviet Union weakened state institutional structures that had maintained interethnic peace—largely through the threat of violent coercion. The resulting devolution of power to the successor political units is precisely what caused the basic changes in interethnic balances of power across the former Soviet space. The fourth factor can be considered a specific case of the third factor. In particular, the most important non-state actors were economic actors (actually or potentially) engaged in international trade and investment, and cultural actors having an influence across borders. These are the main non-state agents of international economic and cultural integration. To summarize, the two factors to be considered are: (1) how the collapse of Soviet power, within each of the various successor states, left behind a new balance of power among ethnically related state and substate actors capable of using organized violence; and (2) the impact of international economic and cultural integration on the preferences and capabilities of these newly empowered state and substate actors.

successive phases. The *first phase* was prior to the collapse of Soviet power, but after Gorbachev's glasnost policy eliminated the hitherto overwhelming threat of physical coercion. During this period, there was a diffusion of national self-determination ideologies and related political mobilization techniques. These classic methods of mass mobilization were adapted to the Soviet bloc's local conditions. Partially, this pattern of diffusion was an effect of international cultural integration. However, such ideologies and methods did not take hold with equal force everywhere. Where they did take hold, for reasons specific to the various Soviet Republics, there was often but not always an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict in the *second phase*—after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of sovereign states in the Republics.

Late Soviet-era Republics that were centers of ethno-nationalist agitation tended to have broader political openings. These openings empowered both nationalist mass mobilization, and countermobilization by alienated ethnic minorities. Where nationalist mass mobilization did *not* engender countermobilization by ethnic minorities, the ethnic minorities typically did not strongly resent or fear the political organizations and state authorities representing the dominant ethno-national group. Where ethnic conflicts broke out, Soviet forces intervened on the side perceived to be most loyal to the Soviet regime. Following the Soviet collapse, internal ethnic conflicts intensified. From the outset, neighboring states intervened in these internal conflicts.

Figure 4.1 shows the schematic political pathways hypothesized to account for variation in late Soviet-era diffusion and post-Soviet escalation of ethnic conflict. The typical grievances of reform nationalist movements in the Gorbachev-era Soviet Republics were as follows. The Soviet regime repressed the dominant (or "titular"[3]) ethnic group's language and culture; distorted its national history; destroyed or neglected its cultural and historical monuments; imposed a corrupt and inefficient economic policy that devastated the physical environment; and above all, destroyed or forestalled the political independence and self-rule of the sovereign people (the majority of whom were of course from the titular ethnic group). Often the Soviet regime also stood accused of breaking off chunks of territory regarded as part of the rightful national homelands, and of encouraging immigration of ethnic minorities in an effort to dilute the titular group's national claims in the present and future.

Reform nationalist agendas sought to remedy these grievances. National language, culture, and history were to be restored to their rightful places of primacy. Ethnic minorities were to be allowed their own cultural autonomy, above all in education. But they were expected to become conversant with the language, culture, and history of the titular ethnic group. The planned economy was to be converted to a market economy. Most importantly, the alien and neo-Russian Soviet dictatorship was to be replaced by a democratic and independent state, in which the titular ethnic group would truly control its own destiny.

Although reform nationalist movements developed in some form in all the Soviet Republics, there was considerable variation in the elite and mass followings they attracted.[4] Where elite and mass followings were stronger and broader, such ideologies tended to make strong inroads into the Republics' local communist parties (CPs), which were dominated or at least heavily staffed by



Figure 4.1 Diffusion and escalation of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic conflict.

members of the titular ethnic group. Such ideologically compromised Republic CPs tended to allow greater scope for the activities of reform nationalist movements, and gradually, to internalize and implement portions of their reform agendas. On the other hand, Republic authorities typically confronted weaker reform nationalist movements with indifference, harassment, and repression. Such conservative Republic CP leaderships seemed most concerned with preserving their privileged positions in the status quo political and economic arrangements.[5]

Not surprisingly, ethnic minorities were more likely to feel threatened by stronger reform nationalist movements. The minorities tended to fear two related sets of contingencies. First, they were likely to lose out from the political, economic, and cultural transition. Their numbers would marginalize them under democracy; their often-privileged positions in government and state enterprise

they often faced language laws that would require them to supplement their existing Russian competence with some fluency in the titular ethnic language, or again, possibly risk losing their positions. Second, there was often a fear that such institutional transitions, being implemented by the titular ethnic majority, would be used as levers of active discrimination—imperiling political rights, economic opportunities, and cultural identities. Such fears were greater if the projected titular ethnic political unit had a Soviet or pre-Soviet history associated with such discrimination against ethnic minorities. Hence, stronger reform nationalist movements were often, but by no means always, confronted with strong countermobilization by ethnic minorities. Such countermobilization tended to demand minority self-determination in its region or regions of concentrated settlement. Minority self-determination demands more or less mirrored those of the titular ethnic group in the Republic as a whole. In a form of early escalation, minority countermobilization was often encouraged and militarily aided by the Soviet authorities, which sought thereby to hold the threat of civil war and territorial decomposition over restive titular ethnic groups.[6]

Ethnic conflicts tended to break out in such situations of simultaneous mobilization by the titular majority and one or more minorities. As the titular reform nationalist movement sought to implement its policy agenda through the Republic's central institutions, the minority movement or movements did the same in their regions of concentrated settlement. Violent interethnic clashes typically began in struggles over control of government or state-controlled institutions in regions heavily populated by ethnic minorities. Forces controlled by the Soviet Center often intervened. Where loyal Republic CPs remained in power, Soviet forces struck at titular majority opposition movements and at minority reform nationalist movements. Where Republic institutions were taken over or heavily influenced by separatist reform nationalist movements, Soviet forces backed minority regional autonomy movements against titular majority authorities.

The *second phase* begins with the August 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union (see figure 4.1). Newly independent Republics with strong reform nationalist movements and moderate CPs tended to institute democracies. In contrast, those with weak reform nationalist movement and conservative CPs tended to develop conservative authoritarian regimes controlled by CP elites. The democracies with strong minority countermovements tended to experience continued ethnic conflict. Both democracies with weak minority countermovements, and neo-communist authoritarian regimes, usually saw continued interethnic peace. The exception to this pattern is Tajikistan, where a conservative authoritarian regime faced an opposition challenge with a strong ethnic and regional basis. The resulting conservative-reform clashes soon developed into a complex ethnic and regional conflict. With the Soviet collapse, there were now a much larger number of sources of escalation. Such third-party intervention occurred in all cases of ethnic conflict. With the exception of Tajikistan, however, there was no new diffusion of ethnic conflict—where diffusion is understood in the Soviet-era sense of new autonomy or separatist movements fueling fresh ethnic conflicts. Logically, this makes sense. If there had been good reasons to anticipate the need for such movements to cope with the expected consequences of a

First phase (1987–1991): late Soviet (Glasnost) period
Strong nationalist mobilization, accommodated by Republic Communist Party: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), to some extent Russia.
Weak nationalist mobilization, blocked by Republic Communist Party: other Soviet Republics.
Strong minority (or, in Azerbaijan, majority) counter-mobilization: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova.
Weak minority counter-mobilization: Baltic States.

Second phase (1991–1994): Soviet collapse and immediate aftermath
Democratic regime, with more nationalist government; ethnic conflict occurs: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova.
Democratic regime, with more nationalist government; ethnic conflict doesn't occur: Baltic States.
Authoritarian regime, without strong nationalist preferences; ethnic conflict occurs: Tajikistan.
Immediate escalation: Armenia in Azerbaijan; Russia in Georgia and Moldova; Uzbekistan, Russia, and Afghan factions in Tajikistan.

Third phase (1994–1997): post-Soviet changes
Shifting escalation: Uzbekistan in Tajikistan.

Soviet collapse, the movements would have developed more strongly prior to the collapse.

In a *third phase*, ethnic conflicts already underway might be subject to further escalation or diffusion. In practice, it turns out that "new" or second-order escalation typically did not occur. The primary reason for this is that it had already occurred where it made sense to the relevant actors. That is, anticipating that it either did or did not make sense to try to stay out, interested states intervened at the onset of post-communist ethnic conflicts, or not at all. Those that calculated that it did not make sense turned out to be right. "New" diffusion did not occur for similar reasons. In Republics where ethnic conflict did not erupt initially, it did not erupt later as a result of ethnic conflicts in other countries. Again, this was largely because the relevant groups correctly anticipated that the developing ethnic conflicts in other Republics would not affect their calculations that mobilization for ethnic conflict in their own countries would be counterproductive. Of course, the correctness of these initial calculations, which had the effect of triggering most diffusions and escalations right away, depended on the parameters of the initial decisions remaining more or less unchanged. The development of ethnic conflicts usually did not significantly alter preferences or relative capabilities. Thus there were usually no basic changes in strategic choices determining the extent of escalation and diffusion. To help understand the following case studies comparatively, table 4.1 classifies the Soviet Republics according to the main patterns outlined in figure 4.1.

Case Studies

Azerbaijan

First Phase

In Azerbaijan, late Soviet-era nationalist mobilization began with the Karabakh Armenians, who demanded that their Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region

(SSR). This demand was endorsed by the Karabakh Supreme Soviet and later the Armenian Supreme Soviet, at times when they were still controlled by Soviet-era CP cadres. Small-scale fighting by local armed bands of Armenians and Azeris began in and around Karabakh in late 1987 and early 1988. Local disputes over resources and control of economic and political institutions were intensified by the separatist political ferment. Constituting 75 percent of Karabakh's population and controlling most of its major institutions, the Karabakh Armenians were in a position to begin implementing their separatist program on the ground.

This produced escalating involvement from Armenia, Azerbaijan proper, and the Soviet Center. A series of bloody anti-Armenian riots occurred elsewhere in Azerbaijan. Over about two years, most of the large Armenian minority in Azerbaijan outside of Karabakh fled to Armenia and Karabakh. The Armenian authorities in turn ejected their Azeri minority. Nationalist mobilization in Armenia occurred simultaneously with that in Karabakh. Integration of Karabakh into Armenia was the primary objective of the Armenian nationalist movement. The forerunner of the main opposition nationalist party, the Armenian Pan-National Movement (APNM), was called the Karabakh Committee. The Azeri nationalist movement was weaker. It developed later, almost entirely in response to Karabakh separatism.

The Soviet Center was concerned only indirectly with the Karabakh conflict, as an agent undermining its control over both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani SSRs. Although Gorbachev initially made efforts to mediate the dispute neutrally, he soon threw the Center's weight behind Azerbaijan. This was because the Armenian CP did not seriously resist the APNM's rise and its associated nationalist causes, whereas the Azerbaijani CP was more reliably loyal. The early effort to resolve the dispute by ruling Karabakh directly from Moscow was dropped, and the region was returned to direct Azerbaijani administration. When Soviet forces entered the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, in January 1990, the official pretext was to protect what remained of the Armenian minority from Azeri rioters. But the rioting had ended a full week earlier. The bloody Soviet occupation of the capital—in what came to be known to Azeris as "Black January"—was aimed mainly at crushing the nationalist movement and reinforcing the power of the Azerbaijani CP.

In Armenia, by contrast, leadership shuffles imposed by the Center were never able to turn the Armenian CP into a reliable agent. The May 1990 Armenian Supreme Soviet elections were free and relatively fair, and the APNM actually took over the government in coalition with independents and sympathetic communists. The Armenian CP soon disintegrated as a serious political force. On the other hand, the September 1990 Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet elections were still largely rigged. The main opposition party, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), was only allowed to break through in a relatively small number of urban constituencies.

The more reliable Azerbaijani CP became the Soviet Center's main ally in its effort to maintain control over the South Caucasus region. Once in power, the APNM poured aid into the Karabakh Armenian efforts to establish local control. In late 1990, the Soviet Center supported operations against the Karabakh Armenian forces by paramilitary police units of the Azerbaijani SSR.

by the Center fought alongside Azerbaijani forces in "Operation Ring," a systematic campaign to terrorize and in some cases completely destroy Armenian settlements in and around Karabakh. However, supported by Armenian volunteers and supplies, Karabakh Armenian paramilitaries put up a stiff resistance. This was indicative of things to come.[7]

Second Phase

After the failure of the August 1991 Moscow coup attempt and the collapse of the Soviet Center, Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence. Newly independent Armenia continued to support the Karabakh Armenian forces. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani CP-controlled government under Ayaz Mutalibov hesitated to form a strong central army, fearing that it would become a threat to the government. Mutalibov preferred to rely on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—a loose alliance of post-Soviet states maintaining good relations with Russia—to maintain its borders. This proved to be a grave error. The CIS would not intervene militarily—Armenia was careful also to become a member and was successful in mending fences with Gorbachev's successors in Moscow. Meanwhile, with the Azerbaijani government only mobilizing weakly for the fight in Karabakh, the gap was filled by militias fielded by affected regions and by various political organizations (including the APF).

A succession of Karabakh Armenian victories produced an uproar in Baku. Mutalibov was forced to resign, and the Azerbaijani CP moved to share power with the APF. A few months later, an attempted coup by Mutalibov and the Azerbaijani CP was defeated by demonstrators and APF paramilitaries. A new APF government led by Abulfaz Elcibey took power in May 1992. The new nationalist government was avowedly Kemalist in its ideology—looking to the Turkish variant of the Western model of secular market democracy. Helped by Azerbaijan's internal turmoil, Karabakh Armenian paramilitaries were by this time in complete control of Karabakh.

The new APF regime alienated Russia without earning any significant offsetting support from Turkey and the Western powers. In the early period of his rule, Yeltsin pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, actively dismantling the Soviet Union, and pursuing a noninterventionist policy toward the former Soviet Republics. However, Yeltsin was soon confronted by an entrenched and hostile Russian Supreme Soviet elected under Gorbachev. Yeltsin had been able to defeat the August 1991 coup attempt because the army supported him over the coup plotters. He was well aware that the allegiance of the military would likely be the deciding factor in his increasingly heated conflict with the Communist-dominated Russian parliament. As a result, from mid-1992, Russian foreign policy shifted to secure and maintain a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Republics (excluding the Baltic States).

Turkey and the Western powers were the biggest threats to this Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Most of the peoples of these regions, including the Azeris, spoke Turkic languages and identified themselves as Turkish peoples. Turkey and the West advanced the doctrine of nonintervention, while seeking to stabilize friendly governments with aid and economic ties.

est threat to regional stability, Russia has in practice formed a strong tactical alliance with Iran to block Turkish and Western influence. In the Karabakh conflict, this meant supporting Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians. Armenia was encircled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, heavily dependent on Russian support both to maintain minimum economic ties with the outside world, and to forestall a repeat of the disastrous events during and after World War I. Hence, Russian military planners correctly identified Armenia as the most reliable local base of support for Russian influence. As early as mid-1992, Turkey massed forces on the Armenian frontier and threatened to intervene to stop the Armenian advances. Turkish intervention was deterred above all by Russia's placement of troops across the border alongside Armenian forces.

The new Elcibey government launched an offensive, and Azerbaijani forces made significant advances into northern Karabakh. However, the situation was abruptly reversed when a large Azerbaijani force in northern Karabakh, under Surat Huseinov, withdrew from the front to the nearby Azerbaijani city of Ganja. This was the beginning of a successful coup attempt against Elcibey and the APF, supported by Moscow. A large Russian force remained near Ganja from the Soviet period. The APF government immediately saw the threat and demanded that the Russian force withdraw. This it did, but not before transferring large stores of equipment and ammunition to Huseinov's forces. Huseinov then marched on Baku, and high defense officials in the capital refused to support Elcibey. Elcibey fled, and a deal was struck dividing power between Huseinov and former Azerbaijani CP leader Heidar Aliev.

Aliev was a great political survivor. Reborn as a nationalist democrat in his native Nakhichevan region after being dismissed in Gorbachev's anticorruption campaign, the newly popular Aliev moved into the political vacuum. By late 1994, Aliev had consolidated power by crushing the APF, and by displacing Huseinov and other independent leaders within the Azerbaijani security forces. Meanwhile, there had been massive new military setbacks. Karabakh Armenian forces had consolidated control over the land corridor linking Karabakh with Armenia, and had overrun large swathes of Azerbaijani territory south and east of Karabakh. Over a million Azeris were driven out before the advancing Armenian forces. After a show of resistance designed to provide cover for his consolidation of power, Aliev agreed to a cease-fire in May 1994. His only condition was that he would not allow Russian bases or peacekeepers in Azerbaijan—for fear that the Huseinov scenario might be repeated. Immediately after coming to power, Aliev made an effort to attract Russia away from Armenia. He dropped the oil exploration agreement Elcibey had signed with Western companies. He also reversed the APF policy of distancing Azerbaijan from the CIS. It did not work. Russia correctly recognized that Armenia remained a much more dependent and reliable ally. Russia continued to supply Armenia with arms, ensuring that the early Armenian military superiority remained intact.[8]

No Third Phase

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no new, second-order escalation or diffusion of the Armenian–Azeri ethnic conflict. Further escalation was

its policy to back Armenia, Turkey could not intervene in the conflict without fighting Russia. Hence Turkey continued to be deterred, as it was earlier during the Soviet period. Iran also did not intervene, for reasons to be discussed presently. Further diffusion would most likely have occurred into Georgia, Russia, or Iran. There were large Armenian and Azeri minorities in Georgia. However, neither group had strong past or present grievances against Georgians or Georgian rule. Moreover, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan wanted to jeopardize vital transportation links by destabilizing Georgia in an uncontrollable manner. Azerbaijan might conceivably have supported separatist movements among Muslim minorities in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. However, Azerbaijani leaders did not seriously contemplate such a strategy, because it would predictably have drawn devastating Russian retaliation.

Northwestern Iran is predominantly populated by Azeris.[9] Ethnic Azeri movements and leaders supported Khomeini against the Shah in an effort to gain greater cultural autonomy. Once in power, Khomeini continued to impose a highly centralized regime. Revolutionary Guards brutally crushed Azeri resistance. Needless to say, Iranian leaders were not pleased when APF leaders, starting in the late Soviet period, began to speak publicly of reuniting "Northern" and "Southern" Azerbaijan—the Azerbaijani SSR and the northwestern provinces of Iran (Shaffer 2000). This threat is the principal reason for Iran's tactical alliance with Russia, and for its tendency to support Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan. Iran only intervened once in the Armenian–Azeri conflict. Its troops temporarily crossed the Azerbaijani frontier in order to keep open a corridor for Azeri refugees to flee east into unoccupied Azerbaijan, rather than south into Iran. This prevented a large and possibly destabilizing Azeri refugee population from moving into Azeri regions of Iran (Croissant 1998: 92–93). Apart from this, Iran was quite happy to see Azerbaijan weakened by Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians, and to see the reformist Elcibey government replaced by the conservative Aliev regime. Here Russia and Iran saw eye to eye.

Summary

The Nagorno–Karabakh dispute had never been "settled." Soviet power had awarded the region to Azerbaijan, but Karabakh and Armenian SSR Armenians had never accepted this as legitimate. Glasnost prompted an immediate separatist mobilization by the Karabakh Armenians, supported by Armenia proper. There was a nationalist consensus on this issue across the entire ideological spectrum. Just as Armenia intervened on the side of the Karabakh Armenians, the Soviet Center, bent on preserving its territorial integrity, soon intervened on the side of the more loyal Azerbaijani CP. After the Soviet Union dissolved, the new Russian state switched sides, convinced that a more dependent Armenia offered a more reliable regional client in building a sphere of influence. Backing Azerbaijan would have alienated Armenia, pushing her into a close alliance with Georgia and the Western powers; at the same time, Azerbaijan's Turkish ethnicity and Persian-influenced religion and culture would in all likelihood have prevented her from reliably entering Russia's orbit. Turkey could not intervene

to intervene, because Russia was already doing her work of weakening Azerbaijan and helping to remove the Kemalist APF regime. Similarly, no further diffusion into Georgia, Russia, and Iran occurred as a result of the Karabakh war. This is because the war did not change the conditions that had prevented such diffusion during the Soviet period.

It was possible to agree on a cease-fire because Armenian forces had won a total military victory, and because Aliev could see that further fighting would endanger his regime—as it had those of his predecessors. However, no political settlement has been reached because of irreconcilable demands. For a while, the moderate Armenian leader Levon Ter-Petrossian was willing to accept a strong form of autonomy for Karabakh Armenians under Azerbaijani sovereignty. But such concessions were intolerable to the Armenian security forces, the Karabakh Armenians, and most of the population of Armenia proper. Ter-Petrossian was removed in a bloodless coup. Since then, the official Armenian position is that Karabakh must have equal sovereignty with the rest of Azerbaijan in a binational state. Such a concession would endanger Aliev's legitimacy, and there is no sign that he will agree to give up Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh. In the future, Azerbaijan may restart the war if Aliev has less cautious successors and if the balance of power changes in Azerbaijan's favor.

Georgia

First Phase

The Georgian nationalist movement formed rapidly, although it remained unusually factionalized. The Georgian CP was internally divided and cautious. It adopted a number of nationalist agenda items, but also attempted, without much success, to restrain and control the popular nationalist organizations. In April 1989, a bloody crackdown on threateningly large nationalist demonstrators in the capital Tbilisi devastated the legitimacy of the Georgian CP and the Soviet system. A new Georgian CP leadership was henceforth much more deferential toward the nationalist movement.

Countermobilization among ethnic minorities was virtually simultaneous with that of the Georgians. There were Armenian and Azeri minorities scattered widely in the South. Three other minorities were concentrated in autonomous regions—Muslim Georgians (Ajarians) in the southwest, Abkhaz in the northwest, and South Ossetians in the north-center. The Abkhaz and Ossetians pursued the most aggressive countermobilizations, and the most serious violence occurred in their autonomous regions.

What distinguished these two minorities from the others? Russian and Soviet migration policies had rendered the Abkhaz a small minority in their own land, and they appear to have taken advantage of a rare opportunity to restore their local predominance. On the other hand, the South Ossetians are relatively recent migrants into Georgia, and appear to have been provoked by the more aggressive stance taken toward them by the Georgian nationalist movement. The other minorities also had the ability to organize separatist movements, but did

threatened by the Georgian nationalist movement, and partially because there were no powerful external backers to encourage them. The Soviet Center encouraged and supported South Ossetian and Abkhaz resistance, as a way of discouraging Georgian separatism. This also provided a green light to local Soviet commanders sympathetic to the Ossetian and Abkhaz causes.

Georgian nationalist parties won the right to participate in the October 1990 Supreme Soviet elections—although regionally based minority parties were excluded. The elections were won overwhelmingly by the main nationalist party, the Round Table-Free Georgia bloc, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The Round Table duly assumed control of the local organs of power in the Georgian SSR. Gamsakhurdia was an emotional, ruthless, and fervently ideological leader, whose rhetoric and activities had done much to antagonize the minorities. Gamsakhurdia moved aggressively against separatist political noises coming out of South Ossetia. Intensified fighting led to large-scale refugee flows—Ossetians fleeing north and Georgians south. Gamsakhurdia made real concessions in an effort to placate the Abkhaz. But Abkhaz leaders felt their national claims to be especially vulnerable, and presumably wondered if and when the fist would come down on them. Meanwhile, Gamsakhurdia was also feuding with the Georgian opposition, and attempting to centralize control over the Georgian paramilitaries that had formed spontaneously in the long period of low-intensity interethnic violence.[10]

Second Phase

By the time of the 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, Gamsakhurdia had made a lot of enemies and alienated crucial supporters. Gamsakhurdia's cautious though not supportive response to the coup attempt was used as a pretext to try to remove him by force. Leaders of his own government, along with much of the government's National Guard, broke ranks and allied with opposition nationalist leaders and paramilitaries. Following dueling mass demonstrations and sporadic violence, Gamsakhurdia was toppled in December 1991–January 1992. The coup leaders brought in Gorbachev-era luminary Eduard Shevardnadze to legitimize their rule.

The military leaders playing the crucial roles in ousting Gamsakhurdia—National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and paramilitary leader Dzhaba Ioseliani—were known to have been at least encouraged by the Russian High Command. Russian leaders had a number of motives for supporting a coup against Gamsakhurdia. They were of course interested in preserving Russian regional influence, to which Gamsakhurdia was adamantly opposed. Much more provocatively, Gamsakhurdia provided rhetorical support for the separatist activities of Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev.

Amid this turmoil, South Ossetia voted overwhelmingly to secede and unify with North Ossetia, within the Russian Federation. Having toppled Gamsakhurdia, the coup leaders turned their guns on the Ossetians. Amid intense fighting, Russian hard-liners threatened to intervene against Georgia, and volunteers from among the Caucasian mountain peoples sought to enter South Ossetia to fight against the Georgians. In June 1992, Yeltsin obtained

took advantage of the diversion to seize local positions of power and declare independence. Soon after, Kitovani's forces were pursuing pro-Gamsakhurdia militias in Western Georgia. Kitovani broadened the offensive by taking the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi in bloody fighting. But the military tide soon turned, largely because of Russian support. Local Russian units, still in place from the Soviet period, provided arms and shelter to Abkhaz forces. Russia also allowed volunteers to enter Georgia to fight alongside the Abkhaz—particularly a large contingent of Caucasus mountain volunteers. With Georgian forces routed from Abkhazia, pro-Gamsakhurdia militias in Georgia made threatening military gains. In order to keep power, the Georgian government was forced to appeal to Russia for aid. In exchange, Georgia had to join the CIS and lease bases to Russia.[11]

Russian leaders supported the Ossetians and Abkhaz not only to establish a sphere of influence in the region. Both minorities had ethnic kin along their borders, among the Caucasus mountain peoples living in autonomous regions of the Russian Federation. If Russia ignored the plight of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, their kin within Russia would presumably mobilize and might become separatist threats. Unlike the Chechens, most of the mountain peoples were not restive (e.g., Kisriev and Ware 2000). Russian leaders wanted to keep it that way.

No Third Phase

There was no further escalation or diffusion of Georgian ethnic conflicts. There was no new diffusion into Russia because the Georgian conflicts did not change the calculations of the various Caucasus mountain peoples. While the Chechens remained hostile to Russian rule, that was not the case for the other peoples. As discussed, Russian policy in Georgia was designed to maintain this status quo, and even to give the ethnic kin of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz new reasons to be loyal to Russia. Moreover, even if Gamsakhurdia's successors had been so inclined, Russian policy had demonstrated that it would be quite dangerous to support or foment separatist movements in Russia. There was no escalation to involve Armenia or Azerbaijan for two reasons. It continued to be case that neither ethnic minority was strongly threatened by Georgian government policies. Indeed, the cautious and experienced Shevardnadze has been far more conciliatory than previous leaders. More importantly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan would be severely weakened if transport and energy links through Georgia were disrupted.

Summary

The Soviet thaw unleashed a strong Georgian nationalist movement, and nearly simultaneous minority countermovements. Soviet forces made an early attack on nationalist demonstrators in Tbilisi, and local Soviet troops openly supported and armed Abkhaz and Ossetian paramilitaries. Following the coup removing Gamsakhurdia, first South Ossetia and later Abkhazia were able to achieve self-rule after defeating Georgian attacks. Locally based Russian troops provided crucial aid, while hard-liners in the Russian parliament and military threatened to intervene on a large scale. This placated Caucasian mountain peoples within the Russian Federation that were ethnically related to the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. The threat of Russian retaliation deterred any Georgian support for

Azeris remained content to preserve the status quo in Georgia.

Fighting stopped once the Abkhaz and South Ossetians had achieved their goals of winning de facto statelets. Ongoing Russian protection and a weak Georgian state make renewed warfare unlikely for the foreseeable future. However, a political settlement is equally unlikely. The Abkhaz and South Ossetians want some kind of recognition of their de facto sovereignty, while no Georgian leader is likely to make such concessions.

Moldova

First Phase

The Moldovan nationalist movement began to form in 1987. By mid-1988, mass political organizations were leading repeated demonstrations advancing the standard list of national revival demands. Although the Moldovan CP leadership was initially hostile, the party itself was divided. While the traditionally dominant Slavic cadres supported the USSR, the large ethnic Moldovan component was mostly sympathetic to the nationalist cause[12] (see figure 4.1). In May 1989, nationalist groups formed the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF). The division within the Moldovan CP was indicated by the September 1989 debate over a new language law. The law made Moldovan the country's official language, although it retained Russian alongside Moldovan as a language of interethnic communication; it also set a 1994 deadline for government officials and state enterprises to develop competence in Moldovan. In Supreme Soviet debates broadcast live on television, amid dueling mass demonstrations by Moldovans and Russified Slavs, the Moldovan CP split along ethnic lines in approving the law. In the February 1990, Supreme Soviet elections, the MPF won about one-third of the seats, and was able to form a governing coalition with like-minded ethnic Moldovan communist deputies. However, by May 1991, amid rapidly declining popularity, the MPF Premier Mircea Druc was unseated by the Moldovan communist deputies, with the support of Slavic deputies. How did this abrupt turnabout occur?

In late 1990, separatist movements gathered force among the Transnistrian Russians and the Gagauz Turks. Russian CP elites, elbowed aside by ethnic Moldovans within the Moldovan CP, proclaimed a "Dniester SSR" east of the Dniester River (this region will be referred to as "Transnistria"). Local Gagauz elites declared a Gagauz Republic in the South. The mass support for these movements was not so much driven by grievances against ethnic Moldovan rule—although the language law raised legitimate fears. In fact, the Moldovan nationalist movement was careful to support cultural autonomy and equal rights for ethnic minorities. What the minorities most feared was the extreme goal of much of the MPF leadership: not only independence from the USSR, but also integration with Romania.[13] Romania was the land of the vicious Nicolae Ceausescu, ruled after 1989 by a neo-communist successor party, the National Salvation Front. Moreover, Romania has an ugly history of intolerance toward its ethnic minorities.

Romania. Apart from Ceausescu and his successors, they had interwar memories of distant, tight-fisted, and corrupt rule from Bucharest. Moreover, they understood that integration with Romania would likely mean civil war with the ethnic minorities, followed by territorial dismemberment. As a result, a majority of ethnic Moldovans preferred Moldovan independence vis-à-vis both the USSR and Romania, while still acknowledging and embracing Moldova's Romanian language and culture. The ethnic Moldovan communist leader Mircea Snegur formed an ethnic Moldovan Center–Left bloc of "Moldovanists." The MPF never held a Supreme Soviet majority. After its minimum Moldovan self-determination and cultural renewal demands were broadly accepted across the ethnic Moldovan political spectrum, its support for Romanian integration made it increasingly unpopular relative to the Center–Left "Moldovanists." This group of mostly rural ethnic Moldovan CP notables, who later formed the Agrarian Democratic Party, pivoted leftward and unseated the MPF ministers in the name of ethnic peace. In this it was of course supported by the ethnic Slavs.[14]

Second Phase

The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow was strongly supported by the Transnistrian Russians. The failure of the Moscow coup did not prevent a "creeping putsch" in Transnistria (Socor 1992a: 8). Having been trained and armed by the locally based Fourteenth Army, Transnistrian Russian paramilitary units consolidated their strongholds in the heavily Russian cities, and then took over police stations, administrative organs, and mass media in towns and villages throughout the East Bank region. This included the predominantly ethnic Moldovan rural areas. Moldovan police and interior ministry units did not strongly resist until Transnistrian forces crossed the Dniester to take Bendery on the West Bank. But supply and direct participation in the fighting was always forthcoming as needed from the Fourteenth Army, guaranteeing Transnistrian victory. Transnistria also controlled the most important transport and energy links from Moldova to the Soviet successor states, and no adequate alternative supply routes could easily be developed in the short run. Recognizing the inevitable, the Moldovan government agreed to a cease-fire in July 1992. This left the local ethnic Russian elite entrenched in Transnistria, and sanctioned the continued presence of Russian forces as "peacekeepers." A similar series of Russian-backed local rebellions put Gagauz forces in control of their main regions of settlement in the South.

Moldovan President Mircea Snegur (elected in December 1991) and the ruling Agrarian Democrats made repeated efforts to end the secessionist movements, offering all manner of concessions short of independence. This worked with the Gagauz, who in 1994 agreed to Moldovan sovereignty in exchange for constitutional guarantees of political and cultural autonomy and of continued Moldovan independence vis-à-vis Romania. The Transnistrian Russians, by contrast, long continued to demand some kind of state sovereignty, so no settlement has been possible. Snegur and the Agrarian Democrats, and their various Center and Center–Left successors, have continued to form the controlling pivot of Moldovan politics. They always had it in their power to restore some kind of

sought to secure Moldovan independence and territorial integrity, preserved democracy, and persisted with market reforms under extremely difficult economic conditions. This is not surprising, given that the support of this group was necessary for the Moldovan nationalist cause to come to the forefront during the Gorbachev period. In other words, there is strong evidence that the ethnic Moldovan reformed communists were and are not merely careerists, but also ideologically genuine nationalists.[15]

No Third Phase

There was no further escalation or diffusion of the conflict beyond what had already occurred in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods. Further escalation or diffusion might have involved Romania or Ukraine. Romanians had strong initial sympathies for the Moldovan nationalist cause, especially once the Russian rebellion in Transnistria got underway. However, their more romantic illusions were quickly dispelled by the ascent of the Moldovanists over the Romanianists. More fundamentally, any military support for Moldova would mean conflict with Russia. Romania's own large minority population—mostly Hungarian—might be roused under such circumstances. Finally, in the early period through late 1992 when active fighting was still underway, the Romanian government was controlled by the strongly "careerist" National Salvation Front. Similarly, during the Soviet period, fear of Soviet retaliation and a desire to stay in power had been the main factors deterring previous Romanian leaders from overtly and actively coveting Moldova. There was no diffusion into Romania because Hungary strongly opposed it, and because Romanian policies did not unduly provoke ethnic Hungarians. Hungary's biggest foreign policy priorities were integration into the NATO and the EU. Peaceful relations with Romania were a necessary condition in both cases. Although Romania's extreme nationalist parties are overtly anti-Hungarian, the dominant parties that controlled Romanian governments have always been careful not to actively discriminate against the Hungarian minority. This was the situation prior to the outbreak of the Moldovan ethnic conflicts, and it remained so afterward.

Similar considerations applied to Ukraine. Ukrainian governments certainly wanted Russian forces withdrawn from Transnistria, and Transnistria more firmly controlled by the Moldovan state. But nothing could be done about it. Ukraine's huge Russian population was concentrated in its heavily industrialized East. It would almost certainly form an irresistible separatist movement in the event of any intervention against the Transnistrian Russians, or any other direct or indirect conflict with Russia. Ukrainian leaders felt lucky merely to have retained their independence and territorial integrity, having already dramatically compromised the usual nationalist agenda in order to placate the Russian minority. Ukrainian governments made these accommodations immediately following independence, and did not budge from them as the conflict developed in Transnistria. Having already acquired such significant privileges and powers, Ukraine's Russian or Russified neo-communist leaders saw no reason to follow the violent separatist path of the Transnistrian Russians. As long as Russian rights in Ukraine were protected and the Russian population was more or less content,

already exist. Again, these considerations were unchanged by the conflict in Transnistria.

Summary

There was no "ethnic contract" in Soviet Moldova, but merely a centrally imposed, quasi-colonial rule of Russian and Russified elites. When Gorbachev lifted the threat of coercion, ethnic Moldovan communists mobilized along with the opposition nationalists for Moldovan cultural revival and independence. International cultural "integration" or trends played a role in this diffusion of the nationalist ideological principle. However, this diffusion would not have occurred so strongly if Moldovans did not feel strong grievances against the suppression of their language, culture, and history. Russia supported the Transnistrian and Gagauz separatist movements for two main reasons. First, local military units on the spot were already involved in the power seizures and low-intensity fighting in the Soviet period, with the approval of a Soviet Center anxious to discourage Moldovan separatism. Later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin government felt dependent on the army and had shaky popular support. The army leaders preferred to back locally based Russian forces out of a mixture of ethnic loyalty, and the combination of self-interest and national interest associated with developing a sphere of interest in the "Near Abroad." Moreover, Yeltsin was not interested in ceding the popular cause of protecting Russians in neighboring countries to the nationalists and the CP. Russia's willingness to intervene was the most important reason that Romania and Ukraine would not intervene. Diffusion to Romania and Ukraine did not occur because of the accommodations already offered to Romania's and Ukraine's minorities, and because Hungary and Russia decided not to initiate separatist movements where they did not already exist. On the other hand, diffusion might easily have occurred had it been encouraged by a Russian regime bent on restoring elements of the Soviet Empire. This in turn might have led Romania and Ukraine to intervene in the Transnistria conflict.

Fighting stopped quickly, once it became clear that Russian forces would support the Transnistrian and Gagauz movements. A political settlement was possible with the Gagauz, because they did not aspire to outright sovereignty. Because the Transnistrian separatists do insist on such sovereignty, no political settlement has been possible in that case. But the status quo is stable because of the overwhelming power advantage of the Transnistrian statelet and its Russian backers.

Tajikistan

First Phase

The nationalist movement developed late in Tajikistan. The first mass demonstrations did not occur until February 1990, when, amid a serious housing shortage, it was rumored that Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan would receive priority in the allocation of new slots. Opposition groups, however, mobilized the discontented behind nationalist goals. Although the Tajik CP made some

block the development and activities of nationalist opposition groups. Thus opposition candidates were not allowed to compete in the March 1990 Supreme Soviet elections, which returned a 95 percent majority for the Tajik CP.

The opposition had three main components: the secular–nationalist Rastokhez (Rebirth) movement and the Tajik Democratic Party, mostly composed of urban intellectuals and professionals; the religious–nationalist Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), mostly drawn from the south-central Gharm region and from Gharmis living in the southwestern regions of Qurgon-Teppa and Kulob; and the regional autonomist Lali Badakhshon, mostly drawn from the linguistically and religiously distinct southeastern autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshon. This was a coalition of convenience among heterogeneous outsiders. The insiders controlling the Tajik CP were also a coalition of convenience. The Tajik CP was traditionally run by clans and personal networks drawn from the northern Khojand region, which is part of the relatively wealthy Ferghana Valley. Among its traditional Soviet-era allies were the ethnic Uzbek minority (23.5% of the population), concentrated in Khojand and in the southwest. This association was related to the traditionally senior relationship of the Uzbek SSR and Uzbek CP vis-à-vis their Tajik counterparts. Southerners often regarded the Khojand region as excessively "Turkified," and the Khojand leadership as excessively deferential to their Uzbek CP counterparts.[16] Finally, clans and personal networks from the southern Kulob region held dominant positions in the Tajik SSR's security forces.[17]

Second Phase

The Tajik CP supported the August 1991 coup attempt. Opposition-led mass demonstrations forced some tactical concessions from the Tajik CP. The partially rigged November 1991 presidential election was won by CP candidate Rakhmon Nabiev. Nabiev duly set about crushing the opposition and eliminating unreliable moderates from important government positions—including the Badakhshoni Internal Affairs Minister and the popular mayor of Dushanbe. This sparked renewed opposition-led mass demonstrations, which coupled educated elites from Dushanbe with Badakhshonis and Gharmis. The government brought in its own counterdemonstrators, mostly Kulobis. Many of the Kulobis were armed by the government, and fighting broke out between the rival demonstrators. When Nabiev sensed that he did not have the complete loyalty of the security forces, he made more tactical concessions—this time agreeing to provide one-third of the cabinet posts and one-half of the seats in a new assembly to the opposition parties. The Khojand elite refused to accept these concessions, and threatened to secede and unify with Uzbekistan. Kulobi elites raised local armies—include many of the armed counterdemonstrators—and attacked opposition-controlled, heavily Gharmi areas in neighboring Qurghon-Teppa. Nabiev was forced to resign by opposition militants. Civil war was at hand.

In the second half of 1992, mostly Kulobi forces, along with significant Uzbek and local Turkic tribal contingents, won the war in the South. After taking control of Qurghon-Teppa, they captured Dushanbe and most of the Gharm region. (There was no fighting in the north, which remained under the control of the

Badakhshoni mountains and across the border into Afghanistan. From these refuges, they continued to fight a lower-intensity guerrilla war. The new president was Imomali Rakhmonov, a Kulobi elected by the conservative Supreme Soviet on the strength of the Kulobi military victory. Rakhmonov immediately set to work eliminating the noncombatant opposition leaders and independent mass media. To the consternation of the traditionally senior Khojandis, however, Rakhmonov also set about packing the positions of power with fellow Kulobis.

In the civil war, Russia and Uzbekistan supported the conservative forces, and a number of warlords and local military commanders in Afghanistan supported the opposition. The most decisive aid was provided by Uzbekistan, which provided bases, training, arms, and crucial air support for Kulobi and ethnic Uzbek forces. Russia was most concerned to prevent the Islamist IRP from coming to power, and to maintain the influence of favorably disposed Soviet-era Tajik elites. Russian forces were mainly used in a partially successful effort to seal off the Afghan border. Iran is most concerned to keep its huge Azeri minority quiet, and towards that end, to maintain good relations with Russia. Hence it has not actively supported the opposition to the Russian-backed regime. Afghan support for the opposition—in the form of training, supplies, and refugees—was of course aimed at bringing the IRP to power.[18] The bulk of the opposition fighters, particularly those based in Afghanistan, were Gharmi supporters of the IRP. Autonomy-oriented Badakhshonis formed the other main contingent. The IRP thus formed the most important part of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which also included the Lali Badakhson and the secular-nationalist parties. Rakhmonov's government succeeded in disarming many of the Uzbek militias that fought alongside the Kulobis in 1992. However, many local military commanders became regional warlords, retaining a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the government.[19]

Third Phase

In late 1993, Rakhmonov dismissed Khojandi Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullozhanov, bringing the Kulobi–Khojandi rivalry into the open. Rakhmonov won a rigged presidential election in November 1994 over Abdullozhanov. The response became evident in 1996. Uzbekistan supported simultaneous mutinies by ethnic Uzbek military commanders. These rebels made threatening advances, and Abdullozhanov held talks with the UTO. As a result, the government felt constrained to make tactical personnel concessions to the rebels. UTO forces took advantage of the opportunity and captured several important towns in the south-central region. It now became clear to Rakhmonov that Uzbekistan, along with the Uzbek field commanders and Abdullozhanov's opposition movement in the North, represented a greater threat than the UTO. At the same time, Taliban advances within Afghanistan toward the Tajik border posed a potential threat to UTO bases.

These changes produced a realignment that has since characterized Tajikistan's politics. Rakhmonov and the Kulobi elite made peace with the UTO in June 1997, following a cease-fire in late 1996. UTO leaders were given cabinet positions, and UTO refugees and fighters were repatriated and integrated. This has

prefer it to continued fighting, even though they retain separate capabilities to revert to the old pattern of warfare. Meanwhile, Rakhmonov's forces have defeated a number of mutinies by Uzbek field commanders. This included the first ever rebellion in Khojand, which was supported by Abdullozhanov. Uzbekistan more or less openly supported these rebellions, leading to heated diplomatic exchanges between Rakhmonov and Uzbekistan's leader, Islam Karimov. Russia has backed Rakhmonov, recognizing that Tajikistan can be used to limit Uzbekistan's influence in Central Asia. More recently, a relatively small Islamist terrorist organization, based in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, formed to overthrow Karimov. This group has been able to operate extensively within and across Tajik territory. (It has continued to operate even after U.S.-backed forces overthrew the Taliban regime, following the September 11 attacks on the United States.) In exchange for Rakhmonov's help containing this new and greater threat, Karimov reduced his support for Rakhmonov's internal opponents and returned to the Russian-led, anti-Islamist regional alliance.[20]

Summary

There was no ethnic conflict in the late Soviet period because the Tajik CP was sufficiently ruthless in controlling a relatively weak nationalist opposition. However, with their Soviet backers in disarray, the Tajik CP leaders had greater difficulty intimidating the opposition—particularly the regionally cohesive Gharmi and Badakhshoni elements. In this second phase, Russia and Uzbekistan intervened to prop up the conservative leaders, just as the Soviet Center would have intervened had the fighting broken out in the late Soviet period. Russia and Uzbekistan both wanted to prevent Islamist inroads, but under the surface they had potentially conflicting objectives. Both wanted to maximize their regional influence; and while Uzbekistan was concerned to forestall Tajik separatism in the Bukhara and Samarkand regions, Russia would support whatever governments and policies would best guarantee her regional influence.

This potential cleavage opened up when, following the victory over the nationalist opposition, the Kulobis unseated the Khojandis. Karimov responded by supporting Rakhmonov's internal Uzbek and Khojandi opponents. Rakhmonov in turn responded by making peace with the UTO, and refocusing his security forces against Karimov's clients. Russia saw that Rakhmonov was her natural ally, and that he could be used to discipline Karimov. In this situation, a fresh Islamist threat has bridled Karimov. So far, Karimov is apparently not interested in jeopardizing his power in a overreaching effort to build a regional sphere of influence and safeguard Uzbekistan's heavily Tajik regions. Similarly, Rakhmonov is more interested in holding his internal rivals at bay than in leading a potentially destabilizing pan-Tajik effort to "regain" Bukhara and Samarkand.

In other words, the present relative stability within and between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is due to the nature of their regimes: both are led by "careerist" elites more interested in keeping power than in acting out risky scenarios of national revival and transformation. This explains both the limited escalation of Uzbekistan's involvement since the Karimov government has fallen out with

not occurred on a significant scale. Similarly, diffusion into Kyrgyzstan is unlikely for as long as its potentially restive Uzbek minority is not roused by support from Uzbekistan proper. While the Taliban remained in power in Afghanistan, it increasingly supported Islamist movements in Central Asia—particularly in strategic Uzbekistan. The weak successors of the Taliban have no ideological or "careerist" stake in providing such support. Iran continues to prefer the status quo to a destabilizing cycle of escalating ethnic conflicts.

Conclusions

Consider again the two basic factors hypothesized to affect diffusion and escalation of ethnic conflict. Diffusion during the Soviet period was feasible due to the Center's declining coercive threat. It was partially motivated and facilitated by international cultural diffusion of national self-determination ideologies and alternative national development models. These ideologies and models influenced both titular nationalist movements and minority countermovements. Majority decisions to undertake such movements, and minority decisions to resist, were affected by the anticipated consequences of international economic integration, which was almost invariably a key goal of strong nationalist movements. However, anticipated cultural and political consequences of titular ethnic self-rule were invariably at least as important.

After the Soviet collapse, Soviet-era ethnic conflicts continued. International intervention ("escalation") occurred immediately where it served the objectives of regimes in power. Democratic regimes were more likely to intervene to support ethnic self-determination of kindred groups, or to preserve their territorial integrity. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes were more likely to intervene or stay out in pursuit of regime survival.[21] With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, all regime types were deterred from intervening where they faced potentially overwhelming threats of retaliation. Again, new post-Soviet ethnic conflicts ("diffusions") were rare. This is because post-Soviet events usually did not change the conditions that made such diffusions unlikely in the first place.

Notes

1. Although authoritarian regimes are more likely to emphasize regime survival, it remains possible that they might strongly embrace ideological objectives. In this event, they are empowered to take greater risks in pursuit of these ideological goals than are democratic regimes, which are more constrained by relatively moderate, median public opinion.
2. Separatist or autonomist movements among ethnic minorities developed in the same way, but usually managed to maintain greater internal cohesion.
3. "Titular," because the Soviet Republics were formed around and named after the dominant ethnic groups.
4. It is beyond the scope of this Chapter to inquire into the sources of variation in the strength of reform nationalist ideologies across the Soviet Republics. Briefly,

period was perceived as setting back a greater national potential. This potential is inferred from the existence of great political and economic achievements in the pre-Soviet histories of the various peoples. In the presence of pre-Soviet "golden pasts," Soviet-era repression, territorial grievances, and ethnic minority threats to territorial integrity tended to be more highly resented (Horowitz 2003).

5. There are two mutually reinforcing factors that explain these differences in Republic CP responses. The first is the extent to which reform nationalist ideologies and movements were able to make genuine inroads in the public, among opposition elites, and within the CP elite itself. The second is the extent to which careerist CP elites were more likely to making accommodating compromises in the face of more popular nationalist movements. In analyzing CP elite responses, is difficult to determine the relative importance of these motives. On the other hand, it is clear that careerism alone should be present everywhere, and so cannot account for variation in the extent to which CP elites were ideologically "converted."
6. However, such Soviet support does not appear to be either necessary or sufficient for the development of strong minority countermovements. Strong minority countermovements only developed where there were strong grievances against past or anticipated policies of political units controlled by the titular ethnic group. Soviet encouragement of minority countermovements, for example in the Baltic States, often fell on deaf ears. Moreover, ethnic minority countermovements were not always reactive. They often organized prior to or simultaneously with the titular ethnic groups. This was the case, for example, with the Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Abkhaz in Georgia, and the Badakhshonis in Tajikistan.
7. On Azerbaijan and Armenia in the late Soviet period, see Alstadt 1997: 116–26; Croissant 1998: 25–47, 69–71, 77–82; Hunter 1994: 26–33, 65–74; Hunter 1997: 442–49; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 28–42; Rutland 1994: 842–55.
8. On Azerbaijan and Armenia in the post-Soviet period, see Alstadt 1997: 127–32; Croissant 1998: 82–97, 107–25; Dudwick 1997: 471–72, 483–93, 501–04; Hunter 1994: 74–95; Hunter 1997: 449–57; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 43–60, 86–91, 122–28; Rutland 1994: 853, 855.
9. Estimates are that Azeris constitute one-quarter to one-third of the entire Iranian population.
10. On the late Soviet period in Georgia, see Jones 1997: 511–22; Nodia 1996ab; Nodia 1998; Slider 1997; Suny 1994: 317–28; Zverev 1996: 26–30.
11. On the post-Soviet period in Georgia, see Billingsley 1998; Jones 1993; Jones 1997: 522–28; Nodia 1996a: 4–8; Suny 1994: 328–33; Zverev 1996: 30–45.
12. In 1989, Moldova's population was about two-thirds ethnic Moldovan. Of the remainder, Russians were 12%, Ukrainians 14%, Gagauz Turks 3.5%, Bulgarians 2%, and Jews 2%. On the other hand, in the Transnistria region east of the Dniester River, Russians were 25.5%, Ukrainians 28.3%, and Moldovans 40.1%. There are also large numbers of Slavs in Western Moldova, particularly in the cities. The Gagauz Turks are concentrated in certain southern regions.
13. Moldovans are ethnically Romanian, and the Moldovan language is a regional dialect of Romanian. Before World War I, Moldova and neighboring, heavily Romanian regions were part of the Tsarist Empire. The regions were ceded to Romania after World War I, but then absorbed by Stalin after World War II. In the interwar period, to pursue the Tsarist territorial claim, the USSR created a tiny Moldovan SSR on the right bank of the Dniester. After World War II, parts of the territory reabsorbed from Romania were grafted onto Transnistria to create an enlarged Moldovan SSR, while other parts were integrated into the Ukrainian SSR. In order to forestall any pan-Romanian movements after World War II, the Soviet government imposed the largely fictional "truth" that Moldovans are really a distinct ethnic group from Romanians, with a separate language, culture, and history.

293–97; King 1997; Singurel 1989.

15. On the post-Soviet period in Moldova, see Crowther 1997: 295–320; King 1994: 297–302; King 1997; Socor 1992b; Socor 1994.
16. In contrast to the other Central Asian peoples, who speak Turkic languages, Tajiks speak a Persian language. In the centuries prior to Russian and Soviet rule, Central Asia was usually ruled by Turks, but possessed a Persian high culture. The main cultural centers, Bukhara and Samarkand, are in present-day Uzbekistan, but continue to have Tajik majorities. It is a major grievance of Tajik nationalists that the Soviets awarded these great cities to Uzbekistan, and that Uzbekistan has undercounted and tried to assimilate ethnic Tajiks.
17. The fractured character of these groupings reflected the extreme backwardness of Tajikistan, in which economic development and urbanization had made relatively limited progress in breaking up regional patron–client networks and identities. It also reflected the absence of a strong association with a specifically Tajik political heritage that could function as a lodestar of national developmental expectations. On the late Soviet period in Tajikistan, see Akbarzadeh 1996: 1108–110; Atkin 1997a: 606–10; Atkin 1997b: 282–92; Shirazi 1999: 614–18.
18. The IRP was internally divided between radicals that wanted to impose an Iranian-style Islamic state, and moderates that believed in using democratic methods to effect a gradual conversion of a relatively secularized population.
19. On the post-Soviet period through the Tajik civil war, see Atkin 1997b: 293–300, 303; Hetmanek 1993: 367–69; Horsman 1999: 37–38; Niyazi 1994: 173–84; Tadjbaksh 1993: 2–7.
20. On developments following the civil war, see Aioubov 1999; Akbarzadeh 1996: 1111–117; Atkin 1997a: 610–18; Atkin 1997b: 300–05; Horsman 1999: 37–40; Rashid 2001; Smith 1999: 243–47.
21. Of course, the example of the Taliban—not to mention the Soviet Union itself—shows that intervention by authoritarian regimes may also be motivated by ideological goals. The Taliban example also shows that authoritarian regimes animated by ideological goals are capable of taking much more extreme risks in pursuit of such goals than would be tolerated by democratic majorities.

CHAPTER 5

Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans: The Breakup of Yugoslavia

Kristen P. Williams

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was the first challenge to the international system in the post–Cold War period. By the time the process of breaking up was completed, including wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, five new states of what was once Yugoslavia emerged. The Yugoslav case is an excellent one to examine both the diffusion and escalation of ethnic conflict. In terms of diffusion, as ethnic tensions mounted in the 1980s and 1990–1991, the conflict spread first from Slovenia, then to Croatia, and finally to Bosnia, culminating in a three-year war that ended with the Dayton Accord of 1995. The conflict escalated as other states and non-state actors became involved as Yugoslavia was breaking up. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) conditionality in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War adversely affected Yugoslavia's economy and strategic position, respectively. Efforts by outside actors such as the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), European Community (EC), and United Nations (UN) in dealing with the impending and continuing crisis further indicate the escalation of the conflict.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the two domestic factors: the changes in the ethnic balance of power and the weakening of the federal institutional structure of the state. I then examine the two international factors: the role of external state and non-state actors and the degree of cultural, economic, and social integration of Yugoslavia within the regional and global system. Importantly, both the domestic and international factors interacted and reinforced each other in such a way as to contribute to both an escalation and diffusion of the conflict—as well as the termination of the conflict.[1]

Domestic Factors

Weakening political institutions within a state can lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the government if the economic and political needs of society are not met. Ethnic groups within a state can then challenge the government's right to rule, demanding that the regime respond to the needs of a particular group. Feelings of inferiority within groups in society who are not benefiting economically or

become aware of a gap between their expectations (social, political, or economic) and their ability to meet these expectations, they are more likely to resort to conflict with other groups as a means of resolving the disparity.[3] An economic decline may heighten feelings of deprivation and scarcity relative to other states, or groups within the state.[4] When the state's institutions are weak or weakening, thus hindering the government's ability to respond to the demands of particular ethnic groups, the only recourse for such groups may be the use of force to obtain their objectives. As will be discussed in greater detail later, Yugoslavia faced a weakening of its federal institutions as the ethnic groups sought greater power in each republic.

Additionally, when the ethnic balance of power shifts, groups that previously dominated may perceive a challenge or threat from groups that are increasing in power relative to the dominant ethnic group. In the case of Yugoslavia throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the shift in power from the federal government (dominated by Serbs) to the various republics (i.e., Croatia and Slovenia), meant a shift in the ethnic balance of power in the state as a whole. The shift in power, as expressed in the demands for independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, threatened the Serbs' domination at the federal level (e.g., most of the 300,000 civil workers in the federal government were Serbs.)[5] The response by the Serbs was to send in the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) to prevent the secession of the two republics. In the end, the outcome was war, first in Slovenia, then Croatia, and ultimately Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the Serbian power structure at the federal level sought to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia.

As Lenard J. Cohen notes, the "persistent and intensification of deep-seated animosities" among the various ethnic and religious groups in Yugoslavia and the fact that many citizens sought to rectify grievances from World War II played a fundamental role as the ethnic balance of power shifted. Importantly, the Communist regime, in place since 1945, failed to implement modernization and nationality policies to deal with the various interethnic grievances.[6] The inability of the regime to respond adequately to the economic and political demands of the various groups that resulted from changes in the ethnic balance of power indicated that the federal institutional structures continued to weaken, particularly following Tito's death in 1980.

Ethnic Balances of Power and Weakening Federal Structures

The Balkan area has been fraught with conflict and competing claims by various religious and ethnic groups for much of its history. This section, however, focuses on the rise of ethnic nationalism in the period of Communist rule in Yugoslavia following World War II when the country was divided into six republics and two autonomous provinces. The interaction of ethnic identities and the two domestic factors (weak state institutions; changing ethnic balance of power) enhanced the perception of threat and the emergence of ethnic security dilemmas.[7] As will be demonstrated, these factors led to the outbreak of conflict and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

republics resented the increasing economic burdens of the poorer ones. The link between economics and rising ethnic consciousness became more evident as minority groups sought to improve their economic and political status, particularly as the republics constituted dominant ethnic groups: Croats dominated in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia, and Slovenes in Slovenia. In response to the rising ethnic consciousness, the federal government instituted new amendments to the constitution in 1971 and authorized a new constitution in 1974 that decentralized the federal state, giving the six republics and two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) more autonomy. For example, Muslims received constituent nation status. Within the Bosnian republic Serbs, Croats, and Muslims received equal representation in the government. The actions of the federal government in giving the republics and provinces more autonomy, thereby shifting the balance of power between the federal and republic levels of government particularly in the area of economic policy, only served to weaken the state's institutional structure.

At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, Yugoslavia encountered significant economic challenges, namely resolving its foreign debt crisis. The IMF pressed the country to focus on a strict macroeconomic stabilization program and reforms "to liberalize foreign trade, promote exports, restore financial discipline, and in general make the economy attractive to capital markets and foreign investment."[10] During the 1970s, Yugoslavia had achieved significant economic growth from foreign borrowing in order to import advanced technology. But the increase in world oil prices in 1978–1979 and rising interest rates for U.S. dollars contributed to the decline in foreign lending to all of Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav government needed to respond and did so by implementing austerity measures to reduce the domestic consumption of imports, while increasing Yugoslav exports. In implementing the IMF's conditions, Yugoslavia reversed its economic policies of the 1970s as well as the decentralization of the previous three decades. The changed policies did not affect each republic and province in the same way. For example, republics such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia were concerned that such a policy would adversely affect them as domestic producers and their trade with eastern markets. Slovenia, as the largest earner of foreign exchange, would also be adversely affected.[11] In fact, the bulk of Yugoslavia's exports came from the more developed republics of the north, that is, Slovenia. These republics benefited from increased exports, which also balanced against the effects of higher prices. The southern republics did not have such a buffer against the effects of the increased prices.[12] As such, the leaders of the various republics stressed the reforms that favored their individual republic, which only led to a stalemate at the federal level given that policy-making occurred through consensus among the republics and provinces. The stabilization program led to triple-digit inflation and increased the trade deficit. Given this downturn in the domestic economy, republics such as Slovenia and Croatia looked to linkages with other regions of Europe and asserted that the federal taxation "violated their sovereign rights." At the same time, resentment in Serbia increased as a result of the autonomy given to the provinces (a part of Serbian territory) in the 1974 constitution.[13] The divisions among the republics reflected the shifting ethnic balance of power between the federal and republic levels of

more autonomous as each republic aimed for self-sufficiency.

The weakening of the federal government continued with Tito's death in 1980. The collective presidency, in which delegates from each republic rotated annually in the office of the president, made any consensus on policy-making difficult.[15] Formed in October 1981, the Kraigher Commission was created in order "to bring about a consensus in the government and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) regarding the roots of, and possible solutions, to Yugoslavia's mounting economic problems."[16] In 1983, the Commission issued its document, "Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program," which recommended market reforms in a more unified way and decrease of governmental interference in the economy. The report criticized the fact that the republics often pursued their own policies at the expense of the economic health of the entire country.[17] The LCY, recognizing the need for economic reform, also began to discuss changes in the political system. Thus a debate over political and economic reforms emerged, leading to rising tensions between the republics and the federal government.[18] For example, the macroeconomic reforms put in place in 1980 led to a decrease in industrial growth throughout the 1980s (2.8% from 1980–1987 and to 0% in 1987–1988; in 1990 industrial growth measured −10.6%).[19] During the 1980s, the economies of the republics and provinces remained dependent on each other, whether in the form of financial resource transfers or trade and raw materials. Yet, the decreasing industrial growth level only made it that much more difficult for the federal government to obtain its tax revenues as the three main contributing republics (combined 70 percent of total federal budget revenue), Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, began to withhold their contributions.[20]

Even more troubling was the ethnic concentration of the resentment between the republics—insecurities among groups increased as a result of the reduction in the number of jobs in both government and industry.[21] As was readily apparent, the republics had different goals regarding economic, and thus political, reforms. Nationalism became the dominant ideology among leaders in the various republics as a means to defend their interests.[22] For example, Slovenia wanted market reforms as a means to reduce the federal government's control and enable the republic to increase its exports to the West.[23]

Thus, the pressure from the republics, particularly their ethnic focus, reflected the changing ethnic balance of power at the intersection of the federal and republic levels. In turn, the state institutional structures continued to weaken. In response to its declining legitimacy relative to the republics, the LCY proposed several constitutional amendments in 1987. But the division between certain republics was set: Slovenia favored a confederation giving the republics more sovereignty, while the Serbs favored maintaining a federal system. In October 1987, the Slovene delegation and some members of the Croatian delegation walked out of the federal parliament, no longer willing to contribute to the federal budget, thereby solidifying the division between the federalists and antifederalists. Despite the actions of the Slovene and Croatian delegations and the increased divisions between federalists and anti-federalists, in November 1988 amendments to the federal constitution on economic reform were approved. However, by this time, the nationalist rhetoric of several republics, namely Slovenia and Serbia, rendered

continued to appeal to their republic, or nationalist interests, at the expense of the federal government. For example, Slobodan Milosevic responded to appeals from Serbs in Kosovo, who had begun to feel threatened following riots by the Kosovo Albanians in 1981. By 1987 he had consolidated his power when he became the Serbian president and subsequently revoked Kosovo's autonomy, leaving the federal government powerless to respond.[24]

In December 1988 and January 1989, the federal government continued to attempt reforms that favored a market economy and to halt the further weakening of its power. Yet, during this period, the complete disintegration of Yugoslavia occurred as the different republics took actions that further undermined the federal government's authority. For example, the Croatian republic's leaders proposed a confederation to replace the federal structure, thereby supporting Slovenia in its aims to strengthen the republics. In mid-1989, Slovenia and Croatia announced the withdrawal of their internal security forces from Kosovo, where the federal police had been sent to respond to the dispute between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Slovenia and Croatia's decision only angered Serbia. At the same time, the Macedonian parliament changed the republic's constitution so as to redefine "Macedonia as state of the Macedonian nation." Now other groups in the republic were considered a minority, and Macedonia began to discriminate against Albanians in the territory. In September 1989, the Slovene parliament instituted new constitutional amendments thereby asserting the republic's power. The amendments declared the "complete and unalienable right" to "self-determination, including the right of secession." The federal government again responded, emphasizing the need for economic reforms to strengthen the federal government and resolve the constitutional crisis. By January 1990, Prime Minister Ante Markovic initiated additional measures for reform, but the disintegration of Yugoslavia was almost complete. The LCY adjourned for the last time (the Slovene delegation walked out). Markovic had hoped that federal elections might stem the tide against disintegration. Unfortunately, republic elections beginning in April 1990 in Slovenia and Croatia hindered any possibility for meaningful federal-level elections. Instead, the outcome of the elections increased the shift in political power from the federal-level to the republics and hence the shift in the ethnic balance of power, which, in turn, indicated the weakening of the state institutions. The republic elections became the means for certain republics to declare independence based on the right to national self-determination.[25] In fact, in the elections held in all the republics in 1990, nationalist parties came to power.[26]

Following the Slovenian election in April, the Slovenian parliament declared sovereignty on July 2, 1990 (prior to the elections in the republics of Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). In Croatia's election in the same month, Franjo Tudjman of the Croatian Democratic Union Party (HDZ, "the party of all Croats in the world") was elected president. As with Slovenia, Croatia wanted recognition as an independent state, with the aim of acquiring territory in Bosnia.[27] In the preceding year leading to the election, Croatian intentions toward the Serbs living in Croatia (the Krajina) became increasingly ominous, including anti-Serb propaganda, discrimination in the workplace, and arbitrary

Croatia were asked to take a loyalty oath. Consequently, the Croatian Serbs perceived a threat from the dominant Croatians, which led to demands for political and cultural rights, and territorial autonomy.[28] In August 1990, clashes between the Croatian police and Croatian Serbs erupted. Tudjman stressed the threat to Croats in other parts of the country, namely that the Serbs were Chetnik assassins who sought the death of all Croats. The nationalist rhetoric only rekindled Serb fears of the anti-Serb Ustashe fascist regime of the interwar period. In response to these events in Croatia, Milosevic, reelected president of Serbia in the elections held in Serbia and Montenegro in December 1990, sought to expand Serbian territory, particularly in light of the calls for unity by the Krajina Serbs in Croatia.[29]

By mid-1991, events in Yugoslavia continued to disintegrate. For example, in the May referendum held in Croatia, an overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence. On June 25, 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, thereby seceding from Yugoslavia. The United States and EC did not immediately recognize the independence of these republics.[30] Following the movement of Slovene territorial defense forces onto the republic's border, fighting in Slovenia erupted when the JNA was sent to defend the federal state's territorial integrity.[31] Ten days later the crisis ended when the federal forces withdrew.[32]

Shortly after the fighting ended in Slovenia, the federal army then moved to protect the Serbs in Croatia and defend Yugoslavia's borders following Croatia's independence declaration. Fighting erupted in Croatia and worsened in late July and August 1991, with Serbs gaining 15 percent of the territory. Soon, more than a fourth of Croatian territory was seized by the joint efforts of Croatia's Serbs, the federal army, and troops from Serbia and Montenegro. Through the forced expulsion of Croats from the territory, the Serb population grew to almost 90 percent. At the same time, the Croatian government forced approximately half of the Serbian population from the remainder of Croatia.[33] Following a cease-fire in Croatia in December 1991, the international community recognized both Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in January 1992. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, following Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia sought independence and received international recognition in April 1992. War erupted shortly thereafter. As external actors became involved in an attempt to resolve the crisis and end the fighting, the conflict escalated.

Importantly, Yugoslavia's demise resulted from the shift in ethnic balance of power and weakening, and eventual failure, of three state institutions: the collective presidency, LCY, and the federal army.[34] Moreover, the combination of the weakening state institutions and shift in ethnic balance of power between the republics and federal government directly contributed to the outbreak of violence in Slovenia that diffused to Croatia, and finally Bosnia. These three institutions became increasingly weak during the 1980s such that by the end of the decade they were unable to counterbalance the strengthening nationalist sentiment emanating from the republics that challenged the legitimacy of the federal state. Moreover, as Badredine Arfi notes, these institutions "became arenas where aggressive ethnic politics was reinforced and where the logic of ethnic fear was anchored."[35]

the federal units, with the president rotating annually. By 1990 the number of delegates reduced to five, as Serbia was able to gain control of the delegates from Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina. Thus, the delegates now came only from Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. In addition, the collective presidency could not effectively address the future of Yugoslavia given that Slovenia and Croatia wanted a confederation of sovereign republics, while Serbia and Montenegro argued for strengthening the federation. As noted previously, the division between those wanting a confederation and a federation led to a stalemate of the collective presidency, and thus its weakening.[36]

With Tito's death in 1980, the LCY was unable to sustain itself in terms of its popularity and legitimacy. Given that the government's major decisions were made by the LCY, it was "traditionally . . . looked upon as the most influential factor in the Yugoslav system." However, the economic and political reforms begun in the 1970s reduced the power of the LCY at the federal level. Yugoslav politics became increasingly one in which eight "party structures representing the republics and provinces" competed for authority.[37] In the mid-1980s, the LCY attempted to regain control by tightening party discipline through the power to expel any member acting in opposition to the Central Committee's policy.[38] By the time that democratic elections were held in 1990, the leaders of the republics challenged an "already fragmented" party, with ethnic politics reinforced in these elections, further eroding the LCY's power.[39]

The third state institution unable to counter the forces leading to Yugoslavia's disintegration was the JNA. Traditionally outside of the forefront of Yugoslav politics, the army acted as a "last resort in preventing nationalist tensions from getting out of hand." In 1984, two high-ranking members of the army recognized that " 'hostile elements' might take advantage of Yugoslavia's current crisis to bring about fundamental change in the Yugoslav system."[40] The army viewed the move toward democracy in the late 1980s–early 1990s with suspicion and a "direct attack on the constitution."[41] As noted previously, in 1991, asserting that the federal government's policies interfered with republic authority, the Slovene leadership decided not to support the federal government's policies. The army was then called in to respond to the Slovene forces in June 1991, leading to the first outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia and opening the way for the dissolution of the state. The inability of the army to restore the federal government's authority in Slovenia paved the way for challenges from other republics, namely Croatia, thus a diffusion of the crisis.[42]

The two domestic factors interacted in such a way as to contribute to the diffusion and escalation of the ethnic conflict. In terms of diffusion, the conflict spread from Slovenia to Croatia and then to Bosnia, particularly as the international community now recognized these republics as independent states. Thus, the conflict spilled over into the new neighboring states of Croatia and Bosnia. In addition, unable to cope well to the IMF's pressure for economic reforms, the federal government's power relative to the republics declined, reflecting the changing ethnic balance of power in the state. The republics were then able to pursue their own policies, culminating in their independence demands and the breakup of the state. As the crisis between the republics worsened, international actors became

the involvement of external actors meant an escalation of the crisis as well as its diffusion.

International Factors

The two international factors, the role of external actors and degree of integration within the regional and global system, are found in the internationalization of the conflict in Yugoslavia. In terms of the degree of Yugoslavia's integration within the regional and global system, Yugoslavia was a member of the CSCE and the United Nations, and had economic links to EC countries. Moreover, since Tito broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia played an important strategic role for the United States. However, the changes in the international system (the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism) and the impact of interdependence (the transition to a market economy) affected Yugoslavia's economic and political structures, further weakening the state's institutional structures as the federal state could not effectively adapt.[43]

In terms of the second international factor, the role of external actors, the international community did not respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia until well after evidence indicated that the state's very existence was threatened.[44] When fighting first erupted in Slovenia in 1991, and then Croatia, followed by war in Bosnia in 1992, the international community could not resolve the tension between perceiving the conflict as a civil war or one of Serbian aggression.[45] The international community eventually recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, while pursuing a coercive strategy against Serbia through the application of an arms embargo and economic sanctions.

Yet at the same time, the actions of several international governmental organizations, such as the EC and the IMF, contributed to the crisis simmering in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Moreover, once the crisis erupted into violent conflict, actions of international institutions, such as the CSCE and the United Nations, actually contributed to the conflict's escalation. Additionally, the escalation of the conflict occurred when individual states, such as Germany and Austria, recognized Slovenia and Croatia, thereby undermining the principle of territorial sovereignty of Yugoslavia.

Degree of Political and Economic Integration Within the Regional and Global System

By the mid-1980s Yugoslavia faced a changing strategic situation. Due to its geographic position in the center of Europe, during the Cold War Yugoslavia balanced the two superpowers by remaining independent but also gaining economic benefits from trade with the West. However, with the EC moving toward further integration and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev instituting political reforms in the USSR, Yugoslavia's position of strategic importance in the region began to erode. In addition, arms control negotiations between the

Yugoslavia as a buffer between the superpowers. By the end of the 1980s, the United States made it clear that the special relationship fostered through the previous decades, one in which the United States had encouraged "financial support of the federal government in exchange for Yugoslavia's strategic role," had ended.[47]

Besides the degree of political integration that Yugoslavia experienced since 1948, the country also was relatively integrated economically. In fact, from 1970–1987, Yugoslavia's trade with other countries had increased.[48] However, with the emergence of the global debt crisis in early 1982, the IMF pressured Yugoslavia in terms of the conditions placed on the loans received from the financial institution, pressure that continued through the 1980s.[49] IMF reforms were intended to reduce Yugoslavia's trade deficit by enacting laws dealing with hard currency and the federal banking system. As a result, the government changed its foreign exchange laws in January 1984 in order to give the federal government easier access to hard currency through the requirement that enterprises set aside a portion of their hard currency earnings for the government. By 1986, the government amended the hard currency laws again to require that the earnings of the exporting enterprises be given to the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The enterprises could then apply for compensation in the national currency, dinars.[50]

Importantly, foreign bankers became concerned with the emerging crisis within the state, in large part because "they wanted more central bank independence and control over republic banks." Yet, the structure of the loans that required central bank control at the expense of the republics only served to reinforce the existing conflicts over political and economic issues between the republics and the federal government.[51] In January 1990, the international financial institutions attempted to deal with the economic crisis facing Yugoslavia through the IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) and World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II). These measures were intended to help the federal government service its debts with banks in the United Kingdom and France. In turn, the federal government suspended its payments to the republics and provinces in order to service the debts. The actions by the federal government served to increase the animosity between the republics and federal government, and importantly the subsequent demands for independence. In the period 1989–1990, the IMF package led to the bankruptcy of many firms and more than 600,000 workers were laid off, mainly in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo.[52]

In addition to the IMF, in the middle of the 1980s, the EC and the Community of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) resumed trade talks, which had been broken off in 1979. At the same time, foreign investment in Slovenia and Croatia increased, further indicating the degree of economic integration within the region. Specifically, Austria and Italy initiated policies to develop economic ties with central Europe, including Yugoslavia.[53] In the period 1989–1991, the EC began to renegotiate the terms of the 1982 agreements in place with several Eastern and Central European states. Interestingly, Poland and Hungary as well as other Eastern European countries were included in the EC aid program, but Yugoslavia was not.[54]

namely the world oil crisis, global debt crisis, and demands for economic reforms that affected the different republics differently, reflect the degree of Yugoslavia's political and economic integration in the global and regional system. Moreover, these political and economic factors interacted with the domestic factors discussed in the previous section in that they contributed to the weakening of the federal institutions and reflected the changing ethnic balance of power between the federal government and republics.

Role of External State and Non-State Actors

In late summer 1990, the United States sent cables to the European states regarding the dire situation in Yugoslavia. Thus, the international community needed to respond, including the need for a shared position on recognition of those republics seeking independence, the issue of the use of force to quell the secessionist movements, and international guarantees for minorities in the republics. The cables also noted that NATO consultations were necessary and that the issue of Yugoslavia's disintegration needed to be placed on the CSCE agenda at the upcoming summit in November. The European states did not respond with enthusiasm. Britain and Germany indicated they were concerned about the situation but that the United States was "overreacting." France concurred with the British and German assessments and rejected the idea of NATO consultations. The French further expressed their displeasure, noting that the issue would be a "summit-breaker" if placed on the CSCE agenda (particularly noteworthy as France was hosting the summit in Paris). Only Austria and Hungary supported the U.S. position. It was evident that no consensus among the Western powers existed. In October 1990 the U.S. State Department issued an official statement, one that would remain the consistent position of the United States throughout 1991: "The US firmly supports unity, democratic change, respect for human rights, and market reform in Yugoslavia. We believe that democracy is the only enduring basis for a united, prosperous and voluntary Yugoslav union. . . . We would strongly oppose any use of force that would block democratic change in Yugoslavia." In January 1991 the United States sent additional cables to Europe. For the most part, the Europeans were more open to the U.S. position, but France and some others now argued that any response by the international community was too late.[55]

In late June 1991 at the meeting of the CSCE foreign ministers, a declaration was issued that "expressed friendly concern and support for the democratic development, unity, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia." However, because resolutions required unanimous consent, as a member of the CSCE, Yugoslavia was able to veto any action that the CSCE might want to take.[56] In addition to the CSCE's action, on June 21, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (with EC support) went to Belgrade and expressed support for Prime Minister Markovic and a unified Yugoslavia. In his meeting with Croatian President Tudjman and Slovene President Milan Kucan, Baker stressed the U.S. position that opposed unilateral secession. In addition, he told Milosevic that the United States opposed the use of force that impeded democratic change.[57]

the crisis following the failure of the CSCE to respond. The EC initiated negotiations and pushed for the monitoring of cease-fires in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the withdrawal of federal army forces from Slovenia. EC actions led to the Brioni Agreement, concluded on July 2, 1991. While agreeing to talks between the parties on Yugoslavia's future and the three-month moratorium on declaring its independence, the Slovene leadership made clear that this did not mean an end to its sovereignty.[58] The Brioni Agreement ended the war in Slovenia, with EC observers sent to Slovenia in July.[59] But the fighting had subdued in Slovenia, so that when the observers finally arrived, the situation on the ground was stable. With the Serb refusal to agree to a cease-fire in Croatia, EC mediation efforts were stymied and the conflict in Croatia continued.[60] NATO remained outside any consideration of intervention, claiming the crisis as an "out-of-area conflict."[61]

In response to significant Serb gains of Croatian territory, the EC sponsored a conference (chaired by Britain's Lord Peter Carrington) in September 1991. Leaders of the republics and foreign ministers from several European countries attended. Yet, mediation became difficult due to differing perceptions and interests of the foreign ministers. For example, the Belgian foreign minister blamed the war on the Serbs, while the Dutch foreign minister blamed the Croats. In the end, the efforts failed to gain consensus and support. France and Italy supported the Dutch proposal for placing a lightly armed peacekeeping force in the region, but Germany did not.[62] Importantly, therefore, the EC's actions solidified the crisis when it deemed the republican borders as legitimate international borders and focused on mediation as a means of concluding cease-fires. The leaders of each republic became the focal point for negotiation with the EC, not the federal army, indicating a further weakening of the state institutional structure.[63] The CSCE did impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia that received UN Security Council approval on September 25, 1991.[64]

The EC continued to attempt to mediate the crisis, with talks conducted between Carrington, Cyrus Vance (UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to Yugoslavia), and the leaders of the republics at the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in October 1991. By focusing on the possible political structures for the new states, the EC undermined Yugoslavia's sovereignty. Thus the role of external non-state and state actors played a significant role in the crisis and subsequent breakup of the state.[65] The EC threatened economic sanctions if the republics did not agree to a plan on territorial borders, thus ending the war in Croatia. But the fighting increased instead.[66]

Eventually, the EC and Vance obtained a cease-fire in Croatia in December 1991 (the deployment of UN peacekeepers, UNPROFOR, occurred in March and April 1992). However, the issue of recognition of the independence of the various republics made it difficult to conclude a comprehensive political settlement. At first, the United States and most members of the EC refrained from recognizing Slovenia and Croatia.[67] Yet both Austria and Germany encouraged Slovenia and Croatia in their demands for independence. Britain warned that recognition could lead to an escalation of conflict in the Balkans. At the same time, France and Britain were concerned about the future of the Maastricht

lenge Germany's position on recognition. In trying to determine whether to recognize any republics as independent states, the EC formed a commission to determine the conditions for recognition, such as constitutional guarantees and protections for minority rights. The Badinter Commission recommended that Slovenia and Macedonia receive recognition because they satisfied the requirements. However, because the Croatian government did not control all Croatian territory nor were sufficient guarantees provided to minorities in Croatia (i.e., Serbs), Croatia did not meet the Commission's requirements. Despite the Commission's recommendations, Germany acted unilaterally by recognizing Croatian and Slovenian independence on December 18, 1991.[68] In January 1992, the international community officially recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. In response, Serbia declared its recognition of Serb-held territory in Croatia and Bosnia. Croatia, in turn, responded by declaring that it would regain Croatian control in this same territory.[69]

In terms of Bosnia specifically, the EC asserted that if Bosnia held a referendum (thereby supporting one of the Badinter Commission's conditions) with a simple democratic majority favoring independence, the EC would recognize Bosnia's independence. Importantly, the Bosnian leadership recognized the implications for the republic if Slovenia and Croatia received unconditional recognition from the EC. The president of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, went to Germany appealing to Chancellor Helmut Kohl not to recognize the two republics. Izetbegovic argued that recognizing Slovenia and Croatia meant that Bosnia could no longer count on the constitutional protection from Serb and Croat territorial claims on Bosnia. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar wrote to the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, asking that Germany reconsider its policy, arguing that recognition of Croatia would bring about "the most terrible war in BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina]." Germany did not alter its policy.[70]

In February and March 1992 the Bosnian referendum was held to determine the republic's future. The Bosnian government, controlled by a Muslim–Croatian coalition, sought independence. Muslims and Croats overwhelmingly voted in favor of secession, while the Serbs boycotted it entirely, recognizing that in any federation they would be out-voted by Croats and Muslims.[71] Bosnia announced its independence, recognized a few weeks later by the EC and the United States. War between the three parties erupted shortly thereafter.[72] On April 27, 1992, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was proclaimed in Belgrade. The CSCE admitted Bosnia as a member and the Yugoslav Army did not stop its offensive.[73]

As Holsti asserts, "Bosnia thus became an independent state without providing any guarantees to protect the rights of minorities, without establishing democratic credentials, and without committing itself to the norms and principles of the Charter of Paris, which emphasizes democracy, human rights, private markets, and respect for minorities. The United Nations became engaged in Bosnia only after it was too late. Perhaps the collapse of Yugoslavia was inevitable, but armed conflict was certainly made more probable by the lack of any collective effort, whether NATO, OSCE, or United Nations, to manage or influence the process."[74]

Bosnia as three newly independent states transformed the conflict from an intrastate to an interstate conflict, a diffusion of the conflict as it moved from Slovenia to Croatia and then to Bosnia. Moreover, recognition heightened tensions among the three main ethnic groups and pushed them to make territorial claims, thereby increasing the likelihood of war.[75] Importantly, the responses of the Western states to the conflict reflects a confused and uncertain world in light of the end of the Cold War.[76] In fact, the direct involvement of the Western states and non-state actors demonstrates an escalation of, rather than an amelioration of, the crisis.

Dealing with the War in Bosnia: Internationalization of the Conflict

From early 1992 through 1995, the Western powers put forth several peace plans in response to the emerging conflict in Bosnia that diffused from Croatia. These responses focused on preventing Bosnia's breakup into separate states and attempting to reach an accommodation with the three main ethnic groups, Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. The various peace plans actually contributed to an escalation of the conflict as more actors became involved, including the EC/EU, United Nations, NATO, as well as individual countries, such as the United States, Britain, and France through the establishment of the Contact Group in 1994. Attempts at peace actually increased the conflict, and more importantly, the deepening involvement of those international actors. At the same time, the support of Croatia and Serbia for the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, respectively, indicates the diffusion of the conflict, as fighting occurred in Croatia and Serbia proper.

The first peace plan involved an agreement reached in Lisbon, Portugal in March 1992 prior to Bosnia's recognition as an independent state, in which a federal structure comprised of three national territorial units would be created. The plan attempted to reassure the ethnic minorities living in the Muslim-dominated territory.[77] The Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, supported the plan. However, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, realizing that recognition of Bosnia's independence would come about at some point in time, did not support the plan (with U.S. approval).[78] (Interestingly, Bosnian Muslims would receive approximately the same amount of territory Izetbegovic signed a year later with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.)[79]

Soon after, the EC attempted to initiate another peace conference. But, the leaders of the new Republic of Yugoslavia refused to attend the conference to be held in August. In turn, Izetbegovic announced that he would not meet with the Bosnian Serb or Croat leaders. The EC made it clear to Yugoslavia that the Serbs were to blame for the war (especially in light of the first reports of concentration camps in Bosnia). In addition, the CSCE threatened to take more severe actions, namely sanctions, against Yugoslavia if ethnic cleansing continued.[80]

The EC and the United Nations again attempted to start negotiations and in August 1992 the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) (replacing the EC Conference on Yugoslavia), cosponsored by the two

support for the norm of territorial integrity and sovereignty and called for a cease-fire. At the same time, the attendees reinforced their commitment that they would "never recognize territory seized by force" and reaffirmed the "territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina," but without clearly stating how they were going to accomplish this. The Serbs made significant concessions, including "negotiations on mutual recognition with the now-independent republics" and agreed to CSCE monitors in Kosovo. Yet, the recognition of Bosnia and the imposition of sanctions on Serbia did not halt the war or deter the Serbs. In fact, the Serbs violated the commitments made at the Conference. With no end to the fighting, the United Nations reacted when it expelled the new Yugoslavia from the United Nations, authorized the deployment of additional troops to Bosnia and decided to establish a War Crimes Commission.[81] Yet, individual members of the international community did not want to increase their military commitment. Affected by election-year concerns, the Bush administration feared that limited air strikes would lead to a larger commitment. Although willing to provide military assistance to protect humanitarian deliveries, Britain and France vetoed the use of force to deter the Serbs. UN military observers and NATO overflights were used to monitor violations, but did not have the mandate to halt the violations.[82]

In October 1992, the "Working Group" conference led to the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan (former British foreign secretary, David Owen, replaced Carrington), creating a unitary federal Bosnia divided into 10 semiautonomous regions along ethnic lines. The Vance-Owen Plan called for a relatively weak central government with regional representatives based in Sarajevo ("mixed" province). The Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan because it would not give them the independence they sought. Moreover, the issue of how to link the Serb communities in Bosnia and Croatia with Serbia proper remained unresolved. Bosnian Croats supported the proposal because they would receive additional territory—more than they currently held—as they now controlled Western Herzegovina. This was territory they sought and, importantly, was not contested by the Bosnian Serbs. The Muslims would gain some territory lost to the other two groups. Negotiations continued from January–May 1993 with the parties unable to agree on the actual division of territory. Vance and Owen finally obtained agreement from the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Domestic political factors, such as a weakening of his support (even though he won the election in December 1992) and the international sanctions' effect on the economy, led Vance and Owen to look to Milosevic to represent the Bosnian Serbs in negotiations on Bosnia's future political and territorial settlement. Vance and Owen were successful in their endeavor as Milosevic pressured Karadzic to support their plan. However, Karadzic made it clear that the Bosnian Serb parliament would need to ratify the agreement and stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not give up any territory including the corridor between Sarajevo and Serbia. At the same time, Tudjman's Croatian forces clashed with Muslim forces in Bosnia and engaged in a major offensive against Serb forces in Croatia proper.[83] While all the parties accepted the peace plan, in the end, it failed.

While these negotiations were carried out, the UN Security Council passed various resolutions providing for UNPROFOR to provide humanitarian assistance,

havens." The UN actions led to a larger role for NATO in the peacekeeping effort (under the control of UNPROFOR). The amount of force authorized by the Security Council, however, was limited and actually led to an escalation of the conflict. NATO air strikes were intended to deter the Bosnian Serb military from attacking peacekeepers and shelling "safe havens." Rather than resolving the conflict the Bosnian Serb military took UN peacekeepers as hostages to deter NATO air strikes. In addition, the placement of UN peacekeepers in territory controlled by Croats and Muslims, rather than Serb-controlled territory, limited the effectiveness of the peacekeepers against the Serbs. For the Serbs, UN actions were not considered credible threats of the use of military force and thus they continued their campaign for territory.[84]

Beginning in June 1993, the reality on the ground led the Western states to acknowledge that the partition of Bosnia into three republics was probably the best solution. Bosnia was already partitioned as each group had its own administrative units and armed forces. In terms of territorial control, the Serbs controlled almost two-thirds of Bosnian territory, the Muslims, 10 percent, and the Croats, the remainder. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (Thorwald Stoltenberg replaced Vance in May) resembled the Lisbon plan of March 1992. The Bosnian Serbs and Croats supported the plan and agreed to give the Muslims one-third of Bosnian territory.[85] The Bosnian government (with the encouragement of the United States) rejected the plan. The negotiations stalemated. The Bosnian government now focused on the creation of a Muslim state. By fall 1993, the Bosnian army and Muslim militia acquired territory against Bosnian Croat forces, driving them from territory in central Bosnia. The Bosnian Croats also used force to gain territory, focusing on Sarajevo and Muslim-enclaves in Serb-held areas.[86]

With the failure of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the unsuccessful mediation efforts of the United Nations and EU (officially became the European Union, EU, in 1992) to end the war and the recognition that the United States and Europeans differed in their policy preferences indicated the diminishing possibility of ending the war. In response, the EU considered the possibility of lifting the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. France and Britain threatened to withdraw their troops. The United States, however, wanted to maintain the sanctions against Yugoslavia.[87]

The fighting continued, with the shelling of a market in Sarajevo on February 6, 1994 that propelled the West to take a stronger position. Three days later, Clinton and NATO initiated an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs: all heavy artillery surrounding Sarajevo must be removed or put under UN control or the Serbs would face NATO air attacks. Muslim forces were also ordered to put their artillery under UN control. Russia pressured the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their weapons and enter into negotiations. Both Bosnian Serbs and Muslims complied with the order and a cease-fire for Sarajevo was subsequently concluded. The UN/NATO strategy seemed to succeed, and yet the Muslims increased their demands for more territory. The Bosnian Serbs responded by securing their borders in Bosnia. The behavior of the Muslims and Serbs contributed to the further disjuncture between the United States and European positions. The United States supported the Muslim claims for a territorial settlement

to partition. The Europeans wanted the conflict resolved by the end of the year. The conflict did not end, as the international actors remained involved, and thus continuing the escalation of the conflict.

The fourth, and final political settlement resulted from the creation of the Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States). On March 1, 1994, the Washington Framework Agreement created a federation of two states between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. At the end of the month, a cease-fire was negotiated between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs. In April the threat of NATO air strikes halted a Bosnian Serb attack on the city of Gorazde. The Agreement supported both the Bosnian government's desire for a unified Bosnia and envisioned a confederation of a Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat federation and Republika Srpska (Serb territory). Rather than ending the conflict, however, the Agreement led to the Bosnian government's military offensive in spring 1994. In the past, the Bosnian government used the UN safe areas as a way to resupply troops and prepare for regaining territory. In fact, the Bosnian government forces often provoked Serb artillery fire in order to garner a response by NATO to use air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces as well as to test the UN's and NATO's credibility. In addition, the Bosnian Serb commander, General Ratko Mladic, determined that the taking of UN personnel as hostages were a means to avoid NATO air strikes.[89]

By the end of the year, yet another cease-fire was concluded that continued through March 1995. The newly appointed Commander of UNPROFOR, British General Rupert Smith, sought to strengthen the threat of the use of force against the Serbs in order to end the conflict. In May, NATO and the United Nations used air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. In response, the Serbs took more UN hostages. However, the previously successful Bosnian Serb strategy to avoid air strikes by taking hostages did not succeed due to the reinforcement of the UN force with combat capability that strengthened the UN's position in the country. In addition, NATO air strikes and the use of Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) artillery damaged Bosnian Serb forces around the capital, Sarajevo, in the summer and directly contributed to negotiations to end the war. In August, a Croatian offensive ended Serb control of territory in Croatia (Croatia proceeded to "cleanse" the Serb population in this territory). Croatian forces then joined with Bosnian forces in Bosnia. Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia decreased from 70 percent to less than 50 percent. Without support from Serbia proper, the Bosnian Serb leadership appealed to Milosevic to negotiate an end to the war. In November 1995, the signing of the Dayton Accord ended the three-year Bosnian war.[90]

Conclusion

The Yugoslav case demonstrates that the domestic factors of weakening state institutional structures and changing ethnic balances of power can enhance the perception of threat between ethnic groups and foster the emergence of ethnic security dilemmas. These domestic factors directly contributed to the escalation (other actors, both states and non-state actors, became involved, such as the IMF

Bosnia) of the ethnic conflict. Further, the international factors, the role of external actors (i.e., United Nations, CSCE, EC, United States, and Germany) and degree of cultural, economic, and social integration (membership in CSCE and the United Nations; economic ties to EC countries) of Yugoslavia within the regional and global system, also contributed to the diffusion and escalation of the conflict as they interacted with the domestic factors. The declining strategic role of Yugoslavia as a buffer between the superpowers during the Cold War indicates the degree of integration in the region. As noted previously, the IMF's conditionality in the 1980s further reinforced the division between the republics and federal government, further weakening the state institutional structures and intensifying the shift in the ethnic balance of power. Moreover, external actors favored some ethnic groups and republics (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia) at the expense of others (Serbs).

Importantly, the case illustrates the importance of the type and timing of the response of external actors. The crisis of Yugoslavia emerged earlier than the actual outbreak of the fighting. In fact, Steven Burg argues that a small window of opportunity existed from December 1990 to March 1991 to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis among the republics. However, the international community blundered because the Western states were concerned about the conflict with Iraq and the situation in the Soviet Union—not with Central Europe.[91] As Susan L. Woodward notes, in March and June 1991 it was evident that the EC had violated the norm of territorial borders. By condoning the forceful change in borders by Slovenia and Croatia, the chain of events unfolded—and escalated the conflict when the EC became involved. The EC, however, did not take responsibility for its actions: an internal solution to the problem was precluded when the EC embraced nationalist leaders' arguments that the constitutional crisis of the federation stemmed from the issue of sovereignty and self-determination. Support for Slovene and Croatian self-determination claims did not consider the minority groups in those republics, namely the Serbs. Moreover, the federal army was not considered a valid actor and brought into the negotiations. In fact, the international community did not support the federal army when it acted to preserve the existing borders in spring 1991 when it moved into Slovenia and then Croatia, which reflected a further weakening of the federal state institutions. Finally, while conferring legitimacy to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the EC refused to send troops to the region to avert war.[92] The EC disregarded referendums held by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia that voted overwhelmingly to stay within Yugoslavia. Additionally, the EC disregarded the applications for recognition of sovereignty by the Krajina Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. Moreover, nonethnic options were never considered (a state based on individual rights or the incorporation of Bosnia into a larger association). The external actors, both the United States and European states, had no consensus on a response. U.S. support for an independent Bosnia meant support for the Bosnian Muslims. With troops on the ground, Britain and France argued it was only a matter of time before the territory was partitioned along ethnic lines. The possibility that the war might spread to other parts of Europe, such as Macedonia and Albania (diffusion), and lead to significant numbers of refugees fleeing influenced their aims. Both countries wanted to keep the war

parties would agree.

In the end, the actions of external actors did not deter the Serbs or thwart the other two ethnic groups from seeking territory and independence. The actions of these same actors also did not end the war in Bosnia. Instead, the West's strategy only escalated the conflict as more and more actors became increasingly involved, beginning with the CSCE, then the EC, then the United Nations and NATO. For example, three years into the Bosnian War UN involvement had increased significantly both in terms of the number of safe areas and the number of peacekeepers. In addition, under UN support, NATO air strikes unsuccessfully sought to deter the Serbs from continuing their territorial gains. Rather than backing down, the Serbs responded by taking UN peacekeepers hostage. Moreover, NATO forces were unable to prevent more than 3,000 violations of the no-fly zone. But the fighting did not cease either in Croatia or subsequently in Bosnia (diffusion). The problem, according to Dan Lindley, is that the United Nations attempted to be impartial and coercive, something it cannot do simultaneously. Never completely impartial or completely coercive, UN mediation was not successful: more than 30 cease-fires were violated.[94] Thus, the conflict did not end until three years after it had begun.

Consequently, the Yugoslav case indicates the importance of the shifts in the ethnic balance of power, as ethnic groups (i.e., Slovenes, Croats) are able to increase their power and authority in relation to the dominant one (i.e., Serbs). The shift in the ethnic balance of power related to the weakening of the state institution, which in Yugoslavia, was dominated by Serbs. As the federal government lost power relative to the republics, so too did the domination of the Serbs at the federal level. Serbs became increasingly concerned about their position in the other republics as well as losing power at the federal level.

Moreover, this case illustrates the importance of the role of external actors, both state and non-state actors, and the degree of integration. In the Yugoslav case, the IMF affected the economic and political crisis in the state during the 1980s, culminating in the debate between federalists and anti-federalists, and those republics wanting particular economic reforms that would benefit them. The division between each of the republics, and between the republics and federal government, strengthened the simmering crisis. At the state level, Yugoslavia was integrated with the regional political system in terms of the role as buffer between the superpowers. Yugoslavia benefited from this relationship, both economically and politically. At the same time, some republics were more integrated economically than others (Slovenia having the largest exports), and were then affected differently by the challenges of the state's breakup. In the end, both the domestic and international factors reinforced each other, leading to both escalation and diffusion (and only later, termination): the internationalization of ethnic conflict.

Notes

1. Parts of this chapter are from Williams (2001). Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.

3. Gurr (1973).
4. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971); Goldgeier (1997).
5. Ding (1991: 12).
6. Cohen (1993: 266).
7. Posen (1993).
8. Schopflin (1993: 185).
9. Cohen (1993: 32–33); Daalder (1996: 42); Glenny (1992: 141–42).
10. Woodward (2000: 134).
11. Woodward (1995a: 47–48, 134–36).
12. Bukowski (1988: 105–06).
13. Woodward (1995a: 135–36).
14. Milanovic (1987: 6).
15. Arfi (1998: 194).
16. Bukowski (1988: 96).
17. Bukowski (1988: 96–98).
18. Woodward (1995b: 199–200).
19. Chossudovsky (1997: 2).
20. Ding (1991: 8, 23).
21. Woodward (1995b: 199–202).
22. Doder (1993: 14); Sekulic et al. (1994: 88).
23. Woodward (1995a: 64).
24. Woodward (1995a: 73, 83, 87, 89, 91, 93).
25. Hutchings (1997: 304–05); Woodward (1995b: 100–01, 103, 107, 110, 143).
26. Doder (1993: 14).
27. Djilas (1995: 92–93); Woodward (1995a: 119–20).
28. Posen (1993: 38).
29. Bowen (1996: 9–10); Djilas (1995: 95–96).
30. Djilas (1995: 97–98).
31. Woodward (1995a: 162); Zimmerman (1995: 12).
32. Ramet (1994: 199–200).
33. Djilas (1995: 95–96); Woodward (1995a: 173).
34. Arfi (1998).
35. Arfi (1998: 194).
36. Arfi (1998: 194–95).
37. Bukowski (1988: 111).
38. Bukowski (1988: 112).
39. Arfi (1998: 195–96).
40. Bukowski (1988: 112).
41. Arfi (1998: 196).
42. Arfi (1998: 196).
43. Woodward (1995a: 3, 15).
44. Daalder (1996: 63–64).
45. Woodward (1995a: 317).
46. Woodward (2000: 136).
47. Woodward (2000: 142).
48. Ding (1991: 20).
49. Woodward (2000: 142).
50. Bukowski (1988: 101–02).
51. Woodward (2000: 143).
52. Chossudovsky (1997: 2–4).
53. Woodward (1995a: 72).
54. Woodward (2000: 153–54).

56. Hutchings (1997: 309).
57. Hutchings (1997: 309–10); Zimmerman (1995: 11).
58. Interestingly, secret talks between Slovenian President Milan Kucan and Serbian President Milosevic were concluded at the same time: Milosevic agreed to Slovenia's right to self-determination, while indicating that he would seek to maintain territorial control over territory in which Serbs lived. See Burg (1995: 240–42).
59. Glenny (1992: 100).
60. Eknes (1995: 112–13).
61. Cohen (1993: 230).
62. Webb et al. (1996: 176–77).
63. Woodward (1995b: 211).
64. Burg (1995: 243–45).
65. Cohen (1993: 232–33).
66. Gow (1998: 280–81).
67. Webb et al. (1996: 177); Woodward (1995b: 213).
68. Cohen (1993: 234); Djilas (1995: 97–98); Glenny (1992: 163–64).
69. Webb et al. (1996: 178–79).
70. Glenny (1992: 163–64).
71. Cohen (1993: 237); Economides and Taylor (1996: 64).
72. Djilas (1995: 99).
73. Cohen (1993: 241); Daalder (1996: 45); Woodward (1995a: 284).
74. Holsti (1996: 194).
75. Doder (1993: 17).
76. Djilas (1995: 97).
77. Djilas (1995: 99).
78. Mearsheimer and Evera (1995: 16).
79. Glenny (1992: 167) argues that if Izetbegovic had agreed to the March 1992 plan, there would have been no war in Bosnia. Given that he pushed for independence instead, war erupted.
80. Webb et al. (1996: 179).
81. Cohen (1993: 243); Gow (1998: 284); Hutchings (1997: 316–17).
82. Cohen (1993: 243); Daalder (1996: 65–66); Woodward (1995a: 200).
83. Cohen (1993: 243–44, 248–53); Doder (1993: 20–21); Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995: 16); Webb et al. (1996: 181); Woodward (1995a: 307–08).
84. Eknes (1995: 117–18); Harvey (1997a: 12); Harvey (1997b: 194).
85. In the spring, Croats and Serbs agreed to cooperate against the Muslims; on June 16, 1993, Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to bilateral talks that divided Bosnia into three parts, representing the three ethnic groups. Djilas (1995: 103–04); Harvey (1997b: 198); Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995: 16).
86. Woodward (1995a: 310–12).
87. Woodward (1995a: 312–13).
88. Djilas (1995: 104–05); Gow (1998: 288–90); Woodward (1995b: 216–17).
89. Economides and Taylor (1996: 86–87); Gow (1998: 292); Woodward (1995a: 314–15, 320–21).
90. Gow (1998: 292–95).
91. Burg (1995: 237).
92. Woodward (1995b: 218, 220–24).
93. Woodward (1995a: 9, 210, 281, 283–84).
94. Lindley (1996: 548–49).

CHAPTER 6

Internationalization as an Explanation? The Development of Ethnic Conflict in Latin America

Philip Mauceri

Ethnic conflict has traditionally not been considered a significant factor in analyses of Latin American politics. In part this is because ethnicity has historically not played a significant role in partisan alignments or political organization in the region. As a result, most studies of ethnic conflict have tended to overlook Latin America.[1] Nonetheless, the region is ethnically as well as racially diverse and the ethnic makeup of Latin America has been an important component in the social structure of the region since the colonial period. In those countries with a large indigenous population, ethnicity has played an important role in numerous protests, rebellions and revolutions since the arrival of Europeans. More recently however, indigenous-based groups have increasingly organized politically to promote both ethnic consciousness and advance a specific agenda geared to benefit their group interests. This relatively new phenomenon has focused on breaking out of the traditional rural isolation of these groups to establish both a national and international political presence.

This chapter will argue that the explosion in indigenous organizations and the similarities in methods, tactics and goals across the region are due to a mix of demonstration effects, the increased role and interconnectedness of the international media, a shift in the international agenda of major powers toward the protection of human rights, democracy and the environment, and finally the growing presence and sophistication of NGOs in the region, which have lent their substantial resources to the promotion of this new wave of ethnic political organization. Together, these factors help explain the diffusion of ethnic-based political conflicts throughout Latin America. Although some outside actors, particularly IGOs and NGOs have become important actors in ethnic conflicts in the region, interstate conflict has not occurred and further escalation has been limited. There nonetheless remains a potential for an expansion of such escalation, particularly because many ethnic conflicts—from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the Brazilian rainforest indigenous—have been linked to issues such as liberalized world trade and the protection of the environment that have recently engaged world powers.

Although indigenous peoples can be found throughout Latin America, 90 percent of the regions indigenous can be found in just five countries: Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador.[2] These countries are in areas that were centers of pre-Columbian civilizations. The Aztec, Maya, and Inca empires were the most developed and populous indigenous cultures of the Americas, with the Inca empire estimated to have had a population of 14 million before the arrival of the Spanish. Each of these civilizations had developed sophisticated urban centers, large military forces, legal codes and systems of sustainable agriculture. However, since these were "empires" based on military conquests rather than nations, identities and loyalties were more closely tied to language and religious custom than political institutions.[3] The arrival of Europeans in these regions in the early sixteenth century resulted in the destruction of these empires, a rapid decline in indigenous populations due to the spread of new diseases, and the creation of new social, economic and political structures predicated on the subordination of indigenous people to the Spanish. These structures and the social relations that accompanied them were to last throughout the colonial period (1500–1820s) and in most cases, well into the twentieth century.[4]

Until the 1960s the vast majority of indigenous peoples in Latin America lived in rural areas engaging in agricultural activities. In the colonial era, the Spanish implemented a system of land tenancy revolving around plantations and haciendas. The former were found mostly in coastal areas and grew crops for export, in particular sugar. Due to the labor-intensive nature of this system, African slave labor was employed. On the other hand, haciendas were largely an adaptation of Europe's agrarian feudalism. Indigenous peasant laborers were required to work the land for large landholders and in return received a small plot of their own. Economically, the system was not very efficient and crops, such as maize, potatoes and wheat were geared for the local market. In addition peasants were tied to the landholder through a complex system of social obligations. For example, the "derecho de pernada" gave the landowner sexual rights over all the women on his lands. Although the indigenous were not considered slaves, they were nonetheless tied to the land by law and custom and had few rights.

The development and survival of the hacienda system had less to do with economic efficiency and more with the social prestige attached to land ownership. As haciendas expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth century they increasingly crouched on the communal lands of indigenous communities, extending a process that had been underway since the early colonial period. With a Western understanding of land as a commodity, individually owned and readily bought and sold, the nonindigenous invaded indigenous lands that they considered "empty" due to the lack of legal property titles and of modern agricultural activity.[5] With the expansion of mining and agro-exports at the end of the nineteenth century, this process accelerated dramatically. Not surprisingly, the nineteenth century witnessed significant indigenous peasant rebellions, particularly in Mexico and Peru, largely dealing with the loss of lands and water resources to large landowners. While rebellions in Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia were sporadic and generally repressed by the authorities, in Mexico the rebellions culminated in the 1910 Revolution, led by Emiliano Zapata in

of lands and/or the restoration of lands taken by large landowners was to dominate Mexican politics until the initiation of a land reform program under Lazaro Cardenas (1934–1940). Even in countries where Revolution did not occur, the growing discontent among the indigenous became an important and potent issue for newly emerging populist and communist parties in the region.[6]

As populist and leftist parties gained ascendancy in the early twentieth century, indigenous identity underwent a transformation. Rather than emphasizing traditional ethnic identity, these groups placed a larger emphasis on the social and economic situation of the indigenous, referring to them largely as "campesinos" (peasants) rather than "indios." The new discourse of these parties responded to a general ideological predilection for "class" as the primary social group, instead of ethnicity or race. Communist and socialist parties insisted that the indigenous should be considered rural workers, available for mobilization after a period of "education" by party officials to instill class consciousness.[7] While populist parties, such as Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Peru's Alianza Popular Revolucionario Americana (APRA) or Bolivia's Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), were less systematic in their approach, they nonetheless viewed the "indian problem" as one involving land reform, education and equality in political rights, rather than cultural identity. Moreover, the political agenda of these new parties included a strengthening of national identity, as part of a larger nationalist program. As a result, the indigenous needed to be assimilated into a new national culture. In the case of Mexico in the period from 1920–1940, this resulted in a redefinition of Mexico as a primarily "mestizo" nation whose culture is a mix of European and indigenous culture. While this construction of national identity was an attempt at inclusion and a recognition of historical realities, it also had the effect of excluding indigenous culture from the definition of Mexican, insofar as that culture had not been combined with the European.

The situation was further complicated by the growing waves of urban migration that began in the 1940s and continues today. As indigenous peasants migrated to the cities, they left behind important elements of their culture, including language, religious practices, traditional dress and communal ties. Once in the cities, most migrants and their children redefined themselves as "mestizos," abandoning their origins in an attempt to avoid the stigmatization and resulting prejudice of being identified as "indio." This transformation was made easier by the official discourse offered by reformist parties that defined the nation as mestizo, as well as by the fact that Latin America's long history of racial intermixing had blurred the line between races, linking identity more with cultural practices and language rather than skin color. As a result, by the mid-twentieth century, indigenous identity was associated with the rural peasantry engaged in subsistence agriculture and following traditional "premodern" cultural practices.

The Reemergence of Ethnic Identity and Conflict after 1970

Beginning in the 1970s, Latin America witnessed a gradual reemergence of ethnic identity with new organizations created to promote and protect indigenous culture and advance the social and economic interests of indigenous peoples.

diffusion that was integral to these developments, it is important to first review the specific dimensions of this indigenous awakening. The first and still the most powerful indigenous organizations to appear emerged in Ecuador.[8] The Shuar Federation was formed in the late 1960s by Amazonian rainforest peoples to resist the growing encroachment of foreign oil companies exploring on Shuar lands, and the arrival of a wave of colonists, encouraged by several governments to migrate into the rainforest to occupy empty lands. The Federation, aided by sectors of the Catholic Church and human rights lawyers, attempted to stave off invasions and occupations of their traditional lands by undertaking legal actions. In 1972 the Quichua of Ecuador's Andean highlands formed ECUARUNARI (Indigenous Awakening of Ecuador). The role of the Catholic Church was important insofar as many of the leaders had participated in Base Communities organized by the Church. Throughout the 1980s both organizations coordinated actions, culminating in their union in 1986 and the formation of CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador). During the 1990s, CONAIE became a key political actor in Ecuadoran politics and the CONAIE's main strategy was to confront successive governments with massive strikes and demonstrations. In 1992, CONAIE organized a march across the country called the "500 Kilometres of Resistance" to commemorate and condemn the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus's arrival in the Americas. Arriving in the capital of Quito, the marchers stormed and took control of the Congress building. In 1994, CONAIE organized a strike to protest the passage of a law that would have opened up communal lands to outside investors. The retraction of the law by Congress was widely seen as a demonstration of CONAIE's new found political power. If further proof was needed of the power of Ecuador's indigenous it came in January 2000 when CONAIE's strike, demonstrations and marches helped provoke Latin America's first military coup in nearly 15 years. The strike called to protest the austerity policies of President Jamil Mahuad ended when the military stepped in to depose him and coup leaders met with CONAIE to coordinate a transition to a new civilian government.

Bolivia along with Ecuador experienced an indigenous awakening in the late 1960s, although the impact and power of Bolivia's indigenous organizations is less clear-cut.[9] The Katarista Movement was formed by various Aymara groups in La Paz and Oruro in 1968, taking the name of a leader of the indigenous rebellion of 1780–1781 in La Paz. The movement was repressed during the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer (1973–1977) and reemerged much weakened afterward. At the end of the 1980s, a new organization was formed, CONAMAQ (National Council of Ayllus) with the specific purpose of defending indigenous communal land rights. Nonetheless, a national political agenda has yet to be defined. In Guatemala, indigenous movements did not emerge until after that country's long period of military rule (1954–1985). The military dictatorship during the periods of rule of General Fernando Romeo Lucas García and General Rios Montt (1978–1983) was especially brutal toward the indigenous, who the military suspected of sympathies with the communist Guerrilla Army of the Poor. Employing near genocidal tactics against highland Mayan peoples, including widespread massacres, forced detentions in concentration camps,

forces, the military was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Mayan indigenous. In the aftermath of dictatorship, indigenous leaders such as Rigoberta Menchu promoted the development of a Pan-Mayan Identity Movement to overcome the traditional language and geographic divisions that had divided the indigenous of Guatemala.[10] The movement has also attempted to promote Mayan cultural identity through bilingual education and the preservation of indigenous land rights and joined with opposition parties to protest economic austerity measures.

By far the most confrontational of the new indigenous organizations has been the EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) of Mexico led by the mysterious Comandante Marcos.[11] The EZLN erupted onto the national scene in January 1994, when Zapatistas guerrillas forcibly took control over a number of towns in the state of Chiapas including the capital of San Cristobal de las Casas. Chiapas has long been the poorest and most indigenous state in Mexico and the main demands of the EZLN involve land redistribution, government support for agrarian development, respect of indigenous culture and an end to the traditional clientelist tactics of local politicians and abuses by the local police of the indigenous. It should also be noted that the EZLN opposed NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and selected the date of their initial action to coincide with the enactment of NAFTA. Although the Mexican military has largely contained Zapatista activity to Chiapas, the EZLN itself has pursued political action, such as the March 2001 march to Mexico City, over further military action. The impact of the Zapatistas in delegitimizing the ruling PRI party before the latter's stunning 2000 electoral defeat and in questioning Mexico's neoliberal economic policies is reflected in the fact that a majority of Mexicans repeatedly signaled their sympathy with the Zapatistas in national opinion polls.

Of all the countries with large indigenous populations, Peru stands out as the only one without a significant indigenous organization. Aside from some small groups in the country's Amazonian region, no large-scale organizations emerged since the 1970s. In part this is explained by the brutal activity carried out by the Maoist Shining Path, which along with military forces, repeatedly assassinated independent association leaders and created fear and terror throughout the Andean highlands.[12] With the defeat of the Shining Path, the neo-authoritarian regime of President Alberto Fujimori made the development of civil society organizations difficult, using media manipulation, clientelist policies and when necessary outright repression to stop such organizations.

In almost every country with an indigenous population, the patterns described earlier have prevailed. From Paraguay's Guarani to Colombia's Guajira, indigenous peoples have created political organizations to protect their interests, largely using lobbying, protests, strikes and their voting power. Among Brazil's Amazonian rainforest peoples, particularly the Kayapo, new organizations have emerged to protect the rainforest from outside colonization and exploitation. The success of the Kayapo contrasts sharply with the Yanomani of southern Venezuela, who remained unorganized and largely unable to defend their interests. With the discovery of large gold veins on their lands, the Yanomani suffered

led to violence, including massacres of entire villages.

Diffusion and Escalation of the Indigenous Movement

The mere fact that the rise of indigenous movements across Latin America occurred within the same time frame (1970–1990) suggests the importance of the international context and actors in this development. In all cases indigenous organizations added a new dimension to the politics of these countries, creating new conflicts, alliances and issues. Admittedly, specific local conditions affected the possibility of forming such organizations, as was noted for the case of Peru, as well as the success or failure of them once formed. It is also clear from the above review that some groups were more successful in achieving their objectives than others, again depending on the national context and the strategy and alliances adopted. This section will focus on the importance of international factors in the diffusion of ethnic conflict in Latin America as outlined in chapter 1. The growing role of non-state international actors, primarily the Catholic Church and NGOs, the growth of regional and global integration during this period, an intensification of competition for resources in a prolonged period of economic crisis and the weakening of state institutions in the wake of the rapid decline of nationalist–populist discourses that offered assimilation in return for social and economic advancement, will be emphasized in this analysis.

The Role of Non-State Regional and International Actors: The Catholic Church and NGOs

Important sectors of the Catholic Church played a fundamental role in the development of new indigenous organizations, as it did in the growth of other social movements in Latin America. As an international organization vertically structured throughout the globe, the Catholic Church has substantial organizational resources, which along with the legitimacy provided by its religious discourse, makes it a powerful international actor. Beginning with Bartolomé de las Casas in the sixteenth century, the Jesuit Missions in Brazil and Paraguay of the eighteenth century and the rebellion of Father Miguel Hidalgo in Mexico (1810), sectors of the Catholic Church had taken up the cause of indigenous rights. Nonetheless, these remained sporadic events undertaken by a small minority within the Church that generally did not have the approval of the hierarchy. Only in the 1960s did significant changes occur within the Church that allowed for an expanded role in supporting indigenous rights. These changes originated with Vatican II, which represented a redefinition of the Church, to now include members of the laity ("pilgrim people of God") in an effort to make the Church more relevant to people's daily lives. In Latin America, these reforms led to the adoption of what became known as Liberation Theology at the 1968 Conference of Bishops (CELAM) in Medellín.[13] A basic precept of

of the poor, combating oppression and the socioeconomic structures that lead to that oppression. In the aftermath of Medellín, important sectors of the Church undertook efforts to organize both the rural and urban poor, instilling a "Liberationist" consciousness through the formation of Base Communities (CEBs) and Pastoral Land Commissions.

Among the rural indigenous, the newfound support and consciousness offered by the Church was critical. The Church provided not only assistance in organizing, often times using Church buildings themselves for meetings, but also provided legal advice, communication and transportation coordination and most importantly legitimacy from a powerful social institution that still commanded widespread respect among all classes and political actors. The discourse of "social justice" emphasized by Liberation Theology was made concrete for the indigenous with new demands for land reform, an end to police/military abuses, recognition of cultural and political rights by the state and the improvement of the health and education infrastructure of indigenous regions. In each of the cases where indigenous movements emerged, priests, nuns and bishops played an important role in supporting the initial organization of the movement. In Ecuador, the Bishop of Riobamba, Monsignor Leonidas Proano was critical in lending not only Church resources, but also publicly emphasizing the importance of indigenous issues.[14] In Chiapas, Mexico, Bishop Samuel Ruiz García had long denounced the situation of the indigenous and the political and police abuses committed against them. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the EZLN's actions, many in Mexico's PRI accused the Bishop of having contacts with "subversion." In the case of Guatemala, accusations against Church officials for having links to "subversive" indigenous organizations and supporting the human rights of the rural poor led directly to violence, including the 1998 assassination of the archbishop of Guatemala City, Monsignor Juan Gerardi.

Along with the Catholic Church, a variety of regional and international NGOs have been critical to the development of indigenous organizations, although there is much variance in their contribution. It should be noted that the growing importance of NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s coincides with the emergence of indigenous movements. International human rights organizations, including Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) have focused attention on rights abuses committed against the indigenous, and through their reports put pressure on governments to end such abuses, as well as on foreign governments to pressure the countries being criticized. A variety of environmental NGOs that have focused on the preservation of the Amazon rainforest have also reached out to the Amazonian indigenous, linking the cause of protection of the environment with the protection of indigenous land rights. Finally a number of regional and international organizations have emerged to share information regarding their experiences and to provide organizational support for indigenous groups. Among the most notable of these organizations have been the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), the Indigenous Council of South America (CISA) and the Indigenous Council of the Amazon Basin (COICA). It should also be noted that various IGOs, such as the World Bank and UNESCO have sponsored

which indigenous leaders from around the world have participated.

Competition for Resources: Economic Crises and Democratization

In the wake of the 1973–1974 oil price shocks, Latin America's economy began to slow after a sustained expansion, initiating a prolonged period of austerity and recurrent financial shocks. Although the specific cycles, characteristics and severity of these crises vary depending on the country, from the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, Latin America was affected by high inflation, unemployment, balance of payments crises, high external debt and little or no GNP growth, leading most economic analysts of the region to term the 1980s, which saw the worst of the crisis, as the "lost decade" for the region.

The impact of this crisis was severe and the costs fell hardest on the poorest sectors of society. As governments across the region implemented austerity programs, largely at the behest of international financial organizations such as the IMF, state spending on social programs and infrastructure was drastically cut back. Along with the decline in wages and salaries, particularly in the state sector, these cutbacks were a significant factor in the rise in poverty and income inequality in the region during the 1980s.[17] Especially hard hit was the agrarian sector, which remained the main economic base for most of the region's indigenous population. Cuts in subsidies, the opening of domestic markets to foreign competition and the growing concentration of landownership promoted by both governments and private interests as a way to increase agro-export income, combined to make life in small farming communities increasingly untenable.

Latin America's economic crisis took place against the background of the democratization of the region, as military dictatorships, many of which had held sway for decades, gave way to electoral democracies. The end of authoritarianism unleashed a new wave of political competition, which was intense although not polarized. In each of the countries that underwent democratization in the 1977–1990 period, new social movements and/or political parties emerged, representing the demands of the social actors that played key roles during the transition process. Not surprisingly, the number of strikes, demonstrations and other forms of social protest tended to increase in the aftermath of democratic transitions. After a long period of dictatorship, such protests and movements represented the first expression of long-suppressed demands.[18] However, in the context of economic crisis these protests and movements also represented an attempt to protect the interests of these new groups in an environment where interest competition, political organization and free expression were now respected.

The emergence of indigenous organizations are clearly part of this complex dynamic involving new political competition in a context of economic crisis. Ecuador's transition from military rule took place in 1977 and led to a weak civilian regime characterized by a fragmented party system, several coup attempts and institutional deadlock between the president and congress.

repeated strikes and protests by labor and campesinos organizations, and eventually by indigenous organizations as well. Most indigenous protests were clear attempts to protect rural interests, including the integrity of communal lands, from market reforms being enacted. To a large extent, indigenous protests were successful in limiting the entrance of market forces into the agrarian sector, and as noted earlier in reversing the implementation of neoliberal austerity policies.

Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a gradual opening up of its political system, long dominated by the PRI, including a flourishing of civil society organizations and the growing competitiveness of non-PRI parties. The ability of the leftist PRD and the rightist PAN to win a variety of governorships, municipalities and eventually Congress and the presidency, attests to the democratization of Mexico. The weakening of the PRI's traditional clientelist networks and its co-optative and repressive apparatus, made it much easier to criticize and organize opposition to the regime. The democratic opening of Mexico coincided with the end of a long period of economic growth. Beginning with the financial crisis of 1982, in which Mexico was unable to meet its debt payment obligations and continuing past the 1994 peso crisis, Mexico's economy suffered through a long series of economic crises that affected the rest of the region as well. For the rural poor, the crisis significantly worsened living conditions, creating increased landlessness, declining incomes and deteriorating health and education conditions. The response of the country's technocratic elites was to liberalize Mexico's economy, and in particular open the country up to competition. The culmination of this policy was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, free trade was viewed as a threat by many small farmers, who saw in this opening of markets the likelihood of a flood of cheaper U.S. grown products drastically lowering prices and thus incomes for peasant farmers. The EZLN, which initiated its actions on the very day that NAFTA took effect, called for a redesigned economic policy that would include land distribution and state-support for small farmers.[19]

Among other countries in the region, with the exception of Peru, indigenous movements clearly took up the cause of defending indigenous economic interests in the midst of austerity, neoliberal economic reforms and democratic openings. The transition to civilian rule in Guatemala in 1985 opened the way for indigenous peoples to organize after a long period of repression. Although in Guatemala, the defense of cultural rights was the major banner of the Coordination of Organizations of Mayan Peoples of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), the need to protect indigenous land rights and the enactment of agrarian reforms were also key. In Bolivia, indigenous organizations joined with the main labor federation (the CSTUB), to carry out protests against government economic policies, especially privatizations and efforts to eradicate coca fields, of the Hugo Banzer government. The new political influence of the indigenous movement was apparent in the 2002 elections, when indigenous leader Evo Morales came in second with 21 percent of the vote on an anti-neoliberal platform, and indigenous parties made their strongest showing in the new congress, controlling nearly 25 percent of the seats.

Regional and global integration have shaped the indigenous movement in Latin America in a variety of ways. To some extent the trends discussed earlier—democratization, free market liberalization and the new role of NGOs—are also expressions of the consequences of increased global integration. The intensification of globalization in the post–Cold War period has reshaped the international political agenda in a way that has had a direct impact on the indigenous of Latin America. Four aspects of globalization are worth examining in particular, given their impact on the indigenous: the role of the media, increased concern for the global environment, new pressure to respect human rights and finally economic integration.

The media have provided an important platform for the indigenous to express their demands. Moreover, the globalization of the media increases the likelihood that the demands of the indigenous are heard around the world. Indigenous organizations have become increasingly media savvy, recognizing that the way to pressure governments is not only by affecting local public opinion, but world public opinion and the media provides the forum to accomplish this goal. When Brazil's Kayapo indigenous wanted to limit government plans to extend roads and colonization in the Amazonian rainforest, they held a joint news conference with the singer Sting. The image of Kayapo leaders, dressed in full tribal regalia, next to Sting, were broadcast around the world and was clearly an embarrassment for the government. In Ecuador, members of CONAIE have traveled to Europe and the United States, holding press conferences and meeting with political leaders in an effort to pressure oil companies to respect indigenous land rights. The presence of indigenous representatives and their sympathizers at stockholder meetings of large oil corporations has proven to be especially embarrassing. Beyond the use of print and electronic media, indigenous leaders have been quick to use the Internet to reach potential sympathizers and other groups worldwide. Websites provide indigenous perspective on politics, highlighting issues important to them, and help to raise funds for these organizations.

One of the issues that has received extensive media coverage in the last decade has been the environment. Growing consciousness concerning the need to protect the environment and a recognition that such protection requires global responses have been important catalysts for a new interest in indigenous issues at the international level. This has been especially important to the rainforest peoples of the Amazon Basin. A recognition of the importance of the Amazon river basin, that reaches into seven countries, and is the largest rainforest in the world, providing one-third of the world's oxygen, led to increased interest to protect the region from development at the United Nation's Rio Conference on the Environment in 1992. As part of the need to protect the environment, global interest in the survival of the indigenous in these zones has been fostered. Indigenous peoples in the rainforest, who remain largely hunters and gatherers are largely portrayed as living in tandem with this fragile ecosystem, and the ability to protect this environment is linked to the protection of these people from outside intervention. In this way, the indigenous and their sympathizers abroad, have linked the land and cultural rights of indigenous peoples with

international level.

Along with the environment, human rights have emerged as another policy area in a globalized context that has had important implications for indigenous peoples. The end of the Cold War coupled with the virtual explosion in brutal civil wars around the globe in the 1990s led to renewed attention on human rights. The attention of the media, NGOs and IGOs on the human rights situation of countries has helped increase pressure on governments to respect basic human rights. This expanded interest and attention has had a direct impact on the situation of the indigenous. As noted earlier, during much of the history of Latin America, indigenous rights were severely limited and military dictatorships, such as that in Guatemala were notorious rights violators. By the 1980s the situation was beginning to change. Regimes that violated internationally recognized norms regarding human rights increasingly faced diplomatic isolation, sanctions and even prosecution of their leadership by international tribunals. Besides referring to existing instruments, including the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, indigenous groups were successful in pushing through the adoption of a new International Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention 169) in 1989. This convention, an overhaul of an existing International Labor Organization (ILO) convention, stresses the equality of rights and the need for the autonomous development and independent institutions of indigenous peoples.[20] As countries faced increased costs at the international level for a poor rights record, repression of the indigenous became less of an option for governments facing protests. The wave of democratization in Latin America in the 1980s was an added factor making respect of human rights more prevalent in the region. With both international and domestic pressures on governments, indigenous peoples have found new political spaces to make their demands heard.

A final aspect of integration worth noting that has had a significant impact on the development of indigenous movements has been the growing economic integration of Latin America in the 1980–2000 period, largely based on the extension of neoliberal policies across the region. The adoption of the so-called Washington Consensus by Latin American governments has meant a growing movement toward free trade and a reduction of the state's role in economic regulation. Neoliberal economic policies in the region have been promoted by a variety of international actors. With the onset of the debt crisis in the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF made further assistance including bridge loans contingent on the adoption of a series of austerity measures and structural readjustments that reflected the prevailing free market ideology of the world's economic powers. The effect of these measures on the rural poor, including the indigenous, has been declining incomes, growing land concentration and the loss of state subsidies for inputs (special credits, subsidized seeds, water and fertilizer) as well as outputs (i.e., price supports). The advance of neoliberalism in the region has met with sharp resistance by a variety of social groups. As noted earlier, in the cases of Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia indigenous organizations have used protests, demonstrations and in the case of Mexico, violence, to reverse the spread of neoliberal economic policies, although only in Ecuador has that attempt met with some success.[21]

integration has also raised issues of cultural identities and rights. In a now famous article, Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa argued that in order to compete in the "modern" world, indigenous peoples needed to leave behind most of their traditions, including dress, language and religion and adopt Western cultural expressions and mentalities.[22] Otherwise Vargas Llosa warned, indigenous peoples would become mere curiosities and tourist attractions for the modern world to marvel at and photograph. The analysis received widespread criticism, largely for the narrow free market understanding of modernity adopted, which suggested that indigenous culture was an impediment to economic success. In this way, defense of indigenous cultural rights was transformed into resistance to the inevitable tide of globalization, which was defined as futile. The debate sparked by Vargas Llosa suggested to many that the costs of economic integration was not only the gradual disappearance of small-peasant agriculture, but also of the culture, primarily indigenous-based, upon which much of rural life in many countries was based.

The Weakening of State Institutions and Ethnic Contracts

Given the type of ethnic makeup that exists in Latin America, explicit ethnic contracts do not have a history in the region. However, the twentieth century did witness attempts to implicitly incorporate the indigenous in various countries in exchange for political support. In this way the national-populist governments that emerged in the 1930s and persisted through the 1970s offers a rough parallel to the explicit ethnic contracts prevalent in other contexts. Of the five countries with large indigenous populations under review, national-populist governments emerged in all at some point in their recent history. The gradual undermining of national populism and its replacement by neoliberalism, predicated on a weakening state role in the economy and society, had serious consequences for the indigenous both in terms of identity and economic benefits, and clearly helped spark the growing antagonism of the indigenous in the political arena.

National populism emerged in the 1930s as the first real expression of mass politics in Latin America. New mass parties attempted to construct a type of politics revolving around the incorporation of lower-class sectors, the adoption of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies, an interventionist role of the state in the economy that included new social benefits and protections for the poor, and nationalist policies that focused on a strengthened sense of national identity. Postrevolutionary Mexico was the first of the countries under review to experience national-populism. The governing PRI undertook a variety of reforms that were specifically geared to help the rural poor, overwhelmingly indigenous and poor. The agrarian reform enacted by President Lázaro Cardenas in the mid-1930s was followed by an expansion of education, health and retirement benefits that significantly improved the lives of indigenous peoples. The PRI regime also undertook a program to redefine the meaning of "Mexican" that, as noted earlier, incorporated elements of indigenous culture into the national culture. In return for these benefits, the PRI expected the support of

to provide concrete benefits and undertook a national-populist discourse, it continued to enjoy widespread support among the indigenous.

The exhaustion of the national-populist development model by the early 1980s, evident with the debt crisis, slower growth, inefficient industries and increasing inflation, led to the gradual movement toward neoliberalism. Beginning with the De la Madrid administration (1984–1988), Mexico's leadership became increasingly controlled by foreign educated technocrats who undertook to liberalize and "modernize" Mexico's economy and society. Undoing the agrarian reform, De la Madrid's successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, eliminated agrarian cooperatives (ejidos), thus opening up much of the land of the rural poor, particularly in heavily indigenous Chiapas, to free market competition. Austerity measures eroded much of the social safety net for the poor, while the new discourse of neoliberalism offered a vision of Mexico as a modern, urban and Western-oriented society, leaving indigenous culture for the history books and museums. The rise of neoliberalism thus excluded the indigenous both economically and socially, and not surprisingly is a key factor in the emergence of indigenous consciousness in Mexico.

Bolivia and Ecuador offer similar histories, although the specific periods vary. In the case of Bolivia, the aftermath of the Revolution of 1952 witnessed a national-popular regime under the leadership of the MNR, which like the PRI adopted a national-populist discourse aimed at incorporating lower-class sectors, including the indigenous. An agrarian reform and new social spending in the countryside, along with official recognition of Aymara as a national language were important steps in integrating the indigenous into Bolivian society and culture. Although the MNR was succeeded by the military government of General René Barrientos in the mid-1960s, national-populist policies persisted until the 1970s, when a decidedly right-wing military regime moved the country away from populism and began its movement toward neoliberalism, which was openly adopted by the new civilian government of President Víctor Paz Estenssoro in 1984. Ecuador's adoption of national populism was more sporadic than in Mexico or Bolivia, in part because of the lack of a revolutionary process. From the 1930s through the 1960s, populist leader José Velasco Ibarra led six separate governments, most interrupted by military rule, that to varying degrees offered reforms for the rural poor. In the early 1970s, a radical military regime adopted a national-populist program, but was quickly replaced by a more conservative junta. Together, these experiences created a populist discourse, but unlike Mexico and even Bolivia, few specific policies or programs were in place long enough to have had a significant impact on the incorporation of the indigenous.

In the case of Guatemala, a repressive right-wing military dictatorship cut short the attempt to construct a national-populist regime in the early 1950s. In the aftermath of the 1954 coup against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the military carried out a specific campaign of persecution and repression of the indigenous. Peru offers a somewhat similar story. The repression of Peru's reformist APRA party effectively prevented the implementation of national-populist policies until the emergence of a radical military regime under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968. Only in the early 1970s was an agrarian

as "campesinos" preferring class over ethnic identity. Thus national populism emerged late and, unlike Mexico, Bolivia or even Ecuador, without a specific ethnic content. Nonetheless, conditions for Peru's indigenous significantly improved and a vast segment of the population that had been socially, politically and economically marginalized was finally incorporated into national life.

Overall, national populism attempted to recognize the importance of indigenous culture in defining national identity and offered political and social incorporation in return for loyalty to the ruling party or state. The emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s ended this exchange. In doing so, neoliberalism directly challenged the previous rules of the political game by leaving out the indigenous. Although it would be difficult to sustain that the end of the implicit ethnic contract of national populism provoked an indigenous backlash, it is clear that the social and economic marginalization of the indigenous under neoliberal regimes led to growing disaffection with a political system that increasingly seemed less sensitive to indigenous culture and economic needs. Combined with the other factors mentioned earlier, the rupture of a national-populist consensus appears to have been an important aspect in the emergence of indigenous movements.

Conclusions: Diffusion and Escalation in Latin America

This chapter has argued that the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America since the 1970s and their growing protagonism in politics, is linked to a series of changes at the international level, particularly the increased role of non-state regional and international actors, the increased competition for resources provoked by economic crises, growing regional and global integration and finally a weakening of the preexisting national-populist discourse and its replacement by neoliberalism. Although it should be clear that the international context has played an important role in the reemergence of ethnic conflict in Latin America, it should also be clear that that context has not led to interstate conflict. Why has this not taken place?

Ethnic conflicts involving the indigenous in Latin America have not been separatist in nature. Although most indigenous organizations insist on respect for their traditional land and cultural rights, they do so within the context of existing nation-states. The lack of any separatist movements is most likely the result of the fact that the existing nation-state structure dates from the early nineteenth century, similar in that sense with Western Europe, and with few exceptions, borders have been relatively stable and unchallenged since the middle of that century. Moreover, as we have seen, ethnic identities rarely cut across existing borders. Finally, indigenous identities as noted in the first part of this chapter, predate the establishment of nation-states, which is a profoundly Western concept that has no real basis in the history of indigenous peoples. Indigenous identity in the Americas has historically revolved around community, language and religion and is a relatively fluid concept linked to culture rather than race or even geographic location. Given that several centuries of racial intermixing as well as urban–rural and interregional migration have been intensive, indigenous

large stretches of the national territory, making separatism unviable.

The lack of significant border disputes, separatism or interstate cleavages would appear to make it unlikely that ethnic conflicts will spill over directly into other states. Nonetheless, a possible conclusion from the analysis of this chapter is that there has been something of a demonstration spillover of ethnic conflict. That is, indigenous groups have increasingly been in contact with each other across borders and through IGOs and NGOs have been made aware of the demands, tactics and goals of others throughout the region. This demonstration effect has played an important role in fostering the indigenous movement although given the vast differences among indigenous groups it is unlikely that a more integrated or regional front of indigenous peoples would emerge.

Even though escalation has not appeared on the horizon in any significant form yet, there are a number of plausible scenarios that could lead to a further drawing in of outside actors, including state actors. As the environment, human rights and economic integration increasingly dominate the regional and global political agenda, states are increasingly vulnerable to outside intervention in what was previously perceived as matters of internal affairs. Thus the European parliament took up the cause of Kayapo Indians and urged Brazil to halt development of the Amazon region; the United States asked for the extradition of Colombian guerrillas responsible for the deaths of three Native American activists killed while developing human rights workshops among the Guajira; and the World Bank provided funding for indigenous groups to establish new economic enterprises. Although such interventions are largely political, social or economic rather than military, they clearly suggest that the terms of conflict are now international rather than domestic. How states in the region adapt to this challenge remains to be seen.

Notes

1. Among the most recent works that provide an overview of ethnic politics in Latin America and specifically attempt to explain the growth of indigenous organizations and consciousness in the region, are Yashar (1998); Van Cott (2000); Maybury Lewis (2002).
2. As a result, unless otherwise noted, this chapter refers to these five countries.
3. It should be noted that Mayan Civilization had declined some 400 years before the arrival of the Spanish, although Mayan culture and languages continued to persist.
4. The classic overview of colonial society in Latin America remains, Stein and Stein (1970); Brown (2000); Bulmer-Thomas (1994).
5. An excellent history of the rebellions and forms of resistance practiced by the indigenous throughout Latin America's history is found in Kizca (1998). On the Andean region in particular see Stern (1987).
6. Peru's APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) party, founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in Mexico City, took up the banner of indigenous rights and land reform, arguing also that Latin America should be known as Indo-America.
7. See Albó (2004).
8. On Ecuador see especially, Silverstone-Scher (2000); Whitten (1981).

10. On Guatemala see Jonas (1991); Nash (2000); Burgos-Debray (1984).
11. Several analyses of the EZLN have been published in the last few years including, Barry (1995); Stephen (2000); Harvey (1998).
12. On Shining Path see especially Scott Palmer (1992); Stern (1998).
13. See Gutierrez (1973); Levine (1986).
14. Almeida and Arrobo (1998: 229).
15. See for example, Davis (2000); Sanders (1989).
16. For a complete review of the impact of NGOs and IGOs on indigenous organizations, see in particular Brysk (2000).
17. On this crisis see especially Frieden et al. (2000).
18. On the dynamics of post-transition Latin America see Aguero (1997).
19. Harvey (1998).
20. Plant (1999: 328).
21. The 2002 election of Lucio Gutierrez, former leader of the coup d'etat that ousted President Jamil Mahuad in 2000 with the support of indigenous groups, as president of Ecuador, may result in a reversal of several neoliberal policies, although as of early 2003 it is still too early to evaluate the full impact of this election.
22. Vargas Llosa (1990).

CHAPTER 7

Diffusion and Escalation in the Great Lakes Region: The Rwandan Genocide, the Rebellion in Zaire, and Mobutu's Overthrow

John James Quinn

The events that led to the military overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 demonstrate the complex link between domestic and international factors, as well as the links between ethnicity and power politics. Despite the fact that the insurgent forces that marched quickly across Zaire, were backed by the Rwandan government (as well as by Uganda and Angola), one cannot claim that this rebel force was a mere proxy of regional forces. The core of the rebellion was made up of ethnic groups whose ancestors had lived and worked in Zaire (or Belgian Congo) for centuries. Nonetheless, it was also clear that the rebels needed external support for success. This intersection between ethnic conflict and changing state interests led to a rapid escalation of Zaire's internal political turmoil, involving many regional actors.

This chapter will show that Mobutu's fall from power was a combination of several factors: a changing structure of international power resulting in changing Western interests vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa, generally, and Zaire, specifically; a disintegrating Zairian state incapable of defending its borders; Mobutu's practice of pitting ethnic group against ethnic group to keep a united opposition movement from emerging; the power and self-interest of neighboring countries in overturning Mobutu's regime; Rwanda's bicommunal nature—likely to result in civil unrest or war and thereby to destabilize its neighbors; the regional disorder stemming from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and the effects this disorder had on domestic power struggles, which resulted in a domestic rebellion against Mobutu. Once the spark was ignited, the other conditions helped feed the fire that was to consume the regime.

The International Context

With the end of the Cold War, important international trends have emerged that have directly impacted Africa, in general, and the Great Lakes area in particular.

many have changed their foreign policies to promote the spread of democracy. For example, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have announced that official development assistance (ODA) would be tied to political liberalization.[2] Indeed, French President Mitterrand announced at the 1990 Franco-African summit at La Baule that aid would be linked to political liberalizations.[3] About the same time, George Bush (senior) and Douglass Hurd made similar statements regarding ODA for the United States and Great Britain, respectively. Beginning in the early to mid-1980s, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF, have tied changes in economic policy to promoting sustainable development.[4] Countries following IFI-prescribed policies were more likely to receive additional lending or have their loans rescheduled.[5] Moreover, the international community has been trying to promote the dual goals of "good governance" and political liberalization.

Coincidental with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a wave of democratization began sweeping the region—though its connection to the end of the Cold War is a matter of dispute.[7] Beginning with the National Conference in Benin in 1989, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant political liberalization. From 1989 to 1992, over 21 countries changed constitutions to allow greater participation within their countries. During the 1990s, 42 of 50 countries have held multiparty elections—though not all could be deemed "free and fair." Although not all countries became consolidated democracies, citizens of most countries in the region enjoyed more political and civil rights than they did 20 years ago.

Zaire, by contrast, was reluctant to implement policies that would lead to "good governance" or to allow a proper transition to democracy. As a result of his failures in both of these domains, Mobutu found himself alienated from his former allies in the West. For example, bilateral aid was cut off to Mobutu in 1990 by France, the United States, and Belgium after violence surrounding a stalled transition appeared to demonstrate that Mobutu had no real interest in allowing more political participation.[8] Not only was aid suspended, but Mobutu was also told by the French (traditionally a Mobutu supporter) that he was unwelcome to attend a summit slated for all Francophone states. Moreover, the following year, the EU cut off all but humanitarian aid to the Mobutu regime. Thus, Mobutu found himself alienated from his staunchest international backers concerning his political legacy and one of his primary sources of funds for patronage disappeared.

As a result of more and more money tied to economic performance rather than international alliances, Mobutu was finding it more difficult to obtain aid money from IFIs. Both the World Bank and the IMF, unsurprisingly, determined that Mobutu had a poor track record of implementing adequate policies that could create growth within the country. Although Mobutu had been somewhat successful with the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980s, by the beginning of the 1990s, relations with these two organizations had all but stopped. With the domestic upheaval of 1991, the IFIs decided not to lend any more money until Zaire could comply with basic policy prescriptions. The following year, Mobutu announced a cessation of all international debt repayments. In 1994, the World Bank closed its office in Kinshasa and the IMF suspended

however, the IFIs tried to reestablish relations. Soon it became clear that with the civil war, no government could create or maintain the economic conditions necessary to implement the basics of structural adjustment. Therefore, yet another venue of funding for his regime dried up.

The Zairian Domestic Context

Economic Decline

Zaire has had economic difficulties after independence, but the economy went into free fall from the mid-1970s. Although the economy grew about 7 percent a year from 1968 to 1974, the economy began to crumble after 1975 In fact, from 1975 to 1980, GDP fell every year.[10] Moreover, the economy as a whole deteriorated under Mobutu's reign, even before the end of the Cold War. The average per capita GNP from 1965 to 1987 was −2.4.[11]

Whether the source of economic decline was internal or external, the effects were there for all to see. By the end of the Cold War, and for nearly a decade before the rebellion, Zaire's economy had been nearly in a state of collapse. From 1986 to 1996, the average per capita income fell 8.9 percent per year. Moreover, from 1990 to 1996 value added in industry was *negative* 17.1 percent and in service it was *negative* 15.8 percent.[13] Finally, inflation rates were nearly astronomical, with the inflation rate in 1996 (relative to a 1987 index) at 146 billion percent![14] Therefore, by the time of the disorder flowing from Rwanda, the Zairian state had all but disintegrated. If it had not been for the international recognition granted it by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, its existence as a functioning state would have been in doubt.[15] The post office could not deliver mail, schools were managed by church organizations (though in the name of the state), health care clinics could not deliver adequate care, and most workers of state agencies resorted to demanding bribes before providing ordinary bureaucratic services—as they were usually paid several months in arrears, if at all. Roads had fallen into disrepair and represented a fraction of those around at the time of decolonization. Even the army, The Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ)—that had been the glue of the system—was disaffected with Mobutu. In 1992, with the issuing of a new currency, the army rioted and plundered Kinshasa.

Political Decline, Transition, and Deadlock

Mobutu headed a *de jure* one-party system from 1967 until 1990 when he announced the creation of a multiparty system.[16] Previously, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR)—along with the army and secret police—underpinned Mobutu's rule.[17] This movement toward political transition must be seen within the context of a regional movement toward political liberalization.[18] By contrast, Zaire can be seen as a blocked transition in which the leader

resources. His means of thwarting the creation of a more open system was by staving off his main rival, Étienne Tshisekedi, by attempting to co-opt other members of the opposition to side with him against his rival.

From 1990 until 1997, Zaire experienced political turmoil. First, it had eight different transitional governments during this period. Moreover, different incarnations of the national conference were convened and cancelled several times. Zaire also had two rival governments from March 1993 to January 1994, each claiming complete sovereignty. In keeping with the eight different transitional governments, Zaire filled the position of state commissioner (prime minister), nearly as many times, with Tshisekedi holding the office three times—though for a total of only 12 days the first time, as the head of the rival government for under a year, and for a month before the arrival of Kabila. Mobutu always arranged to have Tshisekedi derailed from anything but ceremonial power. Further evidence of political disorder came when the governor of Shaba declared the province independent in December of 1993. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for stalling the transition, no real elections for the office of the presidency or for any legislature was ever conducted. Mobutu would have had a difficult time ignoring the results of such a popular mandate. Thus, the transition to democracy was a rearguard action by Mobutu, who maintained effective control of his private forces and the treasury, to keep the process at bay as long as possible. This kept constant commotion in government. With its attendant economic problems, the regime's ability to govern effectively was necessarily fragmented.

Regional Context

In sub-Saharan Africa it is common for the losing side in political or military battles to seek shelter in a neighbor's territory.[20] Most of the continent's boundaries were drawn at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) and people from similar ethnic groups came to live on different sides of the borders.[21] Moreover, since African states often control their territory indirectly, their ability to police such movements are limited.[22] As such, most African countries had difficulties in controlling their own borders. In the case of Zaire, it shared ethnic groups with several of its neighbors. Moreover, it had borders with nine countries—many of whom had their own security problems. Additionally, given the relative decline of the Zairian state as well as the sheer magnitude of its size (it is the size of the United States east of the Mississippi river), its ability to secure its borders have always been in question. According to Young and Turner, this was the source of Zaire's most enduring security dilemma. As they wrote in 1985, "political disturbances in all but one of the nine countries bordering on Zaire have spilled over the frontiers, at least momentarily. At one time or another since 1960, supplies or sanctuary for Zairian insurgents have been provided by or through all neighboring states but Central African Republic and Rwanda."[23]

On Zaire's southern border, several skirmishes were fought with Angola, and both governments have supported each other's rebels. For example, the forces that had fought for Katanga's (Shaba's) independence went into hiding in

hosted, or backed with resources, two different antigovernment (Angolan) groups in Zaire: the *Frente Nacional de Libértação de Angola* (FNLA) and the *Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). Moreover, in the early 1970s, Mobutu had sent Zairian troops (FAZ) into Angola to take sides against the pro-Communist government, called the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA). In October 1975, FAZ along with FNLA forces advanced against the capital Luanda. MPLA forces, bolstered by Cuban troops as well as Zairian exiles, routed these troops sending them back into Zairian territory in complete disarray. This failed intervention in Angola led MPLA officials to return the favor. From Angolan soil, two separate invasions were launched in 1977 and 1979, often referred to as Shaba I and Shaba II. Either of these invasions could have been successful if it had not been for foreign military intervention. In both, the United States provided logistical support, the French and Belgians provided paratroopers, and troops from other countries, such as Morocco, were used to reinforce the Zairian army (FAZ). Both of these invasions indicated the reliance of the Zairian army on foreign support.

In the east, Zaire contained many people of Rwandan ancestry, though few of them constituted a rebel group as such—at least not until the genocide in Rwanda. The ties between citizens of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi predate the colonial period, though most of the documented demographic shifts took place during Belgian rule.[24] Given the relatively high population density of both Rwanda and Burundi, the decision of the Belgians to allow, and promote, immigration from Rwanda to the Belgian Congo was natural. The two groups that are identified with having come from Rwanda are the Banyamulenge (mostly in the South of Kivu) and the Banyarwanda (mostly in the North of Kivu). The Banyamulenge were the earliest migrants from Rwanda and were primarily Tutsi in origin. They have been in South Kivu for centuries and were formally separated from Rwanda with boundary changes made by Belgium that affected the Great Lakes Region.[25] Also in 1935, the Belgians allowed "tens of thousands of Rwandans" to enter Congo and occupy "vacant" land, which then let the population pressures of Rwanda spill over to Congo.[26] The second group was a mixture of Tutsi and Hutu, though in Congo they have shared a common identity: the Banyarwanda (the people of Rwanda). They have been a majority in parts of North Kivu for a century.[27]

The other major Congolese ethnic groups that competed for land and wealth in the area are the Hunde, Nyanga, and Tembo. These latter groups often felt discriminated against vis-à-vis the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, especially in the 1970s.[28] Mobutu, like many unstable leaders, would pit groups against each other to thwart any united front against him.

With the waxing of the political star of Bisengamana Rwema, who himself was of Tutsi ethnicity, and his rise to the position of chief of staff, these Zairians of Rwandan origins prospered. In fact, on January 2, 1972, the Banyarwanda who could show residency in Zaire since January 1, 1950 were officially awarded Zairian citizenship.[29] It also had the unfortunate effect of alienating other rival ethnic groups in the region. During the 1970s, Mobutu often sided with the Banyarwanda against others who were more likely to challenge his rule. In fact,

land or property acquired in the Zairianization and Radicalization acts of 1974 and 1975, respectively.[30] The good relations between Mobutu and people of these ethnic groups ended 1981 with the death of Bisengimana. On June 29, 1981, a law was passed that greatly restricted Banyamulenge Zairian citizenship.[31] They were also denied the ability to hold office. This dynamic initiated Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda enmity for Mobutu and his rule. It also galvanized Tutsi and Hutu in Zaire, for a while, as they saw their struggles as linked.

Rwanda as a Powder Keg

For a variety of reasons, Rwanda was a promising candidate to explode and destabilize its neighbors. First, the Great Lakes Region, of which Rwanda is a part, is one of the most densely populated regions in Africa, if not the world. In the 1980s, the "gross density" of Rwanda was 270 people per square kilometer, while the "practical density" (i.e., access to arable land) was 380.[32] Although a later source puts Rwanda at the fourteenth most densely populated country in the world (in 1997), with 259 people per thousand square kilometers. This compared to an average of 25 people per thousand square kilometer for sub-Saharan Africa. Not only was this area under some of the most intense pressure for land, but it also had most of its people working as farmers. Since its percent of people living in urban areas were only 5 percent (as compared to a world average of 46 percent), the pressure for farmland was intense.[33] Another later source holds that 92 percent of Rwanda's population was rural in 1992, compared to an African average of 69 percent. Only Burundi and Bhutan were higher at 93 percent and 95 percent respectively.[34] Finally, by computing a ratio of hectares under a major crop divided by total land, it can be shown that Rwanda scored among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, at .47.[35] In fact, only the two island nations of Mauritius and the Comoros had higher scores of .53 and .50, respectively. This also compares to a regional average of .13. Moreover, most people in Rwanda were poor: in the early 1980s, over 88.7 percent of the population lived on less than two dollars a day and about 45 percent lived on less than one.[36] Finally, in 1980, over 50 percent of the GNP came from agriculture.[37] This compares to a regional average of 22 percent, though neighboring Uganda and Burundi had similar levels. All these statistics indicate very high pressure on, and competition for, land in Rwanda, though the same is true for much of the Great Lakes Region.

Perhaps most importantly, Rwanda can be described as a bicommunal society. This term refers to a society where over 80 percent of the population belongs to one of two well-defined identity groups.[38] Also, the two groups in Rwanda are not in balance. Bicommunal societies are marked by social differentiation and segregation, which often results in political separation or conflict. In Rwanda, the tribal makeup is Hutu at 85 percent, Tutsi at 14 percent, and Twa (pygmies) at about 1 percent.[39] Thus, over 99 percent of the country belongs to one of two well-defined and hierarchically ordered ethnic groups. Since 1959, the Hutu majority has held political power. From the 1970s onward, a strict quota was assigned for Tutsi involvement in government, schools, and employment. The Tutsi were

civil service and even private businesses." Later, under Habyarimana, identity cards that carried the person's ethnic identity were used to enforce these rules.[41]

Other countries considered to be bicommunal include these: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji, Burundi, India (both before and after partition), Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Canada, Israel, and Northern Ireland. Bicommunalism militates in favor of radicalized politics as no "moderate" third ethnic group or swing voters can be brought into an alliance in which the primary *raison d'etre* of political groups is ascriptive or identity. Thus, radical politicians are rewarded for exaggerating the differences between the two groups. Horowitz makes a similar argument about a two-party system where the two parties are ethnically based. The result is centrifugal reinforcing conflict and a tendency away from the center.[42] In addition, according to Schmitt, bicommunalism tends to harden attitudes regardless of the constellation: majority dominant, minority dominant, near parity. In each case, incentives move away from compromise. For example:

> Where a clear majority dominates . . ., there will be little incentive to compromise because there is no chance of an electoral shift of power. Where the two communities are in near numerical balance, there may also be a tendency toward rigidity as a result of a frantic desire not to lose power. In minority-dominant bicommunal systems, the dominant community [i.e., the minority] may have a particularly great fear of compromise because the loss of power might relegate them to being permanently out of power.[43]

Adding to the problems of bicommunalism, Rwanda's version features group relations that are primarily hierarchical, as opposed to parallel. According to Horowitz, the nature of conflict is quite different, and often more severe in such countries.[44]

Statistics from Rwanda bear out this pessimistic predictions. Following decolonization, the Hutu launched a revolution against their former overlords, the Tutsi. In 1959, following the death of a prominent Hutu politician, a violent uprising against the Tutsi aristocracy ensued. Tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands were killed or fled. Moreover, as a result of a Tutsi invasion into Rwanda from Burundi, a backlash resulted in "a massive wave of repression in which an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were slaughtered between December 1963 and January 1964."[45] A new round of pogroms occurred in 1972–1973 in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed.[46] Such violence has led to successive waves of refugees, inundating Rwanda's neighbors. According to Prunier, some 130,000 Tutsi sought refuge in Belgian Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda by late 1963.[47]

The level of violence in neighboring Burundi, where the Tutsi dominated the Hutu, suggests that bicommunalism can lead to horrific levels of violence—regardless of which ascriptive groups is in charge. In 1972, the Tutsi army in Burundi carried out a massacre of Hutu where Lemarchand estimates the number killed to be between 100,000 and 200,000. Similarly, in 1988, the Burundi army killed over 10,000 Hutu. Finally, following the death of the presidents in 1993, over 30,000 Tutsi were killed, with the army killing as many Hutu in revenge.[48]

society that was facing external pressure to liberalize and grant concessions to perceived enemies, but it was also becoming an armed camp just prior to the 1994 genocide. In fact, between 1992 and 1994, Rwanda was third in sub-Saharan Africa for the importation of arms—as much as $100 million worth.[49] Moreover, many of these arms were distributed to militias and other supporters of the regime. According to McNulty, the flow of arms in the region "acted as a catalyst for the hardening of the regime, and the state-sponsored emergence of extremist militias and assassination squads."[50]

In sum, Rwanda was a powder keg waiting to explode. The question in the early 1990s was: how much collateral damage would the neighboring countries incur? Rwanda's problems were about to diffuse and destabilize Zaire.

Background in Rwanda

Like Mobutu, President Habyarimana was facing pressure from the international community to liberalize the political system.[51] Habyarimana took power in 1974 and established a one-party system. After outlawing other parties, he created the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND). The party, and its control, was all encompassing: all Rwandans had to belong to the party, people had to carry identity cards (which showed their ethnicity), and citizens needed the government's permission to move.[52]

The first movement away from this system followed Habyarimana's attendance of the Franco-African summit at la Baule in June 1990. According to Prunier, Mitterrand advised Habyarimana to promote multiparty politics and the advice was taken.[53] In July, he announced that a transition to multipartyism would ensue. Like Mobutu, however, Habyarimana would use delaying techniques to divide the opposition to ensure that the MRND (renamed the MRNDD: *Mouvement Républicain National pour la Democratie et le Développement* would control while tolerating some small opposition parties.[54]

The Spark of the Spark

On October 1, 1990, Rwandan members of the Ugandan army collectively deserted, with arms and supplies, and invaded the Hutu-majority-run Rwanda. They called themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The exact cause or timing of the invasion has been debated, though Prunier offers three reasons: first, the RPF would lose its opportunity of overthrowing a dictatorial regime if it waited to act until after real democratic process had been made. Moreover, had they not invaded, they, as exiles in Uganda, would not have had a say in the transition. They wanted to gain the right for all Tutsi to repatriate themselves to Rwanda. Finally, the departure of the politically powerful Tutsi from Uganda stemmed criticism from Museveni's critics for his close ties with these outsiders.[55]

Those that invaded from Uganda were the children of Tutsi who had fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1963, following the Hutu revolution.[56] After facing

joined the rebel army of Yoweri Museveni (the National Resistance Army or NRA). After Museveni gained power militarily, and with their help, they became part of the regular Ugandan army (still referred to as the NRA). There they stayed until 1990 when they launched the invasion into Rwanda.

France and Zaire responded to the invasion of 1990 by aiding the Habyarimana regime. The Habyarimana regime was composed primarily of people of Hutu origin, and importantly for France, Habyarimana and his regime were francophone, while the attacking Tutsi had become anglophone. France sent in over 300 French troops, which were stationed in the capital Kigali. The presumptive reason for the deployment, code named operation *Noroît*, was to safeguard French citizens in Rwanda, though the forces stayed for three years.[57] The Belgians, too, sent paratroopers to protect their citizens. Mobutu sent his *Division Spéciale Présidentielle* (DSP), to help repel the invasion. The Zairian involvement could be seen as a way to support the French effort and, thereby, get back into their good graces. Reports vary as to the effectiveness of the Zairian troops, though it is alleged that the DSP was asked to leave after having looted on Rwandan soil.[58]

Despite the initial successes of the RPF in claiming territory, the Rwandan army (FAR, Forces Armées Rwandaises) and the troops from Zaire were able to stem the invasion. French troops were deployed to Kigali, though there is debate as to whether or not they engaged the RPF. The Belgians were also in Kigali, though they did not have any reported engagements with the RPF. The international community began to broker a peace deal. Negotiations began in Arusha, Tanzania and produced a deal that called for a cease-fire, the creation of a power-sharing government, and peacekeepers from the United Nations to enforce the cease-fire. This force would be called the United Nation Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The 1990 invasion by the Tutsi forces helped give rise to a truly radical, anti-Tutsi, Hutu workers' party outside of the government's control: *la Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR).[59] This party was to the right of the MRNDD and attacked the latter's compromising with the "the enemy" (i.e., the RPF) at peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania. Also, some members of the MRNDD held similar views as did the CDR. Importantly, hard-line militias were emerging that were more aligned with political parties than with the army—and thus had no direct government oversight. Moreover, with or without France understanding the goals of these groups, "France trained the MRND(D) and CDR militiamen, the notorious Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi who were later to organise and lead the April–May 1994 genocide."[60] The French, from their perspective, were aiding a traditional ally, who represented the majority (i.e., the Hutu), who were francophone, and who were under attack from an exiled (and anglophone) minority (i.e., the Tutsi).

On July 14, 1991, at Arusha, a cease-fire was agreed upon. This followed a month of negotiation in Brussels and Paris. This cease-fire was well accepted in the international community, though many of Habyarimana's supporters and allies were upset with the results: negotiation with the RPF increased the resentment that the CDR and the hard-line fraction of the MRNDD.[61] The Arusha negotiations resulted in a power-sharing agreement that gave the RPF seats in

January 1994 and violence erupted in the whole northwest. Moreover, extremist militiamen went on a rampage in which prisoners were tortured and many people's houses were burned. In all, over 300 people were killed.

In the wake of this violence, Arusha was suspended and the RPF ended its cease-fire. It launched a second offensive in February 1993 that showed the Rwandan government that a complete military victory by the RPF was possible. The FAR withdrew in disarray. Given the military victory on the ground, the balance of power had shifted when the Arusha negotiations were resumed. The final accord provided for a 60-40 representation in the army in the favor of Hutu and a 50-50 split of the high command. Habyarimana had little choice but to sign, though the radical elements within Rwanda considered the agreement to be a betrayal of the country.

Although the RPF advances on the ground were successful in influencing talks at Arusha, in the longer term, these events radicalized the opposition and moderate Hutu who became less willing to been seen as moderate. Moreover, this new status quo was unacceptable to the radical party CDR, which would back the now infamous Interahamwe. As this group was considered to be radical, given its specific anti-Tutsi stance, it was excluded from government, which further radicalized it.

On April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying both the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down by a missile. Although specific blame for the event is in dispute, it seems most reasonable that radical elements with the FAR or Hutu militias were to blame.[63] Within hours of the incident, elements of the Interahamwe and other radical elements within Kigali set up roadblocks and began a campaign to kill Hutu politicians associated with the signing of the Arusha accord. In addition, ethnic Tutsi, members of the clergy, and UNAMIR personnel were attacked and killed. The killings were conducted and directed by Interahamwe forces, along with many sections of the FAR. According to Prunier, about one in ten people was killed during the ensuing genocide—this is the literal definition of decimation.[64] This represented the killing of between 800,000 and 850,000 men, women, and children.

Two days after the death of the president, and with news of killings and genocide broke from the capital, the predominantly Tutsi RPF broke the cease-fire and waged a military campaign to pacify the country. Within three months, RPF forces captured the capital and most of the countryside. On July 19, 1994, Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was inaugurated as president of the new government, though the RPF was clearly in charge of the country. The RPF chose a Hutu as president and had Hutu members in the RPF to show that they wanted an inclusive government. However, by this time, nearly the entire former government (administration, hard currency, and military forces) had fled to Zaire.[65] Moreover, approximately 30 percent of the Rwandan population fled during the war. According to Prunier, somewhere between 1.3 and 2.1 million Rwandans left as refugees, flooding neighboring countries: 270,000 fled to Northern Burundi, about 577,000 fled to Tanzania, about 10,000 went to Uganda, and about 1.2 million retreated into Zaire: of these approximately 850,000 were located in Goma, 332,000 in Bukavu, and 62,000 in Uvira.[66]

The flow of Rwandan refugees into Zaire had significant international, regional, and domestic effects. First, on the international front, as Mobutu was now responsible for the refugees in his sovereign country, international aid workers and countries that donated supplies had to coordinate with him to aid the refugees. In fact, this event seemed to rejuvenate Mobutu internationally, in the short term. Both the United States and France reestablished ties and aid to Zaire, though aid for the refugees was channeled through NGOs. The Clinton administration promised a $76 million budget for the crisis of the refugees and transport planes from Germany.[67]

Most importantly for Mobutu, France reestablished diplomatic ties. Having been uninvited to the francophone summit the previous year, Mobutu was now invited to the subsequent one. Moreover, it was from Zairian soil that France was able to launch Operation Turquoise, which was billed as a humanitarian mission to end the genocide. With a United Nations' vote, French troops were based in and around Goma and Bukavu, which are on the north and south shores of Lake Kivu in Zaire. The entrance into Rwanda itself was in the south east. Here a humanitarian zone of safety was established. However, according to several sources, France helped rearm the former government of Rwanda, once in Zaire.[68] Moreover, with Operation Turquoise, nearly the whole former government of Rwanda could escape, though the stated intent was to stop the genocide.[69]

The refugees represented unique problems for the international community. On the one hand, several million displaced people needed access to food, water, shelter, medicine, and latrines. Given the conditions at the camps, many were dying of dehydration, cholera, and dysentery. According to one source, "by July 1994, despite an intensification of international relief efforts in the region, at least 2,000 refugees were dying each day, adding to a refugee camp death toll already in excess of 20,000."[70] More problematic for the aid workers, however, was that many of the refugees had planned, staged, and carried out one of the most brutal attempts at genocide in recent memory. However, the majority of people in the camps were not members of the Interahamwe or the army (FAR). Separating the goats from the sheep would be nearly impossible. Nonetheless, the former government of Rwanda (FGOR) controlled the camps and determined who could enter and who could leave.[71] With worldwide media centered on the problems of these refugees, however, ignoring their plight was difficult. Nonetheless, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) was unprepared for the size of the inflow, as they had only planned on receiving about 7,000 refugees.[72] So the international community sent additional supplies to the region. By October 1996, in Goma alone, there were only enough supplies for 700,000 refugees for a month.[73]

Regional Impact of the Refugee Camps

Although Zaire was responsible for managing these camps, it did not have either the inclination or ability to disarm the former FAR and Interahamwe. In principle,

either the French or Zairian troops, however, many of these arms were returned to the militiamen—along with additional arms.[74] As such, these camps were to become a major source of instability for the region. First, the refugees were organized in exile by the FGOR. Thus, nearly the whole government of Rwanda simply reestablished itself on Zairian soil. Though such organization would ordinarily be a boon for law and order, the leadership of the camps were the perpetrators of a genocide in which some 500,000–800,000 men, women, and children were killed. In fact, it is estimated that about 50,000 ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and Hutu guerrillas from Burundi were in these camps.[75] Nonetheless, given the lack of medicine, food, and shelter, the international community could not but aid the camps.

Since the camps became organized by the former government of Rwanda, or the *genocidaires* as they were called by their detractors, the interests of the leaders of these camps were to (1) maintain their power even in exile, (2) avoid repatriation to Rwanda to escape punishment for their deeds, (3) to rearm and resupply themselves in order to eventually retake power in Rwanda by force. Toward these goals, they had interests in the camps as follows: (1) to maintain the flow of humanitarian assistance provided for the masses for their own purposes, and (2) keep most refugees from returning to Rwanda. Should most innocent refugees return, the guilty would remain separate from the masses and be exposed as those that perpetrated the genocide. Further, they would also lose their human shields, which they thought would protect them from either international or regional forces.

Moreover, armed incursions into Rwanda from these camps began soon after they were established. The initial attacks began in October 1994, though they increased in intensity and frequency over time. According to Reed, the FGOR did not intend to invade Rwanda per se, rather they sought to destabilize Rwanda and turn the remaining Hutu against the minority Tutsi leadership. The attacks ranged from skirmishes on the border to incursions into Rwanda going as far as Kigali itself. This was so disturbing to the new government of Rwanda that Paul Kageme, the leader of the RPF, told American diplomats that if no international force would disarm the people in the camps and prevent future incursions into their territory that they would do it themselves.[76]

Domestic Impact of Refugee Camps

From all appearances, Mobutu welcomed the FGOR into Zaire with open arms. Given the predicament that the FGOR found itself in, it would prove to be a loyal ally to Mobutu—as it would never seek to overthrow him or to replace him. On the one hand, the people in the FGOR were vulnerable to return to Rwanda for punishment for their crimes and needed sanctuary. On the other hand, foreign nationals could not gain the allegiance of Zairians and were thus not a likely political threat to Mobutu. Finally, as the French had backed both of these francophone regimes, they were natural allies.

with their anti-Tutsi views, with their ambitions to establish a Hutuland in exile,[77] and with their relative autonomy from Kinshasa—their impact on local politics was earthshaking. First, the Interahamwe and ex-FAR sought to continue their policy of attacking Tutsi. Soon after arriving in Zaire, these militiamen, with the support of local politicians who nursed grudges against the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, attacked Banyarwanda villages in North Kivu. By December 1995, several hundreds of Zairian Tutsi and other locals had been killed by those seeking to establish their Hutuland in Eastern Zaire.[78] Thousands more were dislocated from their land. The Rwandan Hutu refugees acted in concert with the Zairian army, as well as Zairians of other ethnic groups, to attack indigenous Tutsi and take their property. For the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, this was a matter of ideology and obtaining resources in a foreign land, for other non-Banyarwandan Zairians, it was a time to settle old scores and to quench land hunger. These skirmishes would divide the Banyarwandan into their Hutu and Tutsi constituent elements, though they had acted in concert prior to this point. The Tutsi elements of the Banyarwanda as well as the Banyamulenge found themselves under siege and in danger of their lives, fortunes, and property. Thus, the genocide from Rwanda was replaying itself in Zaire, though with somewhat less intensity.

The Spark: The Rebellion in Kivu

The Zairians of Rwandan descent found themselves completely isolated, politically vulnerable, and under attack. That they could not count on the Zairian government was evidenced by the act of April 28, 1995 by the Transitional Government, which stripped both Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge of their Zairian citizenship.[79] Anti-Tutsi violence on the part of Interahamwe and ex-FAR as well as FAZ troops led to the displacement of between 100,000 and 250,000 individuals in Zaire.[80] As a result, nearly all of the ethnic Tutsi population of Northern Kivu had left, though they had once been in the majority.

When the anti-Tutsi violence spread to South Kivu, and as invasions into Rwanda from these camps continued, these pressures resulted in a military counterattack by the Banyamulenge against the government forces (i.e., FAZ), the ex-FAR, and against the Interahamwe. The earliest counterattacks were launched in the south, in Uvira, where the Banyamulenge were the strongest. In October 1996, "units of the RPF, assisted by Banyamulenge elements, launched a series of deadly raids against each of the dozen or so refugee camps strung along the borders with Rwanda and Burundi, killing thousands and sending an estimated 400,000 running for their lives while approximately the same number chose to return to their homeland."[81] Toward this end, the Banyamulenge sought common cause with the Rwandans who viewed the camps on their borders as armed enemy camps. According to one source, the Banyamulenge were able to defend themselves against the attacks of the FAZ and Interahamwe given their mountainous homes, which they were able to defend with light arms.[82]

when the Banyamulenge, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, moved against their attackers—the army and ex-FAR.[83] The forces that Kabila led were called the *Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire* (AFDL) and were based in Shaba and East Kasai. In response, the transitional government declared all people of Tutsi origins to be noncitizens and were called upon to leave the country. Also, the deputy governor of South Kivu asked remaining Banyamulenge to leave the province. He gave them six days.[84] The rebels soon shifted their attention from FAZ bases to the refugee camps. As mentioned earlier, the camps were evacuated and the refugees began to return home or drove further into Zairian territory—and out of far Eastern Zaire.

The exact extent of Rwanda involvement in the rebellion in Zaire was difficult to assess initially and remains a matter of debate. According to one report, the AFDL was composed of "a patchwork of Rwandan Tutsi soldiers, Angolan government troops, new Zairian recruits and recently returned exiles from the Zairian province of Katanga."[85] According to many press releases of the Zairian government, the entire rebel force was comprised of only Tutsi troops from Rwanda. However, given the recent disenfranchisement of Zairians of Tutsi ethnicity, the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge would be classified as foreign by definition. At the time, Zairian officials held that the attacks in the north were waged by the RPF, though they were supplying and fighting alongside the Banyamulenge in the south (of Kivu).[86] However, a few years later, McNulty would write:

> It is now a matter or record that the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) [read RPF] spearheaded the AFDL campaign. Rwanda officers planned and directed military operations, and mid-level commanders led AFDL forces throughout. Rwanda troops participated in the capture of at least four cities (Lumumbashi, Kisangani, Kenge, and Kinshasa), and Rwanda had provided arms and training for those forces even before the rebellion began.[87]

Nonetheless, much of the rank and file were Zairian, and the nationalistic surge of anti-Mobutism as a rallying call for other ethnic groups in the area gave the AFDL a thin patina of legitimacy as an indigenous force. According to Prunier, the spark of the rebellion was truly from within Zaire and its ethnoregional conflicts, the persecution of local Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda—with the collusion of the Zairian government, but the war and its allies were regional.[88] Moreover, Emizet argues that the Rwandans sought domestic insurgent allies to create a nationalist force that could overthrow Mobutu. As such, they allowed Laurent Kabila to become the spokesperson for the AFDL, which was a combination of four political parties.[89]

Moreover, Uganda joined the rebellion as fighting moved closer to its borders. The FAZ had been supporting rebels who were seeking to overthrow Yoweri Museveni. The anti-Museveni rebels were called the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) and had been operating in Zairian territory.[90] However, as Kabila's AFDL moved into the territory that had been used by the rebels against Uganda, so too did Ugandan troops.[91] The combination of

ex-FAR, and anti-Ugandan rebels. The camps of the ADF were completely cleared through their combined efforts. The AFDL soon occupied most of Northern and Eastern Haut-Zaire. Three months later, Kisangani, the capital of Haut-Zaire fell, along with the best base of operation for a counterattack for Mobutu's troops.

In the south, the ex-FAR and FAZ retreated into a zone traditionally controlled, or used, by UNITA rebels. In a preemptive move and to neuter the possible alliance of UNITA, FAZ, and ex-FAR, the Angolan government (MPLA) allowed AFDL to attack from its border.[92] It is also reported that Angolan regular troops were present for battles at Bafwasende and Bunia.[93] Moreover, Swahili speakers [presumed to be AFDL troops] were present in Cabinda, which is part of Angola and near the Zairian capital of Kinshasa.[94] Even prior to these battles, the government of Angola reported flew former Katangese rebels into rebel territory so that they could join the AFDL.[95] When rebel forces were finally closing in on Kinshasa, Angolan forces once again were instrumental. According to McNulty, Angolan tanks and heavy artillery were used to force UNITA, ex-FAR, and the remaining pro-Mobutu Zairian troops across the river into Brazzaville.[96]

Burundi, as well as Rwanda, was accused of sending its army into Zaire either to attack Zaire, or to assist the Banyamulenge, depending on the accounts.[97] Their self-interest to do so would be to attack their Hutu rebels found in Zairian territory. The all-Hutu militant wing of Burundi's *Conseil National pour la défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD) was located in Zaire just across the border from Burundi. Burundi, like Rwanda, is a bicommunal society where the Hutu and Tutsi comprise approximately 85 percent and 15 percent of the population, respectively. Unlike Rwanda, where a revolution had the Hutu in charge from 1959 onward, Burundi has been run by Tutsi since independence. Therefore, it was also a bicommunal society, though a minority-dominant one. When the attacks on the camps began, Burundi sent in troops to assist the RPF-trained Banyamulenge and the AFDL to attack the camps of the CNDD. According to a leader of the CNDD, the rebels were really Burundi and Rwandan troops acting as if they were indigenous rebels.[98] Once these camps were cleared, many of the Burundians returned to Burundi, and the rebel forces marched north.[99]

Other countries also came to back the rebellion, though by most accounts this was diplomatic as much as anything else. Beyond Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, other countries, such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, expressed support for Kabila and his movement.[100] For example, the AFDL had close ties with Zimbabwe that emerged as a supplier of military support.[101]

By early November, AFDL and its allies had cleared the refugee camps in Uvira, Bukavu, and Goma and held territory from Burundi to Uganda.[102] The early successes of the AFDL and its attempts to establish "good governance" over the territories it held, changed its public image from that of a Tutsi-led rebellion to that of an anti-Mobutu uprising. With such easy military victories, the AFDL continued to expand its zone of control and began a campaign to overthrow Mobutu. Few real military confrontations occurred as the underpaid Zairian army was unwilling to stand and fight.

erstwhile ally. The Zairian government armed the ex-FAR in hopes that they would fight more determinedly than did the FAZ. Moreover, Mobutu brought in mercenaries from Serbia, as well as UNITA troops for the defense of Kisangani.[103] Unfortunately for Mobutu and his allies, the crack Zairian troops brought in to bolster the mercenaries fired on them instead. The latter fled as did the FAZ troops, allowing the AFDL to enter Kisangani in March.

Although the French wanted to intervene, by creating a cease-fire and sending in UN peacekeepers, they could not muster the votes for such an enterprise soon enough. For example, the United Nations was on the verge of approving of sending troops into the region in November 1997, but military gains by the AFDL rendered the decision unnecessary: the camps had been routed, the FGOR was fleeing further into the hinterland of Zaire, and nearly a million refugees began to repatriate themselves to escape the problems associated with life in the camps and to risk reprisals upon their return.[104]

The military juggernaut continued to advance against Zairian troop strongholds, though few proved to be strongly defended. The FAZ tended to flee or melt away right before the AFDL arrived. Once Kisangani fell, few serious efforts at resistance emerged. By mid-April, Kabila held the diamond producing areas of the two Kasais as well as the copper producing area of Shaba. They already held the gold areas of Haut-Zaire. In effect, Mobutu's hold over the productive sectors of Zaire had ended (though Mobutu still controlled the money supply).[105] On May 17, Kabila declared himself the president of Zaire, which he renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Mobutu, suffering from prostate cancer, absconded with what was left of his fortune to Togo, and then to Morocco. He died in Morocco on September 7, 1997. His decision to keep his country so weak that internal dissent was impossible also kept him from defending against a rebellion with regional backing. He could not fight the AFDL militarily, and they had more legitimacy than did Mobutu: the rebels (despite the Tutsis among their ranks) were welcomed as liberators nearly everywhere they arrived. Mobutu's tactic of holding his country hostage to chaos resulted in chaos, and this time the United States and France stood back and watched as the process unfolded.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the analysis, the rebellion in Zaire that resulted in Mobutu's overthrow cannot be reduced to a mere proxy war of the Rwandan Tutsi government (or Burundian) against Mobutu's government, though the war required regional support to be successful. Instead, his overthrow was the result of a confluence of forces that combined to create an unstoppable flood that swept his regime away. First, Mobutu had lost international financial support for his regime. When the Cold War ended, Western powers became less interested in anti-Communist allies and more interested in good governance and political liberalization. Mobutu bucked both of these latter trends mightily. Second, he presided over a declining economy and a deteriorating infrastructure.

ization, was quite low. Even his army, the primary source of his rule, was ineptly run, poorly paid, and a paper tiger. Third, no regional forces would back him once others had decided to move against him. Over the years, he had helped insurgents against Angola and was then hosting—on Zairian soil—perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide—who were now leading raids against Uganda, Rwanda, and even Burundi. Fourth, he alienated beyond limits the Tutsi, and many Hutu, who had been living in Zaire for decades, if not a century. Although the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge curried favor with the Mobutu administration during the 1970s, by the 1980s, they became political targets. On the one hand, most Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge lost their citizenship in 1981. On the other hand, they became the targets of concerted attacks by both the Zairian army and their newfound allies, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.

Had the rebels tried to overthrow Mobutu without the logistical and leadership support of the Rwandan army, the rebellion may have stalled or failed. Although Mobutu's army had been unable to stand against other well-trained armies in the past, it had been sufficient to stop local rebellions, especially when they were poorly armed and provisioned. Moreover, the ex-FAR had every incentive to destroy the rebellion that might send them into flight back into Rwanda or farther into the Zairian hinterland. Also, the battle for Kisangani may have failed without this support. Part of the loss of Kisangani was the regular army turned against the mercenaries. Had the advancing army been seen as foreign invaders, and not as an anti-Mobutu movement, the soldiers may have made different calculations.

Had no indigenous Banyamulenge group existed, Rwanda would still probably have attacked the camps for several reasons. First, the camps were used as bases of attack carried out on Rwandan territory. Second, as long as the leaders of the camps were the ones who perpetrated the genocide, those guilty of the genocide would not allow the other refugees to return. The return of most refugees would leave the FGOR (the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and other *genocidaires*) vulnerable to attack, and the international community would no longer provide humanitarian relief to camps made up primarily of armed militiamen.

Moreover, had the Zairian government not revoked the citizenship rights or the Banyamulenge or the Banyarwanda, the consequences of Rwanda's attacks against the camps probably would not have led to the rebellion. Only when it appeared that anti-Mobutu elements were in charge of the rebellion, did the snowball effect come into effect. RPF attacks against the camps without apparent indigenous support probably would not have led to a rebellion as such, at least not in the short term. On the one hand, international norms militate against supporting an outside invasion of a country. Both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity are organized around the principle of sovereignty and against territorial aggression and probably would have condemned the incursion. On the other hand, local citizens may have rallied against the "foreign invasion," and the rebels would not have been welcomed as heroes in nearly every town that they took.

As such, several steps seemed to be necessary for Mobutu's overthrow: first, his being ostracized by international actors and IFIs; second, his deteriorating economy,

fourth, the rebellion of the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda caused by their loss of citizenship and persecution by the FAZ and ex-FAR; fifth, the early military successes of the Banyamulenge that routed the ex-FAR, FAZ, and Interahamwe—as well as drawing other indigenous support; and sixth, the backing in arms, men, munitions, and leadership of the RPF, as well as other regional actors. Finally, the inaction of both regional and international actors during the onslaught against Kinshasa and Mobutu. None were sufficient, all seem to have been necessary.

Importantly, no regional or international allies came to Mobutu's defense militarily. Had any significant regional or international power done so, the likely outcome would have been a stalemate or a defeat of the rebellion. Evidence for this comes from the second rebellion launched from the East by the Banyamulenge and backed by Rwanda and Uganda. After Kabila was in power, he became estranged from the allies in the East who had helped empower him. Once again Rwanda and Uganda felt that their borders were no longer secure. They launched an invasion of the DRC (Zaire was so renamed after Kabila took power), though with different results. Although they were able to take more than a third of the country in rapid battles, they were opposed by Angolan and Zimbabwean forces. Had Moroccan troops (or French, Angolan, or Zimbabwean) opposed those of the Banyamulenge and RPF during the first rebellion, as they had the Katangese rebels in Shaba I and Shaba II, the outcome might have been more like the second—or even like the two Shaba invasions. Mobutu might have stayed in power once again by pitting the ends against the middle—until another crisis would expose his regime's true weakness.

Acronyms

ADF	Alliance of Democratic Forces/[anti-Museveni, antigovernment (Ugandan) rebel force]
AFDL	*Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire*/Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CDR	*la Coalition pour la Défense de la République*/the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic.
CNDD	*Conseil National pour la défense de la Démocratie*/National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Hutu antigovernment rebels in Burundi
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo/formerly Zaire
DSP	*Division Spéciale Présidentielle*/Mobutu's Presidential Guard Division
ex-FAR	former Forces Armées Rwandaises/Rwandan Army in exile in Zaire
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises/The Rwandan Army prior to invasion
FAZ	Forces Armées Zairoises/The Zairian Army
FGOR	Former Government of Rwanda (Reed's term)
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libértação de Angola*/National Liberation Front of Angola
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund

MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPR	*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*/Revolutionary Populaire Movement
MRND	*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*/The National Revolutionary Movement for Development
MRNDD	*Mouvement Républicain National pour la Democratie et le Développement* The National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
NRA	National Resistance Army (of Uganda/Museveni)
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Tutsi Army, formerly RPF
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front/Tutsi led force from Uganda
UNAMIR	United Nation Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNITA	*Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Notes

1. For other treatments of the impact of the Rwandan genocide on Zaire, see McNulty (1999: 53–82); also Gnamo (1999: 321–50).
2. For analysis of ODA in Africa, see Lancaster (1999).
3. Schraeder (1996: 173–90). Though many now wonder how strong this commitment really was. For example, Richard Joseph has argued that France now embraces "acceptable governance" as opposed to either "good governance" or "democracy." See Joseph (1999), fn. 27. Nonetheless, the original quote only stresses political liberalization or openness and not democracy per se.
4. For an overview of these institutions, see Mosley et al. (1991). Also see chapters 1–3 in Callaghy and Ravenhil (1993).
5. For which countries are considered to have been better adjusters and for their relative performances, see World Bank (1994).
6. World Bank (1989); also see World Bank (1992).
7. For domestic explanations for causes of transition, see Bratton, and van de Walle (1997). For "bandwagoning," see Huntington (1990).
8. Unless states otherwise, the data from this section come from *Africa South of the Sahara* (1999 or 2001).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. World Development Report (1989), table 1.
12. *African Development Indicators* (1997), table 1-1.
13. Ibid., tables 2-3, and 2-4, respectively.
14. Ibid., table 3-3.
15. For the importance of international community to state consolidation, see Jackson and Rosberg (1986: 45–70); Herbst (2000); and Englebert (2000).
16. Unless stated otherwise, the data information in this section come from *Africa South of the Sahara 2001.*
17. For background, see Meditz and Merrill (1994).
18. Huntington (1990); Diamond (1996: 20–37).

20. For example, see Clapham (1998).
21. See, e.g., Herbst (2000); and Englebert (2000).
22. Herbst (2000).
23. Young and Turner (1985: 273).
24. This section draws heavily from the following sources: Prunier (1995); Lemarchand (1999: 324–52); Emizet (2000: 163–202); Adelman and Suhrke (1999); and Hintjens (1999: 241–86).
25. Emizet (2000: 166).
26. Lemarchand (1999: 330).
27. The Economist (1996: 3, 45).
28. Emizet (2000: 167).
29. Ibid., 166; Lemarchand (1999: 334).
30. Emizet (2000: 166). Also, see Young and Turner (1985).
31. Lemarchand (1999: 334); Emizet (2000: 167).
32. Prunier (1995: 4).
33. World Development Report 1989/1999, tables 1 and 2.
34. Human Development Report 1992, table 10.
35. The data in this section is computed from The World Bank (1997), Tables 1-1 and 8-12. The translation from hectares to square kilometers is this: (H ⋆.01) = square kilometers.
36. World Development Report (1989/1999), table 4.
37. Ibid., table 12. A year before the genocide was chosen.
38. See Schmitt (1988: 33). Also see, Milne (1981).
39. *Africa South of the Sahara* (2001).
40. Prunier (1995: 60).
41. Ibid., 76.
42. Ibid., 347.
43. Schmitt (1988: 42).
44. Horowitz (1985: 21–41).
45. Prunier (1995: 56).
46. Lemarchand (1999: 328).
47. Prunier (1995: 51).
48. These numbers also come from Lemarchand (1999).
49. McNulty (2000: 107).
50. Ibid., 121.
51. Longman (1997).
52. Prunier (1995: 76–77).
53. Ibid., 89–90.
54. Ibid., 127.
55. Ibid., 127.
56. See Prunier (1998: 119–33).
57. McNulty (2000: 109).
58. Reed (1998: 137).
59. Prunier (1995: 128).
60. Ibid., 165.
61. Ibid., 166.
62. Ibid., 173.
63. For an analysis of competing theories, see ibid., 213–29.
64. Ibid., 264–65.
65. See especially Reed (1998).
66. Prunier (1995: 312).
67. Ibid., 304.

69. Prunier (1999: 281–306).
70. *Africa South of the Sahara, 2001.*
71. Reed (1998). He uses the acronym FGOR to stand for ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and former government officials who were complicit in the genocide.
72. Halvorsen (1999: 307–20).
73. McKinley (1996b: A7).
74. Halvorsen (1999: 312).
75. Gnamo (1999: 324).
76. Ibid., 329.
77. Emizet (2000).
78. Ibid., 168.
79. Ibid., 168.
80. Reed (1998: 144).
81. Lemarchand (1999: 335).
82. The Economist (1996: 45).
83. Reed (1998: 146).
84. Emizet (2000: 168).
85. Block (1997: A12).
86. McKinley (1996a).
87. McNulty (1999: 55).
88. Prunier (1995: 197); cited in Gnamo (1999: 330).
89. The Party of the People's Revolution led by Laurent Kabila, the National Resistance Council for Democracy led by Kisase Ngandu, the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire led by Massasou Nindanga, and the Democratic Alliance of Peoples led by Deogratias Bugera. Cited in Emizet, "Massacre of Refugee," fn. 11.
90. Lemarchand (1999: 336).
91. Reed (1998: 150).
92. Ibid., 151.
93. French (1997: 1, 6).
94. Ibid., 1, 6.
95. Ibid., 1, 6.
96. McNulty (1999: 77).
97. McKinley (1996a).
98. Ibid. Statement attributed to Innocent Nimpagaritse as spokesman for "main Burundian rebel group."
99. Lemarchand (1999: 336).
100. French (1997: A6).
101. Reed (1998: 151).
102. Ibid., 148.
103. French (1999).
104. Reed (1998: 149).
105. Ibid., 151.

CHAPTER 8

The Regionalization, Internationalization, and Perpetuation of Conflict in the Middle East

Jeffrey W. Helsing

Introduction

As the United States appeared poised on the brink of war with Iraq at the beginning of 2003, the question of ethnic conflicts in the region seemed remote, or at best on the margins of discussion about international relations and the Middle East. And yet, many observers and experienced analysts of Middle East politics urged that the issue of ethnic conflict be a major part of the Bush administration's thinking as it made plans for war and its aftermath. The politics of identity are critical to managing the future of Iraq and are the essence of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs columnist of *The New York Times*, wrote in late January that there were considerable risks if the United States and its allies found themselves inheriting a divided and problematic country: "You've just won the Arab Yugoslavia—an artificial country congenitally divided among Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, Nasserites, leftists and a host of tribes and clans that can only be held together with a Saddam-like iron fist" (Friedman 2003: 13). As Joseph C. Wilson, former U.S. chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, noted recently about regime change in Iraq: "The likely outcome will be a very, very nasty affair. There will be revenge killings against the Sunnis, against the Tikrits, against the Baathis. There will be Shiia grabs for power in the south and probably Baghdad. There will be Kurdish grabs for, at a minimum, Kirkuk as well as likely a rekindling of their historic ambition for an independent Kurdistan, which opens a whole other can of worms. In the middle of this will be an American occupation force" (Cordesman 2002: 7). And, heavily involved in this ethnic cauldron will be the neighboring states of Iran, Turkey, and Syria each of which feels it has a major stake in the outcome of a regime change in Iraq.

The nature of ethnic divisions and the relationships between different groups, therefore, not only has a great impact on the perpetuation of violent conflict in the Middle East region, but has, or will have, an equally important impact on whether peace and reconciliation are possible in many of the most significant

contemplates both war and reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq, the nature of the ethnic and religious divide—between Sunni and Shiite Arabs and between Arab and Kurd, and the additional demands of Turkmans, Assyrians, and Yazidis—will have, or should have, a major impact on how Iraq emerges from its confrontation with the United States. Whether Iraq can become the first Arab democracy and lead toward broad democratic changes in the Middle East, as American President George W. Bush has proclaimed, will depend greatly on how the different goals and perceptions of these groups in Iraq are managed. Peacemaking, reconstruction, reconciliation—"nation-building"—all depend on the right balance between hostile groups. Can the competition for power between these groups be managed by emergent democratic institutions or will attempts to democratize in the Middle East simply unleash uncontrollable forces? In the case of Iraq, if American policy is to succeed, either via war or some nonviolent regime change, this will depend upon whether building a democracy that embraces and provides institutions for dealing with such identity and ethnic differences is possible in Iraq.

The forces of tribe and ethnicity, nationalism, and religion shape conflicts in the region. It is thus important to examine the most prominent cases of conflict and war that have significant identity-based elements: Lebanon, Iraq (in particular, the Kurdish question) and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. All have been, and continue to be, influenced by regional and global outsiders. Internationalization of these conflicts perpetuates them; yet, internationalization also holds the key to their resolution as well. It is important to emphasize that these are not the only ethnic or ethno-political conflicts or cases of oppressed minorities in the region. There exist Palestinian–Jordanian tensions in Jordan, Berbers in Algeria and Morocco that press primarily for economic and cultural aspirations, and Saharawis pushing for independence in the Western Sahara, but these cases are the ones that have had the greatest international ramifications and lasted the longest in the region. One could also talk of other embattled ethnic and religious minorities (Copts in Egypt, Alawis and Druze in the Levant, Shiites in Saudi Arabia, and Khuzestan Arabs, Azeris, Bahais, and Baluchs in Iran). But most of these conflicts have been managed either within the state structure or have had fewer regional and international ramifications (Harff 1993: 217–19).

Of the cases for this chapter, Lebanon is a relatively straightforward example of ethnic conflicts that have been exacerbated by weakening state structures and resulting diffusion. The Kurdish conflict is somewhat unique because of the shadow of unmet Kurdish aspirations that spread into four different and often antagonistic states, none of which support Kurdish independence but often exploit Kurdish aspirations in order to weaken a neighbor. The Kurdish conflict in Turkey would have been a useful case to explore as well, but the Iraqi case has always been subject to greater international forces and, is very timely. Finally, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a unique ethnic conflict because it has always been a highly internationalized conflict born of two world wars and focused on a small area of land with much broader regional and global implications. Israel is one of only two states—Pakistan is the other—created specifically as a religious, ethnic state. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has always been very high on the

been framed in different ways. And, it has always been, at its core, about identity and recognition.

Identity and Ethnicity in the Middle East

Throughout the Middle East region there are clear historical, linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences, yet there are some singular and overarching commonalities that create a much greater sense of identity at the nationalist and religious levels. Many would argue that even though there are 18 different Arab states, the Arab people constitute a single Arab nation. There is also a Jewish state, a Turkish state, and a Persian state.[1] In the Jewish state of Israel, there is a considerable Arab minority and in Turkey and Iran, there are sizeable Kurdish populations. Nevertheless, the history and development of the Middle East region has revolved around the establishment of two predominant identities—Islam and Arabism. The Middle East in the twentieth century, as with many parts of the world, saw substantial shifts in population often due to expulsions or exile of populations. These would include the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey, a majority of the Arabs from preindependence Israel, most Jews from the Arab states, Kurds from Turkey, and Iran and Iraq. Of the close to 300 million inhabitants of the Arab countries, about 40 million (15%) can be defined as non-Arab or non-Muslim. Ten percent are Christian, 5 million are Jews in Israel (1.7%). The disposition of minorities is not much different than what befell minorities in most parts of the world in the twentieth century; in fact, when compared with Europe and the Indian subcontinent during the twentieth century, the Middle East was much less affected. And, it was the exile and wholesale slaughter of Jews in Europe that created the most internationally significant conflict in the Middle East: the Arab–Israeli wars and perpetual violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

It is important to note that identity and nationality may be viewed somewhat differently in the Middle East than in the West. In the West, the state where an individual resides and has jurisdiction over him usually determines nationality. In the Middle East, who that individual is—the heritage carried from one's ancestors, including a historical, cultural, and religious identity—determines nationality, despite where he or she lives (Ra'anan 1991: 14–15). This is a personal notion of nationality and identity. Religion is a critical component of that identity (and for some it may be the most important element of one's identity). This type of nationality establishes a clear boundary. But if the Middle East is a region where identity matters very much, that does not necessarily mean that ethnicity always matters. In much of the region ethnicity is often subordinated to the larger identities of Arab nationalism or Islam. In Lebanon, for example, Christian and Muslim with equal vehemence will denounce Israel and, more recently, the United States for anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab actions and policies. There would be little if any differentiation whether the denouncer were Sunni or Shiite Muslim, Druze, or Maronite or Greek Christian. Muslim and Coptic Christian students would join in anti-Israel or anti-American protests in downtown Cairo.

Sudan, and Afghanistan, have simply imploded. There are also significant internal cleavages in Israel and Turkey as well as sporadic unrest in Jordan and Egypt, and in some Gulf States. In Lebanon, a peace that finally ended a long and bloody civil war remains shaky as the country takes tentative steps to rebuild and reconcile. Syria is ruled by a dictatorial regime headed by members of a minority (Alawites) propped up by an elitist military/political party. And the Kurds, one of the largest, stateless ethnic groups anywhere in the world directly impact any political considerations in the countries of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. From Western Sahara at one end, and Afghanistan at the other end, the Middle East is rife with conflicts, many with little solution or end in sight. But, because of the predominance of authoritarian rule throughout the region, many ethnic conflicts have been suppressed or contained, thus remaining local, not regional, much less international.

It is important to emphasize that while ethnicity is an important factor in the conflicts in the Middle East, ethnic conflict is not the sole or exclusive source of most problems in the Middle East region. Not all conflict in the Middle East can be reduced to an ethno-political dispute. One of the bloodiest wars of the twentieth century was fought between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. While there were elements of ethnic and even religious differences in the conflict, the war was primarily a struggle over land and regional power. The same could be said of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting international response. It should also be noted that, in citing these two examples, internationalization is not inherently conflict exacerbating. The array of international forces against Baghdad ended the conflict with Kuwait by expelling Iraq from the country and reduced its military capacity considerably. During the Iran–Iraq war, the international indifference helped sustain the conflict, although periodically countries in the West would assist Iraq to the extent that it would not be defeated or overrun by Iran.

Ethno-political conflicts are those "in which groups . . . . who define themselves using ethnic or national criteria make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state or against other political actors" (Gurr 2001: 163). Even though they may be seeking equal rights and opportunities as well as political power, the identity itself matters. As Ted Gurr notes, national groups usually seek independence or they desire to leave the political entity; while minorities want access to the system. "In states that suppress or ignore such claims, leaders [of ethno-political groups] are likely to follow strategies of violence that often escalate into protracted ethnic warfare" (Gurr 2001: 164). In states with weak or nonexistent political parties, democratic means do not exist to compete for, and achieve, political power. This has been the case in Kurdistan and to some degree in Lebanon. Israel, the most democratic of all the states, is the embodiment of an identity-based nation; and the result has been constant conflict if not outright war through most of its 55-year history. Since 1992, Israel has recognized some of the claims of Palestinians but there is an impasse between what Palestinians claim and what Israel will give, or give up. Those ethnic groups in the Middle East that have been able to organize for rebellion or violence have often had a territorial base; those that are dispersed and urban have it more difficult. But that is less the case today with the rise of terrorist activities.

salience of group identity. Many of the appeals used by ethno-political leaders aim at increasing the salience of group identity by invoking historical memories and symbols of victimization. Serious episodes of conflict leave bitter residues in people's memories and for a long time afterward can be used by leaders to justify political action" (Gurr 2001: 169). In the Middle East, the past is used to justify action but is also a battleground. Who is to blame, or who did what to whom? As Ian Lustick has noted, "In many countries, including Israel, we see ongoing political (and often violent) struggles over just which identity, which vision within the community's repertoire is to be honored" (Lustick 1999: 355).

The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflicts

To understand the relationship between ethnic conflicts in the Middle East and the larger international community, one must ask whether these conflicts are shaped by international forces and pressures or whether such conflicts are shaped by the unique nature of the relationships of the conflicting ethnic groups. It is clear, "A great many international factors help shape the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of ethnopolitical groups. They also affect state policies toward minorities. Moreover, the nature of international engagement is a major determinant of whether ethnopolitical conflicts are of short duration or long and whether they end in negotiated settlements or humanitarian disasters" (Gurr 2001: 177).

Where violent conflicts have emerged, they have been easily internationalized because the international community is highly engaged in the Middle East. And, ethno-national groups in the most significant and violent identity conflicts depend on outside political and military support. In addition, with most of the major ethno-political conflicts in the Middle East, outside powers have taken different sides—that is particularly true in Lebanon (mostly other regional powers took sides, but on occasion international powers were involved). In many ways, the most predominant conflict in the region—the larger Arab–Israeli conflict and the escalating Israeli–Palestinian conflict—is so predominant because it has been internationalized and ongoing for 55 years. It was also a critical arena for competition between the superpowers during much of the Cold War.

Where the United States and the West have considerable strategic interests at stake, there has clearly been intervention to keep certain ethnic nationalities from achieving their objectives—particularly the Kurds and the Palestinians. But this has also been the case in Lebanon. Thus, identity-based conflicts that are internationalized are recipes for intractability. And, intractability is exacerbated when the identity is victim-based (as opposed to identity-based on the emergence of a new state).

There are a number of generalizations about the internationalization of ethnic conflict in the Middle East:

1. The Middle East region has for over a century been the focus of geopolitical interests and power struggles between Great Powers. Thus, few ethnic

a very weak ethnic group against a powerful state, and rarely reach the dimensions of major warfare.
2. Political and social dynamics in the region are strongly influenced by, even subsumed by, a dominant religious and ethnic affinity: Islam and Arabism. Thus, the most prominent identity-based conflicts revolve around groups outside one, if not both, of those two predominant regional identity groups.
3. Conflicts have arisen or been exacerbated by the fact that national identity in the Middle East was often artificially constructed, due to colonial policies and the establishment of artificial boundaries and artificial regimes.
4. Conflicts escalate and are more easily exploited by outside parties when the state authority is weak or beset by internal political divisions (Lebanon), or its options constrained by outside forces (Iraq) or domestic checks (Israel, as a Jewish, democratic state).
5. The conflict with Israel in the Arab world and Islamic world reverberates throughout the Middle East and greatly affects relations between Middle East countries and much of the rest of the world, particularly the United States.
6. The conflict with Israel also overshadows, and in many ways preempts, legitimate grievances and forces of many groups in society.
7. Ethnic claims have been subverted for decades because, for the most part, the international community, particularly the United States, has geared its policies to preserving the status quo.

One cannot overestimate the prominent role of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in Middle East politics. Today, Arab nationalism and Islamism continue to center on the Palestinian issue. Anti-Israel policies and actions permeate the region and there is increasing anger directed against the American presence in the region, American support for Israel, and American support of pro-Western, nondemocratic and nonaccountable regimes. Those same regimes use antipathy against Israel as a way to divert attention and aggression outward and away from their own regressive policies. In fact, in most of the Middle East, because of the focus on Israel and increasingly on the United States, nationalism and Islamism have almost always taken precedence over class identity. And, the elites have perpetuated such loyalties in order to protect their hold on power. Thus, most would argue that the key to long-term peace in the Middle East lies in the transformation of the relationship between Israel and the Arab world, and perhaps between Israel and the Islamic world.

The Historical Legacy and the Rise of Nationalism and Islamism

Identity, particularly religious identity, was crucial during the Ottoman Empire. In effect, the Ottoman Empire "legitimated ethnic and sectarian diversity" in large part because of the "millet" system, in which one's identity was usually determined by religious affiliation (Binder 1999: 361). Under this framework of decentralized governance in the Ottoman Empire, personal status issues

the authority of an individual's community, usually religious officials. Under the Ottomans, except for taxing the subjects in the empire and performing some limited services, there was little involvement by the political authorities in the lives of the people. The community authorities collected certain taxes, were elected as officials, and judged civil cases of law. Thus, the Ottoman Empire was made up of distinct communities of Jews, Druze, Alawis, and numerous Christian groupings, regardless of where in the empire they lived. Jews and Christians in particular were scattered throughout the region. In fact, the legacies of the millet system are still felt in a few countries, particularly in Lebanon where the political system has embodied different laws for each community and created a compromise government pact based on a formulaic electoral representation and governmental authority. Because of the nature of Ottoman rule and the application of civil and property law, based on religious affiliation, identity has always existed and mattered. There was no such concept as a national or ethnic minority in the Ottoman Empire, only religious distinctions such as Jews and Christians. All Muslims were equal—language and culture were incidental (Fuller 1999: 225). Prior to the twentieth century, "Religion, not territory, served as the organizing principle of power, this always distinct from lower level of community solidarity rooted in clan, tribal, or ethnic bonding. Nationalism, as a rigorous doctrine that posited a criterion of peoplehood to legitimize power, was largely unknown in the Middle East" (Nisan 2002: 9).

Ethnic justification and national self-determination was promoted and embraced in Europe at the end of World War I, and that was true also in the Middle East but in significantly different ways. The peoples of the Ottoman Empire embraced the Wilsonian notion of self-determination and the end of empire. They appealed to the United States to fashion a new political map of the Middle East. But the Americans, as they did in Europe, withdrew from any post-war responsibility, leaving the fate of the Middle East to the victorious European powers, Britain, and France. Almost any sense of national identity was very new. At the same time, the Pahlavi regime in Iran was working to forge a Persian national identity and consolidating power while in Turkey, Kemal Ataturk advanced sweeping policies of secularism, modernism, and a Turkish identity, clearly with a view to emulating much in the West and Europe.

Nationalism is in many ways an elusive subject. Some scholars note that a nation is a people with a common past or history, or is the product of a remembered or imagined past (Pfaff 1993: 57). There is a feeling of uniqueness and a separateness that unites a people together—because of what they have in common with each other and what they have that is different from others. The similarities and differences can be territorial, religious, linguistic, tribal, or a shared history. Nationalism may be forged by a common experience or trauma, as was the case with the emergence of Palestinian nationalism.

Empires remain inclusive not exclusive as nations are; thus, the peoples under the Ottoman Empire retained much of their local culture and local political control over territory and peoples. Then, due to the artificial manner of how the European allies politically divided up the lands of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism emerged as both a unifying force and an anticolonial force. In many ways,

newly emergent states or nations in many regions. Few states in the Middle East were forged as a nation with centuries of common historical experience, although some states like Morocco had been nominally sovereign under the Ottomans, and Egypt had a continuous history and a sense of place and territory that went back many millennia. But others, like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia only came into existence in the early 1930s, when the leader of an Islamic sect known as the Wahabis, Ibn Saud, wrested power away from other tribal chieftains in the Arabian Peninsula. One of the losing chiefs was Sharif Hussein of Mecca whose two sons would be established by the British as the kings of Jordan and Iraq. Only after World War II, did most of the states of the Middle East become independent.

The European powers argued that emergent national entities in the Middle East were too immature politically to exercise independence much less real power. In addition, the French and British were keen to extend their influence and protection of interests in the subcontinent and Africa. And, it was necessary to keep the Russian Empire and then the successor Bolshevik regime in Moscow from extending its influence into the Middle East. There was little history of national unity or continuity in the Middle East when compared to Europe, India, China, or Japan, though there was a strong religious continuity. Thus, the British and French essentially created artificial states with invented dynastic monarchies placed on thrones or artificial seats of power. The boundaries were arbitrary and reflected administrative needs, with little thought given to any tribal and ethnic claims in certain regions.

As a result, many of the states that eventually emerged as independent entities after World War II often commanded little national loyalty. Only a few, such as Egypt or Morocco, had much of a sense of national identity and for many of the new citizens, tribal or religious identity was paramount. "The nations that exist today in the Middle East are all provisional, not only because they were the creations of the British and French who ran the Middle Eastern peace settlements of 1918–23, but also because in the opinion of many Arabs there is supposed to be an 'Arab nation' without internal frontiers" (Pfaff 1993: 116). Initially, the central authorities had little influence over or reach into the hinterlands. Zionism, only two decades old, was much further along than Arab nationalism. In many parts of the region, there were simply Arab or Muslim tribes loosely ruled from afar by the Ottomans. Where there is the greatest conflict involving ethnic minorities, there is a key issue of territory (Israel–Palestine, Kurds) or relatively equal parties competing for political power (Lebanon, Jordan, to some degree). Where those two issues are not significantly present (or possible) there is much less violent conflict (Copts, Berbers, Turkomens, Asyrrians, Baluchs, Druze, Alawites, etc.).

Yet, as elsewhere in the world in the twentieth century, nationalism swept across the Middle East, beginning in World War I when Arab tribes and leaders began to lobby for support from the British and French against Ottoman rule. But the Arab communities were effectively divided up after World War I; so too were Kurdish communities. Jews were given limited autonomy and probably would have remained a privileged minority if they had not seized power to go

desperation because of the holocaust in Europe. Thus, in the Middle East, there are interesting examples of peoples who refuse to accept minority status. In the end, only they can protect themselves. This includes the Jews of Israel (because of their collective experience in Europe and to some extent in the Middle East), the Kurds (particularly in Iraq where they were victims of poison gas as an instrument of ethnic cleansing), and the Palestinians (who were dispossessed from much of Palestine), many of whom live in exile throughout much of the Arab world and Middle East where they have few rights, much less citizenship.

Nationalism emerged as a counterweight to the European dominance of the Middle East. Such nationalism gained its greatest influence under Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. One consequence of Nasserism was to transform the Palestinian issue, focused on the right of return of refugees, to one of Arab nationalism that pitted the Arab world against Israel. Arab failures and defeat by Israel greatly undercut the nationalist message. So, in turn, Islamic fundamentalism came as a response to the failed nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. And the Palestinians and PLO made the call for a Palestinian state a new means to link Arabs and Muslims in the region. Thus, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains an identity issue throughout the Middle East. This conflict remains a source of pain and humiliation that affects or compounds other grievances and issues region-wide. So, both Arab nationalism and political Islam are critical unifying forces in the face of weak states that have had little common local or national elements with which to appeal to their citizens. One has to wonder how much both of these regional forces owe to the concurrent rise after World War I of a Jewish nationalism in the Middle East. How much of the existing unity or perception of common interests and common history is due to an anti-Jewish, anti-Israeli appeal? For many Arabs and Muslims, the creation of Israel or, as some would claim, the transplanting of Jews into the heart of the Arab and Muslim world was essentially a European problem imposed on the Arab people. In addition, there has been a backlash against American influence in the region because of the sense that American and Western values will undermine the unique identity and values of both Islam and Arabism.

Thus, "ethnic affinity becomes a powerful—though not the exclusive—mobilizer and promoter of collective interests. . . . modernization has witnessed the competitive mobilization of ethnic communities to capture and hold the machinery of the state, to claim their fair share of the resources deployed by government, or to demand autonomy from the reach of unfriendly political authorities" (Esman 1991: 58). The ethnic conflicts in the Middle East have revolved primarily around a share of political power and resources or autonomy. In this regard, nationalism can be viewed at two different levels in the Middle East: the larger Arab nationalism and the smaller "national" aspirations of ethnic groups, including Palestinians and Kurds. They are working to assert their self-determination; different ethnic groups in Lebanon are trying to find a way to live together in a single nation and assert their claims on the nation's resources. One could also add that Israelis and Palestinians are also trying to find a way to accommodate their aspirations as peoples and autonomy over their own lands

will ultimately have to face the probability of living with other peoples in a unified Iraq.

If, for the Arabs, common identity was an essential means to conquer, or pacify, a region, Islam was a very effective force for creating such a common sense of identity, despite ethnic differences. As Leonard Binder notes, "Ethnicity embraces religion, while religion scorns ethnicity" (Binder 1999: 363). Thus, over centuries of Arab conquest and, by extension, Muslim conquest carried out by Arabs, the name or identity of Arab, despite its local origins in the Arabian peninsula, became a region-wide phenomenon, with only a few pockets or areas where the indigenous people maintained their identity. And, it used religion as a unifier, particularly because Islam requires that the Koran only be read and reproduced in Arabic. There were no authorized translations into other languages. In addition, some anthropologists make the point that only in the most mountainous areas were people able to resist Arabization (Berbers, Assyrians, Kurds, etc.). Jews were able to re-exert themselves in the region as a powerful minority because of the strength and resources of a diaspora outside of the Middle East.

While some would argue that Zionism was at best a romantic notion of nationhood that emerged out of European secular nationalism (and its founder Theodor Herzl was a secular, assimilated Jewish intellectual from Austria) that inspired calls for all peoples and nations to achieve their national aspirations and statehood. The peace settlements that emerged out of World War I were the logical conclusion to this notion. But despite support by the victorious powers for a Jewish homeland (and also a Kurdish homeland) they politically backtracked from that in the immediate postwar period because of the instability that emerged in the remnants of the Ottoman lands. The Kurds never got their promised homeland because they were at political odds and were a relatively backward and isolated people. There was little international constituency for it. The Jews on the other hand were able to bring significant resources to bear in the move for emigration to Palestine and the creation of a homeland. But even then, Israel would never have been realized were it not for the tragic events in Europe with the rise of Nazism. Numerous historians of Israel have noted that World War I made Israel possible and World War II made it necessary.

By the end of the century, nationalism was for many a great failure. Statehood failed, as have many regimes, to serve the needs of most of the peoples of the Middle East and improve their lives. Some would argue that the artificial nature of statehood in the Middle East led to a movement toward nationhood, or Arab nationalism. The one attempt to unify Arab polities, the union between Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic, ended quickly and with major recriminations on both sides. In addition, the Arab states have suffered one political and military reverse after another. In some cases, they fought with each other, in others they lost wars to Israel, the non-Arab and non-Muslim transplant that represented European colonialism. Many of the regimes that were most anti-Israeli and anti-Western drew their support from the Soviet Union, which ultimately failed as a counterweight to American influence. And, the Arab countries have rarely been able to come together on an issue of vital importance to the region.

organizations. It has proven almost irrelevant regarding Israeli–Palestinian issues and ineffectual in inter-Arab disputes. It could do nothing for Lebanon during its bloody civil war and failed to prevent Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Eighty percent of the League's decisions have been unanimous but are rarely implemented (Salame 1988: 340).

Except for the Algerian victory over the French in 1962, there was little to cheer. So some cheered the ouster of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran and the taking of American hostages in 1979. And others felt that the terror attacks of September 2001 in the United States was a long overdue achievement of standing up to the dominant superpower, one that had long projected power and influence into the region. Thus, a sense of victimization and resentment is very much at the core of Islamic and Arab thinking and actions, and fuels many of the more extreme responses. There is also resentment of the failure of most of the Middle Eastern regimes to respond to the needs of the people, and to limit political and social expression and be so unprepared for the global challenges of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (particularly the failure of most Middle Eastern education systems) for many of the states to provide much of a political and social consciousness. In addition, tremendous pressure from the population growth in most Arab countries strains the resources and the economies while also creating a whole generation of disaffected youth. For many, religion has become the only credible institution that provides some tangible assistance in the community and some answers to the problems many people face. After independence, many Arab nations and leaders experimented with nationalism and socialism, and some even attempted limited economic and political reforms. But few nations were able to truly modernize and become prosperous and competitive on a global scale. These failures, ultimately, helped to create the conditions for the rise of fundamentalism.

Because of the failure of Arab leaders in particular, but also the downfall of the Shah of Iran and the disillusionment of many in Turkey with the secular leadership, there has been an increasing tendency to forego national identity and loyalty and turn to religion for solutions and, for many, the capacity to compete for political power. And, because of the failure of political systems it is easier for religion and politics to merge (although one could argue that political power is a critical component of the religious tenets). Thus, because there is little separation between political institutions and religious institutions (between "church and state" as it were) it is harder to develop secular solutions to problems (in science, social sciences, etc.) and generate a freer exchange of ideas (a terrible irony given the fact that in medieval times Arabs were much more advanced in science and mathematics than Europeans). So modern political and economic practices are not as prevalent.

So, before we can understand the nature of ethnic conflicts in the region, it is important to acknowledge that they take place in a regional and international context that either exacerbates ethnic conflicts or makes them more likely. The recent Arab Human Development Report argues that most problems in the Arab world have little to do with ethnic and religious differences. Two of the most important priorities are the "need for full respect for human rights and

development" and the need for "the consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its effective utilization" (United Nations Development Programme: vii). But the lack of these priorities does exacerbate ethnic tensions, and the lack of development has often allowed Arab leaders to promote scapegoats—particularly non-Arabs—as the source of economic and social problems and failures. Almost every Middle East state is facing significant economic problems. It is hard to ignore links between economic dislocation, failed economic expectations, continued high population growth, and internal ethnic strife that is growing. The economic suffering of the Palestinian people has clearly exacerbated the conflict with Israel. The poor status of Shiite Muslims while its population percentage increased in Lebanon helped push the Shiia to militarize and challenge the political status quo, one of the major contributing factors to the civil war there.

Despite the turnover of a few leaders, little change has occurred politically within most Arab societies and their governmental systems. Religious fundamentalism remains strong within the region, often continuing its broad-based appeal to many disenfranchised or disaffected sectors of society. This reflects a growing divide between the haves and have-nots in society. In addition, the scarcity of natural resources such as water, arable land, and the pressures of high population growth increase the risks of conflict, both within countries and between them. And, one must acknowledge that in the absence of democratic processes, the only institutions in the region that allow for activism and organizing outside government control are religious organizations. Finally, hovering above these issues, one must impose the fundamental conflict that still exists between Arab nationalism and Zionism as well as the competing claims for the same land among Palestinians and Israelis.

Lebanon

After World War I, France was given the mandate over Syria by the League of Nations. The French then created Lebanon in 1920, which had a small majority of Christian inhabitants. Initially, many Muslims were unhappy with an arrangement they perceived would be a Maronite Christian state that would be a French puppet. But, in World War II, a weakened France was compelled by the British to give Syria and Lebanon independence. Initially, the Muslim and Christian leaders worked together to establish a new state and develop a compact that would reflect the religious balance in the country. One analyst noted, "A consociational-confessional Lebanon is the legacy of France's involvement and its collusion with the Maronite clergy" (Hudson 1999: 98). But overall the arrangement in Lebanon was mostly homegrown.

Lebanon's system of governance was designed to accommodate ethnic differences. The Christians, who were a slight majority of the population based on the census of 1943, would have a majority of the high positions in government. By agreement, the president of Lebanon would be a Maronite Christian. The prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim; the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies was to be a Shiite Muslim; and the deputy speaker was a Greek Orthodox. A high

The electoral laws would allocate seats in the Chamber of Deputies as well as to major civil service positions at a 6 : 5 ratio in favor of Christians. Voters could vote for anyone, but each office was reserved for a particular group. This meant that Christians ran only against other Christians, Sunni against Sunni, and Shiite against Shiite. Thus, interethnic coalitions could emerge because different groups did not compete against each other. The system put a premium on interethnic cooperation and intra-ethnic competition.

Each side had promised to avoid outside support. The Maronite Christians promised to forego any special relationship with the West, particularly France, while the Islamic communities agreed not to pursue any future political integration with the Muslim Arab countries. However, by the mid-1950s, Muslims began to question the demographic logic of this national pact, as there were far greater increases in the Muslim populations than in the Christian population. The only major conflict that occurred in over 30 years came about in 1958 because the government of President Camille Chamoun was accused of violating the pact due to the perception of aligning Lebanon with the West. The resulting four-month civil war ended because of American military intervention. So, for most of the first 30 years, the pact was a source of stability, although the government was relatively weak and fractious.

But, what ultimately doomed Lebanon were external factors that further undermined a government that could not control activities within the state. In an article comparing Switzerland and Lebanon, Jürg Steiner asserts, "until the mid-1970s, power-sharing worked reasonably well in Lebanon, because the country had a relatively neutral position on the Middle East conflict. The tragedy of Lebanon is that it suddenly got involved in the intricacies of the Middle East conflict. As might be expected for a culturally diverse country, the various groups took sides with different countries, and this opened the door for the invasion of Lebanon by foreign troops" (Steiner 1991: 114). Clearly, Lebanon's conflict became worse as it became internationalized, but there were some changing internal dynamics that were critical as well. The power-sharing system wasn't working for all the communities, particularly the growing yet underdeveloped Shiite community.

Thus, despite the relative stability of this ethnic arrangement, Muslim dissatisfaction grew. In addition, each political party (which fell along ethnic/religious lines) began to create its own militia. The Maronites, sensing that the demographics had turned against them, were desperate to cling to the 1945 6 : 5 formula. Sunni Lebanese were increasingly turning to Arab nationalism while many Shiites began to flirt with revolutionary ideas and follow an emerging militia, the Amal. Many would soon embrace a more socially conscious movement, the Hizbollah (Party of God). The credibility and effectiveness of the central government began to diminish. At the same time, regional issues greatly exacerbated the tensions. The Arab–Israeli conflict in particular began to influence events in Lebanon. In the midst of growing instability, a strong and influential Palestinian resistance movement emerged that coalesced in the growing and increasingly organized Palestinian refugee communities in Lebanon. Even though Lebanon had avoided the three major Arab–Israeli wars in 1956,

neutrality. Increasingly, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conducted raids into Israel from Lebanon because they were controlled and constrained in the other Arab neighbors of Israel. And, of course, the Israelis retaliated across the border.

The triggering events that would escalate into nationwide civil war were a series of clashes between Palestinian fighters and Maronite militia that escalated quickly. As the Lebanese Muslims began to seek alliances with the Palestinian fighters, a major security dilemma emerged as each group felt threatened by moves made by the others to strengthen themselves. Within the Lebanese military, splits along sectarian lines began to divide and weaken the military. A separate Christian Lebanese Army and a separate Lebanese Arab Army (Muslim) emerged. The contest for power grew and became militarized, and all sides began to seek outside intervention and assistance by either Syria, the PLO, Israel, Iran, and Iraq. Initially, Syria tried to mediate but, concerned that the Christian forces were weakening and fearing civil war on its border or Israeli intervention in Lebanon, soon came in on the side of the Maronites. By 1977, with its army firmly ensconced in Lebanon, the Syrians switched sides and attacked Christian positions in large part because of the growing ties between many Maronites and Israel. From 1975 to 1981, the different militias began to exercise control in different sectors of the country while by the early 1980s, the central government was reduced to controlling only a small part of Beirut around the presidential palace. In many instances, Lebanese army officers and soldiers joined one or another of the warring militia factions.

Some analysts argue that the Lebanese conflict, essentially an internal conflict, became fully internationalized because Syria and the PLO needed to counter the Egyptian movement toward peace with Israel in 1977 and 1978. Egypt's peace initiative changed the equation for the Palestinians and the Syrians. Egypt was perceived as deserting Syria and rushing into the arms of the Israelis and Americans. Attempts at establishing an Arab Defense Force that would bring peace to Lebanon was ineffective because all the Arab contributors withdrew their troops, leaving Syrian forces as the overwhelming military enforcement power and further aggravating the situation. Syria had essentially become a participant in the conflict as the PLO power play in Lebanon provided the Syrians with an excuse to intervene in internal Lebanese politics. Essentially, as Farid el Khazan notes, the Lebanese conflict worsened considerably as it was influenced by outside parties. There was "a concurrence of internal unrest and external destabilization" (El Khazen 2000: 6). These included the increased involvement of Syria in the conflict as a party; the Egyptian–Israeli peace accord; and the increased PLO role in Lebanon. On top of that, Israel would invade Lebanon twice—once briefly in 1978 and then in 1982—and would occupy southern Lebanon for almost a decade. The Maronite Christians began to fight among themselves and ultimately one faction allied with Syria and another with Israel.

One of the interesting points of comparison is why Jordan, when faced with a mobilized and militarized Palestinian movement, had been able to overcome the threat and stabilize while Lebanon could not? In large part this was due to

where there were a variety of entry points into the process. In Jordan, where the PLO risked everything on armed conflict in 1970, there were few ways to influence the regime and the political system. In Lebanon, the PLO was able to influence unions, political parties, the press, and student organizations (El Khazen 2000: 372). Large sums of money, coming in from sympathetic sources around the Middle East from increasing oil revenues in particular, poured into PLO coffers; thus, by 1975 the PLO had massive political and military infrastructure, something that was not possible in a much more authoritarian country such as Jordan. This culminated in the transformation of the Palestinian issue from a "refugee problem" to Palestinian self-determination and liberation. Having failed in the liberation of Palestine, Arab states threw their support behind the PLO (essentially an umbrella organization for many different Palestinian groups) and a national movement.

In 1982, Israeli military forces were soon in Beirut and Israel controlled close to half of the country. It would later withdraw due to American and international pressure, but retained a protectorate role that it relinquished only in 2000 with the decision of the Labor government under Ehud Barak to withdraw unilaterally from southern Lebanon. The PLO actually agreed to a U.S.-brokered cease-fire arrangement with Israel in summer 1981, afraid that the power it had built up in Lebanon would be undone if Israel invaded, which it did the following May. But it was not until the last of the PLO leadership and hierarchy was finally ousted from Lebanon completely and finally in 1983 by Syrian forces that PLO influence ended in Lebanon (leaving behind close to 300,000 refugees). While the PLO did not directly challenge the Lebanese order, and since 1970 had pledged not to interfere with the domestic affairs of an Arab country, it did work to assist those Lebanese who were challenging the system, which was easy to do in the most open society in the Arab world. Lebanon became the first real land base for the Palestinian movement to operate autonomously (and why ultimately Israel believed it could not condone the PLO presence by 1982). And, as El Khazen argues, the other Arab states could continually support the PLO as long as it retained a base of operations and territory only in Lebanon, a place that was half-Christian, secular, and democratic and, to some, considered too Western and outside the real Arab world. And the PLO fit in there because it too was a secularized, somewhat democratic, albeit factionalized organization. Its ultimate failure in Lebanon led to the rise of Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and the subsequent development of the Hamas movement because the PLO base in Tunisia was much weaker and more remote.

Peace efforts effectively confirmed Syrian power in Lebanon. Syria was the necessary force to counter the PLO and leftists in Lebanon. The decisive military action was initially Palestinian and then Syrian, not Lebanese, although the Lebanese were combatants on all sides because all but one of the major political parties created militias. Israel and the United States acquiesced in the Syrian intervention in Lebanon because it was aimed primarily at the PLO. They were willing to allow Syrian dominance of Lebanese politics in return for a greatly weakened if not destroyed PLO, and some also felt that this might make Syria

by Israel after the 1967 war.

Foreign governments engineered the 1989 Ta'if Accord that ended the war in Lebanon. The United States, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were the prime movers behind this agreement, which was a renegotiated consociational arrangement. In effect, the same system was revived but with a different power balance. The presidency remained a Maronite Christian position but it was considerably weakened. The prime minister and cabinet were strengthened. For example, the president can no longer dismiss either the prime minister or the cabinet. The legislature and its Shiite speaker were strengthened as well. The judiciary and local governments were also made more powerful. With respect to regional issues, the accord prohibited granting citizenship to Palestinian refugees. At the same time, it called for the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation and reaffirmed a special relationship between Lebanon and Syria. To many critics, the Ta'if Accord seemed to legitimize a role of protector for Syria in Lebanon, despite the fact that the accord called for Syrian forces to be redeployed to east Lebanon. It is very plausible that the United States supported the Ta'if Accord as a way to help a key ally, Saudi Arabia, while also attempting to entice Syria to the negotiating table with Israel, which would occur two years later.

Ethnic and religious conflict in Lebanon demonstrates how a weak government and central authority, even if democratic, can be exploited by outside elements. Outside forces were complicit in the horrible death and destruction that occurred in Lebanon. But the demographic and social makeup of Lebanon is, and will remain, problematic. All groups are, in effect, minorities, because there is no clear majority. Even the identity of Muslim is not sufficient because of the differences between Sunni, Shiite, and Druze (who are not strictly Muslims and view themselves as distinct from Arabs). The consociational system reinforces these distinctions and divisions rather than bridges them.

Iraq and the Kurds

In the northern part of Iraq the Muslim identity of the predominant Kurds has not served to create a greater sense of common identity and unity with the Arabs of the central and southern parts of the country. Estimates, which vary considerably, are that between 20 and 30 million Kurds are concentrated in the four states of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Kurdistan is an isolated, mountainous area where many of the people have retained a tribal way of life and clan ties that have often hindered ethnic solidarity. About 40–50 percent of all Kurds live in Turkey but they are only about 15 percent of the population there. The Kurds in Iraq number some 3 million and make up 20–23 percent of the population (Yavuz and Gunter 2001: 33). Unlike other rebel movements, the Kurdish movement in the twentieth century never came together under a single umbrella so there has always been considerable infighting between different factions. This is due, in part, to the fact that Kurdish lands were for centuries divided between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. In addition, there are significant

Kurds in Turkey and northern Iraq and those in eastern Iraq and Iran. Since World War I, the Kurds have often been dominated and weakened by one of the various host-states; in addition, the international community has usually ignored or worked against Kurdish nationalism and independence because one or more of the host-states was or is an ally or client of a major power. At the same time, assimilation attempts in Kurdish areas have almost always led to an armed backlash and fueled Kurdish separatist movements. In the twentieth century, Kurds have fought with Turks, Persians, Arabs, and even Assyrian Christians, as well as with each other, often with as much energy as against state authorities.

As with the other areas of significant ethnic conflict in the Middle East, Iraq and the specific area of Kurdistan were greatly influenced by British colonialism and the competition between the Great Powers. The Kurds were promised autonomy under the Sèvres Treaty but the European powers deferred to the new nationalist regime in Turkey and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, made no mention of the Kurds. Created from three Ottoman administrative districts—Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—Iraq legally became independent, but still remained under strong British influence. The British installed a Sunni Arab from Arabia as ruler of a population that was majority Shiite.

During the Cold War, Kurdish separatists in Iraq were supported at different times by the United States, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Israel. Most of the countries in the Kurdish regions have hosted Kurdish parties from the neighboring countries and often allowed them to initiate guerilla strikes from their side of the border. This was especially true of Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, the Syrian regime of Hafez al Assad for many years allowed the radical Marxist Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) to use Damascus as its headquarters and operate, with Syrian acquiescence, across the mountainous border with Turkey. In the early 1970s, Iranian heavy artillery and funding and arms from the CIA helped sustain a guerilla war against the Soviet-backed Iraqi military. The Kurdish guerillas in Iraq wanted autonomy but also demanded the province of Kirkuk, which produces most of Iraq's oil and contains 35–40 percent of its proven reserves (Abi-Aad and Grenon 1997: 85). The latter demand killed any hope of an agreement with the Baghdad regime. And, in 1975, a peace agreement was reached between Iran and Iraq with American blessing. Iranian and American aid to the Kurds was immediately suspended and Iran closed its borders. In return, Iraq ceded certain Iranian claims to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Many rebels were then hunted down by Iraqi forces and executed. Others escaped into either Syria or Iran. The two major Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) regrouped and took advantage of the war between Iran and Iraq to resume Kurdish guerilla actions and demands for autonomy. Iraqi Kurdistan itself would become one of the major fronts of the Iran–Iraq war. Throughout the war, alliances constantly shifted on both sides of the border. Both the Iranians and the Iraqis were able to recruit many Kurds to fight against the other. And, most Kurds continued to remain loyal to their tribal leaders, some of whom fought with the Iraqis and others with the Iranians. And, again, many fought amongst themselves. Turkish forces used the conflict as a pretext to cross into Northern Iraq in order to clear out Kurdish guerilla bases.

together against Iraqi forces. The fighting in the Kurdish provinces escalated significantly between Kurdish guerillas and Iraqi military forces. Many government officials were assassinated by Kurds. The Baghdad regime began what amounted to a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Hundreds of Kurdish villages were destroyed and thousands, if not tens of thousands, of Kurdish civilians were executed or killed by poison gas deployed by the Iraqi air force. And, when peace was concluded in July 1988 between Iraq and Iran, Iranian military forces no longer provided a military counterweight to the Iraqis. So, Saddam Hussein's armed forces flooded into Iraqi Kurdistan, routed the Kurdish guerillas and displaced over 100,000 people into Turkey and Iran. More villages were systematically destroyed and Kurds claim that poison gas was once again used.

Three years later, with the ouster of the Iraqi military from Kuwait, the Kurds revolted against Iraq, particularly after Shiites in the south of Iraq spontaneously revolted against Saddam Hussein's regime. Most Iraqi forces in the north were redeployed to deal with the southern rebellion. Kurds attacked almost any vestige of Iraqi authority remaining in northern Iraq. Thousands of Iraqi Arabs were killed as the PUK and KDP joined forces and declared an independent Kurdistan. But, after pushing Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait, the American-led international coalition stood back, allowing the Iraqi military to reassert control over the south, and then turn its attention to the north. The Iraqi military campaign led to a massive refugee outflow that was, for the first time in history, very much in the international spotlight. Western reporters and news cameras documented the plight of over a million Kurdish refugees pouring over the Turkish and Iranian borders. The West, for the first time, was compelled to act on behalf of the Kurds for humanitarian reasons. After some initial hesitation, American and West European countries delivered food, clothing, and medical assistance, established refugee camps in Turkey and provided air cover against Iraqi forces pursuing the refugees in "Operation Provide Comfort." The Western powers then established a safe zone in Northern Iraq that would allow the Kurdish refugees to return to their homes. In order to protect the safe haven, a no-fly zone was created north of the 36th parallel in which the Iraqi air force was forbidden to operate. In addition, American, British, and French forces set up transit camps that would assist the return of the refugees. Ultimately, the refugee needs were transferred to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees but the American air force has continued to monitor and enforce the no-fly zone. That has effectively allowed the Kurdish provinces in northern Iraq to develop from 1991 to the present as a de facto political entity under self-rule, although what emerged were actually two separate Kurdish political entities.

Initially, there was considerable factional fighting between the KDP and PUK and two rump governments were established, the KDP in northern Kurdistan and the PUK in eastern Kurdistan. The presence of a third Kurdish party was also felt: the PKK, the Kurdish Worker's Party, which was launching raids into Turkey from Iraq. The KDP made a deal with the United States to police the border with Turkey in order to prevent raids by the PKK. As a result, the PUK began to support the PKK, as did both Syria and Iran (Yavuz and Gunter 2001: 38). In fact, both Iran and Turkey have sent military forces into Iraqi

own countries since the no-fly zone does not apply to them.

In 1996, the KDP, threatened by the PUK and Iran and Syria as well, actually asked for help from Saddam Hussein who dispatched military troops to halt the PUK. This allowed the KDP to gain the important town of Irbil, but the territory remained effectively divided in half. The United States threatened Saddam Hussein in order to get him to withdraw Iraqi forces from the Kurdish areas and then mediated a cease-fire between the KDP and PUK. Since then, the American-brokered cease-fire has held, and the Kurdish territory has improved economically and a greater sense of a common community has emerged. One of the unintended consequences of the Kurdish safe haven for the past 12 years has been the development of some democratic forces. There is an emergent civil society and a growing free press. Also during this period, Kurds in Iraq have been able to modernize their fighting forces so that they may be much more effective against regular military troops than in the past. Many Kurds argue that the experiment in self-rule provides a model of federalism or limited autonomy that can serve as a political basis for a post–Saddam Hussein Iraq, particularly as the Iraqi Kurds have been forced to deal with their own minority issues—incorporating Turkmans, Assyrians, and Yazidis as well as different Kurdish tribes and factions. This is much more the case in the KDP-ruled northern Kurdistan than the PUK-ruled eastern Kurdistan.

Part of American policy on Iraq the past few years has been that a united opposition effort will lead to a more stable government and allow the major ethnic and religious groups in Iraq to participate, "thereby helping ensure the unity of the country and assuaging regional allies' fears of a breakup of Iraq that threatens to alter the balance of power in the region" (United States Institute of Peace, February 1999: 10). So the United States has worked considerably to overcome a sectarian division that mirrors divisions in the country. Because each major group—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—all have a separate base of support, and the Kurds are divided into two major parties, stability is tenuous and democracy risky. However, there is some hope that the two major Kurdish factions can bury their traditional fighting; the potential for war against the regime in Baghdad seemed to have created greater cooperation. As the prospects for war increased, the PUK and KDP actually agreed to combine their military command.

Iran did not support the Shiites in Iraq in the 1991 uprising because Iran feared the uprising would fail and Iranian support would hurt larger Iranian interests. It was believed to be an internal Iraq matter. Iran would not support the Iraqi Kurds either, although Iran has since played one side off the other in order to keep Kurds preoccupied with internal dissent and less likely to spill over and enflame Iran's own Kurdish minority. Turkey's policy is similar. Iran is interested in stability on its border, not ideological affinity if it leads to instability. Thus, with Afghanistan on its eastern border, Iran did not support the Taliban either. Even as a theocracy, "Iran has a clear preference of interests over dogma" (Menashri 1999: 144). And, ethnic conflicts have had a significant effect on Iran. Iran has one of the largest refugee populations in the world—well over one million people—that have spilled over from Iraq in the northwest and Afghanistan in the northeast. Those same refugees could have a major impact

Hussein was gone.

But, as the prospects for war in Iraq mounted in early 2003, the Kurdish question again had considerable implications for regional politics. In order to secure Turkish cooperation in providing bases and easy access and transit through Turkey into northern Iraq that would allow U.S. forces to open up a second front against Saddam Hussein, Washington proposed allowing Turkish military forces into northern Iraq. By March 2003, the Turkish military had begun to move troops and equipment toward the border, while at the same time Kurdish forces in Iraq were deploying and training along that same border. Turkish authorities have rather bluntly stated that their goals are to prohibit refugees from crossing into Turkey, preventing the Kurds from declaring independence, and disarming the Kurdish fighters (Williams 2003: 14). While the vote by the Turkish parliament not to allow American forces to use bases in Turkey may lead to a change in U.S. policy, the Americans have strongly supported Turkish entry into northern Iraq in order to help maintain stability there, and quell any thoughts of independence. But the Turks are even against any limited form of autonomy for the Kurds, so it is not clear what the postwar political scene will hold. At the same time, Ankara is encouraging Iraqi Turkmen to demand autonomy on the same basis as that called for by the Kurds and to demand autonomy over Kirkuk and Irbil, both of which the Kurds claim. Turkey has also claimed the right to intervene in Iraq if the Turkmen are threatened or denied their rights (Yaphe 2002: 27). Iran's position with respect to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is unclear and there is some concern that Iran may be providing assistance to the Ansar al Islam, a religious extremist group in northeast Iraq. Fighting between Turks and Kurds could draw in the Iranians, and they could work to exploit such a conflict.

It is also not clear what Iran will do to help Iraq's Shiite community gain power. Most Iraqi Shiites consider themselves Arab and Iraqi, not Shiite first, but Iran has been the home of many Shiites in exile. The major Iranian concern seemed to be that the United States would simply impose a Sunni strongman in Baghdad, something the regime in Tehran believes is preferred by Saudi Arabia and Israel. A conservative government in Baghdad, one that would preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and pose no threat to the regional status quo, would be highly preferable for Tehran, but not at the expense of denying legitimate power to Iraq's majority Shiite community. Thus, Iran has encouraged Iraqi Shiite leaders to engage with the Iraqi opposition groups in exile. As one leading analyst of Iraq notes, "the United States almost certainly will face a critical political decision before the military battle is over. That decision will involve whom to reward with power, authority and responsibility" (Yaphe 2002: 26). A number of outside parties will have a strong interest and stake in that as well.

Israel, Palestinians, and Arabs

It is important to understand the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as ethnic because it is at its core an existential conflict that revolves around identity. Many Israelis,

the establishment of the state of Israel is the legitimate expression of a Jewish national homeland. Israeli analyst Joseph Alpher has asserted that Yasser Arafat claimed to him that 70 percent of Israelis are actually Arab. This includes the 20 percent of Israelis who are not Jewish but also the 50 percent who came from Arab or Muslim countries. Arafat also stated, according to Alpher, that "there is no historic link between today's Jews and the Haram a-Sharif (Temple Mount)" (Alpher 2002: 39). For an Israeli, this is a denial of Jewish identity and ethnicity. Arafat implies that Jews are little more than co-religionists and that ethnically they are either European or Arab. So, the threat that faces Israel today, for most Israelis, is not that the land of Israel is threatened, but that the state of Israel—as a Jewish homeland—is threatened. Despite its very strong and modern military, Israel faces a great dilemma: whether Israel can remain a Jewish, democratic state if it continues to exercise control over millions of Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This is a major reason why increasing numbers of Israeli Jews favor separation between Israelis and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Continual occupation would lead to an apartheid-like system with a sizeable Palestinian minority within Israel. This would be a threat to the notion of Israel as a Jewish state; and, because Palestinians have a much higher birthrate, Palestinians could conceivably become a majority in the future. As it is, with a population of 6.6 million, Israel already has to deal with an existing minority of almost 1.3 million non-Jewish Israelis, most of whom are Palestinian and Muslim.

Most Israeli Jews place the greatest emphasis on the preservation of a Jewish state. The size of that state is not as important as its guaranteed security and preservation as a *Jewish state*. In fact, the two-state solution, with a Palestinian state next to Israel, is the ultimate guarantee of Israel remaining secure as a Jewish homeland, a Jewish state. As Alpher noted, because of the demographic threat, if there is not a Palestinian state next to Israel, then ultimately there will only be a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea—one that becomes a Palestinian state in 20 or 30 years, a state with a majority of its inhabitants who are Arab. This would be the destruction of Zionism, something that many Israeli analysts believe is the ultimate goal of the more extreme Palestinians. They cannot destroy Israel militarily, but demographically—that is, by destroying it as a Jewish state.

At the same time, the Palestinians have struggled for recognition of their own existence as a people—Arab, but uniquely Palestinian. Leonard Binder argues, "The Arabs of historic Palestine (i.e., the land of Israel, or *Eretz-Israel*) never developed national identity distinct from Arabs across the region. Lacking tight ethnic ties, bearing no cultural individuality or religious specificity, without territorial depth or an integral national history the community known today as Palestinians does not fit the criteria of the Mideastern minorities . . ." (Binder 1999: 20). Palestinians believe that such language is a denial of their rights, and their existence. Thus, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is in its purest essence a conflict of narratives, of history and, most of all, of acceptance. One hears from both Israelis and Palestinians that, "*you* may not accept my narrative, which is okay, but you cannot deny *to me* that narrative." Israelis and Palestinians search far back

historic Palestine. Yet, international opinion has rested its views on a more contemporary notion of ethnicity or nationhood; one that embraces both Israeli and Palestinian aspirations for acceptance. The goals of Palestinian self-determination and statehood fit those definitions of ethnicity that refer to "a subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and aspirations" (Rothchild 1997: 4). The Arabs of historic Palestine are, or have become, conscious of a unique identity. It may have been constructed, or it may have developed in reaction to a common historical trauma, but in contemporary political terms it is very real. The same could be said for the tribes in the Kurdish mountains.

Since 1948, the "Palestinian question" has been internationalized because of the fact that millions of Palestinians were displaced by the war between Israeli and Arab forces and have settled either in refugee camps in the neighboring states or live as Palestinian diaspora around the world. The refugee issue remains unsettled today and poses one of the most difficult obstacles to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The quest for a separate Palestinian entity emerged as a result of the ongoing conflict with Israel and the inability of the surrounding Arab states to prevent the establishment and consolidation of the state of Israel and then the failure to oust Israel from the territory it has occupied since 1948. Indeed, a Palestinian entity within the borders of the territory occupied by Israel after 1967 would have been viewed as antithetical to Arab/Palestinian interests in 1948, when Arabs by and large rejected just such a national expression of Arab statehood in Palestine. Initially, in the first half of the twentieth century, Palestinian nationalism was very weak. The people of Palestine supported a variety of different political movements, were stratified by class and were adherents of two major religions. And there was a large diaspora, throughout the region and worldwide.

In the 1970s, the focus began to shift to the Palestinian issue. In October 1974, the Arab League recognized "the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated" (Smith 1992: 232). This declaration legitimized the PLO, which since 1968 had called for an armed struggle to establish a democratic, secular society in the place of Israel and also undercut the capacity of Jordan to speak for the West Bank and its Palestinian inhabitants. But a debate about what would be acceptable as Palestinian territory began to split the Palestinian communities and the larger Arab world. Should the lands to be liberated only include those occupied after 1967 or the entire territory established as the state of Israel in 1948? Some, in particular those who lived in the occupied territories, wanted liberation of the 1967 lands while others, particularly those in refugee camps as well as more radical Palestinian organizations, wanted a conquest of Israel. These Palestinian groups along with the more hard-line Arab states became know as the "rejection front." The PLO also rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the recognition of Israel (and all states in the region), because it did not address the Palestinian issue except in a reference to "the refugee problem."

ultimate goals were. When Palestinians talked about liberating Palestinian territory, it was not clear what was considered Palestinian territory. Neither Arafat nor most other Palestinian leaders would specify the West Bank and Gaza, nor would they clearly articulate recognition of Israel. Arafat often claimed that he wanted to hold on to recognition as his trump card or strongest bargaining chip, so would only use it when he could get something very significant in return. However, this played into Israeli hands for many years because it gave Israel the excuse to avoid the PLO and often ignoring the Palestinian issue. And, this question of ambiguous intentions and linguistic parsing continues today in relations between the Palestinians and Israel.

The Zionist movement had created a reawakening of Jews, even a national awakening as a people, by creating in the minds of Jews everywhere, as well as in the international community, the notion of a national homeland for Jews. One of the keys to the success of Zionism would be emigration to historic and biblical Jewish lands and the settlement of that land with people and infrastructure along with the development of institutions that would lead to Jewish control over the land and economic activity. The ultimate objective of Zionism was to build a minority into a majority. To do so required establishing political, intellectual, military, and housing capacity. Hebrew was revived as a functional language. Jewish identity would be cast as a Middle Eastern identity that was linked to the ancient lands of Israel and the city that had always symbolized Judaism, Jerusalem. Jews would move away from the predominantly diaspora mentality that Jews are a people without a homeland and away from the belief by some that survival of Jews was ensured through assimilation in non-Jewish societies.

British policy, in particular, during World War I helped create the conditions for conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and in most of the Middle East. During the war, Great Britain pursued a policy of urging open revolt by the Arabs against the Ottomans in return for British support of Arab independence. At the same time, in order to gain greater Jewish support for the allied war effort as well as leverage American Jewish pressure to get the United States to enter the war, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, which was a pledge to support a national homeland for Jews in Palestine. After the war, Jewish immigration increased dramatically, particularly after Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany. As more Jews came, often desperate to escape the Nazi killing machine and unwelcome in most other countries of the world, including the United States by this time, Arab discontent erupted into violence and open revolt. For many in the West, including some Zionists like Chaim Weizman, the first president of Israel, the essence of the conflict was not whether the Jews were morally more right than Arabs, but rather which was "the greater or lesser injustice," in the words of one member of the international commission investigating the status of Palestine who was paraphrasing Weizman (Smith 1992: 130). But injustice was unavoidable and the decision would be whether to be unjust to Jews or Arabs. Zionists believed they had nothing else left; they could not stay in Europe and were not wanted elsewhere. For the Palestinians, the notion of injustice has always been very much at the heart of the conflict for them, and a major part of their narrative is a desire for acknowledgment of and compensation for the wrongs done to them since 1948 and after.

Palestine began even prior to Israel's establishment. It became a major political battleground throughout the Cold War, particularly since both the Soviet Union and United States viewed the Middle East as a place of great strategic value. Because the Arab–Israel conflict became the critical foreign policy issue in the region, it also became the critical issue for the superpowers. In fact, both moved to be the first to recognize the new Jewish state and both effectively wooed Israel in the hopes that each would have a new ally in the region. Thus, limiting the influence of the other became a critical goal of American and Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. In addition, in the United States, support for Israel was quite strong, and it was mobilized and became a powerful political force that clearly was able to exercise leverage on the presidency and on Congress. Even so, until the 1967 war, the United States in many ways did attempt a somewhat balanced approach to the region. It was a staunch supporter of conservative regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran, attempted to develop a working relationship with Egypt, and was the leading donor to international programs that focused on the Palestinians displaced by the 1948 war. In 1956, the United States pressured Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw from the Sinai during the Suez crisis. It was not until 1962 that the United States began to provide limited military assistance to Israel (most military aid and weaponry for Israel was coming from France and Britain then).

Both the 1967 and 1973 wars demonstrated in different ways how internationalized the conflict had become, and how resolution of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis was the key to advancing one's interests in the region. In effect, outside parties, mostly the United States and Soviet Union, realized that to end the ongoing conflict, Israel needed peace delivered, peace secured. The Arabs needed the return of Arab lands, particularly those occupied after the 1967 war. With the Arab lands it occupied, Israel gained a critical bargaining chip, one that it initially believed could be traded for the peace and recognition it sought. The two wars demonstrated that the depth of the conflict had gotten worse over time, not better. The 1973 war was critical because the great Israeli victories of 1967, and the security attained through occupying Arab lands as a buffer and the development of the most powerful military in the region, still did not prevent an Arab attack. The Arabs were not deterred, and regardless of its strength, Israel was still not secure, nor accepted. The conflict had not gone away.

Before the 1973 war, and certainly after, the United States changed its policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict and in many ways transformed the conflict—in a way that has almost made the United States a critical party to the conflict in the past few decades. Under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, first as National Security Adviser, then as secretary of state, the U.S. policy emphasized to both Israelis and Arabs that the United States was, in the words of Kissinger, "indispensable to *any* progress" in resolving the conflict to the satisfaction of each of the parties (Kissinger 1982: 354; emphasis in original). Kissinger believed that the best way to undercut support for the Soviet Union in the Middle East was to demonstrate that only the United States could deliver what all the parties sought: "in the Middle East, friendship with the United States was the precondition to diplomatic success." Thus, Kissinger's policy was to produce

American aid had helped secure Israel and allowed it to occupy Arab lands but Soviet aid had not helped the Arabs regain those lands.

In addition, it became American policy to give large amounts of aid to Israel and provide it with military and strategic support in the belief that only an Israel that felt assured of its existence would be secure enough to make the necessary compromises for peace; that is, return the lands it occupied. Through highly personal and highly publicized diplomacy, Kissinger was able to broker two Egyptian–Israeli and one Syrian–Israeli disengagement agreements. This also helped to exclude the Soviets from any peace process. At the same time, the United States began a precedent that continues today of providing strong economic rewards when the parties do come to agreement. Economic and military aid to both Israel and Egypt increased considerably when they concluded a formal peace.

During the Kissinger years, the United States also pledged to Israel that it would not negotiate with or recognize the PLO unless it accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which effectively embodied the land for peace formula, and formally acknowledged Israel's right to exist. The Carter administration did not change this policy but did argue that the Palestinian issue was critical to any resolution of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and offer to engage Israel in a negotiated peace effort trumped the Palestinian-oriented approach of Carter. And, since the PLO made no move to recognize Israel, the United States could not realistically go down that road. The Reagan administration wanted to reorient U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East toward an emphasis that the Soviet Union and Arab and Islamic radicalism were the greatest threats to peace in the Middle East. But even those countries most concerned about Soviet-backed threats to their conservative rule, such as Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, argued that Israel, and the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian dispute, remained the greatest threats to the region. In spring 1982, the United States appeared to give its tacit approval to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in an attempt to destroy the PLO as an effective military and political force. The failure of President Reagan's rather half-hearted attempt to promote Palestinian self-government (in association with Jordan), the inability of the United States to broker peace between Israel and Lebanon, the ill-fated U.S. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, and the survival of the PLO ultimately led to the Reagan administration's disengagement from the promotion of an Arab–Israeli and Israeli–Palestinian peace process. This suited the conservative Israeli Likud governments then as they continued to consolidate the Israeli presence in the occupied territories by building increasing numbers of Israeli settlements.

Two events transformed the conflict. The first was the 1987 Palestinian intifada in the occupied territories. This reminded all of the continued suffering by the Palestinian populace from the ongoing occupation, including the PLO leadership ensconced in Tunisia that was continuing its policy of ambiguity regarding the recognition of Israel, while calling for a continued struggle that was getting Palestinians under Israeli occupation nowhere. In fact, to get out in front of Palestinian popular opinion and make itself vital again, the PLO got the

Israel's existence (there is some concern that the Palestinians did not go so far as to admit Israel had a "right" to exist), and renounce terrorism. By the end of 1988, the Reagan administration agreed to direct talks with the PLO. The United States remained opposed to any Palestinian state and seemed unwilling to put much pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian issue.

Then, Saddam Hussein laid the groundwork for an ultimate breakthrough because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Soviet Union had collapsed and was now backing U.S. policy in the region. The United States cobbled together an impressive coalition of Arab and international states against Iraq and kept Israel out of the conflict even after it had been hit with missile strikes from Iraq. The United States combined renewed leverage it had with most Arab states (for freeing Kuwait and defending Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf states) with the influence it had with Israel along with a greatly weakened PLO (which had supported Iraq and thus alienated the Palestinian cause from many of its strongest and wealthiest Arab backers). The Madrid conference was convened as a way to initiate direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbors including the Palestinians, although not initially as a separate party, and also get the international community to invest in Middle East peace. This process was essentially controlled and directed by the United States but seemed to give the immediate parties to the conflict as well as regional and international states a stake in the outcome of the peace process. Eventually, the Israelis and Palestinians, constrained by the Madrid process, broke away to initiate their own peace process, known as the Oslo process. Yet, the Oslo process was constantly brokered by the United States, as were the ultimately unsuccessful Israeli–Syrian negotiations. Only the Jordanian–Israeli peace agreement was negotiated primarily by the parties themselves.

Some have argued that in its desire to protect Israel and ensure that Israel is not pressured to submit to any agreement not in its best interests, the United States has been short-sighted and missed considerable opportunities for peace and resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Lesch and Tschirgi 1998: 102–04). The United States has been very reluctant to pressure Israel to make concessions at the negotiating table; rarely, has it ever used the substantial leverage it has to move Israel from a particular position. The most notable exception occurred shortly after the Madrid Conference when the Bush administration threatened to cut off or delay aid because of the continued building of settlements as the United States was trying to move the peace process forward. Some argue that this leverage actually resulted in the electoral defeat of the hard-line Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir by Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor party.

One of the major reasons that the ramifications of the failed Camp David talks in summer 2000 have been so great, and so destructive, is that President Clinton ultimately took sides by blaming Yasser Arafat for the failure. Despite a promise to Arafat that he would not be blamed if the talks broke down—given to Arafat in order to secure his participation in negotiations he did not want to attend—Clinton felt it necessary to protect Ehud Barak back home in Israel. Thus, Clinton lauded the Israeli prime minister as having made a very generous offer only to be refused by an ungrateful Arafat. Part of the problem ultimately

has sponsored over the past decade has borne any fruit. The standard of living for Palestinians has declined considerably and not a single settlement or settler has been removed from the occupied territories. In fact, settlements have grown more since Oslo than in all the years before then. Thus, peace has had few if any benefits for Palestinians. And for Israelis, their personal security has not been enhanced and acceptance of the existence of Israel remains elusive.

In many ways, it is more difficult to talk about the internationalization of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict today because the current Bush administration is really the first American administration since 1973 that has little interest in the conflict or active involvement in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the peoples. Essentially, the American position is that Arafat must go and the Palestinian Authority must reform while the United States supports Ariel Sharon's policies of retaliation for Palestinian violence and subduing the Palestinians by force and reoccupying Palestinian lands until such time as the Palestinians develop new leadership, renounce violence, and come to the negotiating table with a blank slate. The Bush administration has decided that it should not be directly involved in sustaining any attempts at bringing peace to Israelis and Palestinians.

The United States seems to consistently back Israel's conception of the nature of the conflict. As one analyst has noted, Israel negotiates "as though the conflict had begun in 1967, while the Palestinians [negotiate] as though the conflict in 1948 . . ." (Robinson 2001: 17). If 1967 is the focus, refugees are less important than if 1948 is the focus. And, if 1967, when Israel occupied considerable amounts of Arab territory, is the focus then returning 90 percent of the territory to Palestinians may seem quite generous. For the Israelis, Resolution 242 only calls on Israel to withdraw from "territories" it occupied, not "the" territories. The United States ultimately predicates its policy on brokering an agreement that Israel can live with, which ultimately means that Israel must give its consent for everything. Some question whether or not the United States can actually be both an effective mediator while also being the guarantor for Israeli security. The Palestinians, as the weaker party, and the ones whose land is occupied actually have no consent to give on anything. They possess nothing. In effect, Israelis will have to give up some of what they possess, or occupy, now; Palestinians will have to give up claims to things they do not have. The one thing the Israelis and Americans claim that Palestinians can control are the actions of its populace and thus they demand a halt to the terrorist bombings as a *sine qua non* of renewing the peace process. There seems to be an assumption in Washington that "Arafat can push a button and immediately create a rush of frenzied energy, and then push another button to immediately stop it" (Robinson 2001: 15).

In actuality, the one thing that Arafat could probably control is government reform and corruption that the United States demands be dealt with, but Washington has done very little to push or empower the Palestinians in that direction. Because the Palestinians have so little leverage in the process, they are constantly playing to a larger regional and global audience. Outside pressure may be a much more effective form of leverage, but if the United States steadfastly protects Israel from such pressure, then movement may not be possible. Does this perpetuate the conflict, or is the United States simply protecting Israel's very

with Israel as it exists, strong and protected in a hostile area of the world, not as they might wish to remake Israel: weak and conciliatory. This, from an Israeli perspective would give Arabs the notion that if Israel will make concessions today, they can be forced to make them again tomorrow and on and on until Israel is so weakened that its very existence is at stake. But unlike with Egypt or Jordan or eventually with Syria, it is very hard for the Palestinians and Israelis to make a peace that can simply keep them apart. Their futures are intertwined. Even if Israel could separate itself (or divorce itself, which is the language that many Israelis now seem to prefer) from the West Bank and Gaza, 20 percent or more of its population will continue to be Palestinian Arab.

Even if a peace agreement created a *modus vivendi* between Israelis and Palestinians, another question would remain: can Israel coexist within the larger Arab and Muslim dominated Middle East? Unlike Turkey and Iran, with their long histories and significant territorial depth, Israel has neither. Both are also on the periphery of the region. Israel is in the center, surrounded by formerly, if not currently, hostile neighbors. And, Israel has almost nothing that links it to its neighbors or any other state in the region, with the exception of a growing strategic relationship with Turkey, another non-Arab state. Not only does Israel have ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences but its orientation is predominantly Western. The historical roots of its founders and many of its citizens are European, not Middle Eastern. While that has changed, particularly in the last generation, with the rise in numbers and power of Sephardic Jews, Israel will remain a state with no ethnic or religious affinity to the rest of the region.

This is one reason that former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres believes it is critical for Israel to become integrated economically into the Middle East. Some common bonds and mutual interaction are necessary to give the regional parties a stake in peace with Israel and ultimately in Israel's continued existence. However, even though Israelis such as Peres are considered in the "peace camp" in Israel, many Arabs view economic integration as replacing military dominance by Israel in the region with economic dominance of its neighbors. Some believe this is simply a more subtle, yet nonetheless insidious, plot to undermine and dominate the Arab world. Israel's former negotiator with Syria, Itamar Rabinovich, has noted that Hafez al-Assad was more wary of Peres's focus on economic ties than on Rabin's tough stance on security issues (Clawson and Gedal 1999: 14). In fact, more Israelis probably subscribe to the tougher and, by their estimation, more realistic approach that regardless of whether there is peace, Israel will still live in a hostile neighborhood and the Middle East will remain a dangerous place, an arena full of real and potential conflict.

Internationalization and the Prospects for Peace

It is clear that internationalization of ethnic conflicts in the Middle East has helped to perpetuate such conflicts. Yet, outside parties can also be critical to achieving peace. Because of the highly intractable nature of ethnic conflicts, internationalization can become a way out of conflict when the parties themselves are

twentieth century shows, identity and existence is at stake for at least one of the parties in the major ethnic conflicts in the region. The parties do not want peace with each other, or may fear peace with the other. In ethnic conflicts, there is often deep-seated antipathy toward the other party that cannot be overcome without international pressure and involvement. In most cases, resolving identity-based conflicts requires a resolution in which both sides must ultimately live with each other. There is much more at stake than just a competition for political and state resources. Ethnic conflicts do not easily lend themselves either to compromise or finding some means to provide what both parties need. Often what is required is trust that one party will respect the rights of the other (particularly the weaker one), and not threaten its security or existence. Since trust between different ethnic groups in conflict is hard to develop, verification and outside guarantees become critical. That became the basis of American involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflicts. For example, for almost 30 years outside monitors and peacekeepers have been critical to maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel and helping ensure the disengagement of forces between Israel and Syria.

Clearly, outside guarantors on the ground will be necessary if peace is to be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. And, international involvement in the postwar transformation of Iraq will be critical if civil (and ethnic) war is to be prevented there. But, there are also international failures at peacemaking or keeping the peace. In Lebanon, outside parties, including the United Nations, tried to implement agreements or enforce cease-fire arrangements and failed miserably. Lebanon is often cited as the epitome of UN peacekeeping failure. In addition, American mediation in the Oslo peace process did not prevent its complete breakdown by early 2001. But, for parties to a conflict to sign on to an agreement and believe that peace is possible, that their needs can be met, they must see that an agreement can be implemented and made real. Thus, peace enforcement and implementation are often critical roles for outside parties.

Most violent cases of ethnic conflict show that outside parties can move to exploit a conflict, particularly as it becomes more extreme. When this occurs, finding a national solution to the conflict, or even managing it, becomes much more difficult. On the other hand, international involvement may often be the only way to help the parties get to a national solution or help them reduce the level of violence. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has certainly reached such a point. The risk is that the outside parties have their own agendas. But, when the status quo becomes so untenable for both sides, the prospects for working toward a solution or a reduction in the violence may become possible.

Conclusion

Each of the cases examined in this chapter has been both an example of ongoing violent ethnic conflict and an example of nation building. Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel have for the past 50–75 years been engaged since their inception in creating a new nation, each with a sizeable minority or with minorities that have their own unfulfilled national aspirations. Each of these conflicts has been

state in the first place and secured its survival. In addition, the Middle East has for the past century been one of the major focal points of international politics.

So, one of the reasons that these cases have been so intractable is that, with the exception of Lebanon, the regimes have felt it necessary, in order to consolidate power or even ensure the continued existence of the nation, to appeal to a common national identity that excludes a significant segment of the population. A minority regime in Iraq has appealed to a common Arab identity as a way to link the majority Shiite community to the state. In the case of Israel, the state very clearly identifies itself as reflecting a specific majority community, and the state is, therefore, the embodiment and guarantor of the existence of those people. But creating such national loyalties and reflecting a single narrowly defined national identity is clearly exclusionary. And, the Kurds and Palestinians have rejected, and fought against, this exclusion and, for the most part, demanded not inclusion but their own expression of national self-determination.

As Michael Brown (2001) points out, transition or change can create opportunities for violence. A state is usually weaker as it changes. An economic or political transition allows ethnic groups oppressed by the center to assert themselves more. Thus, would one predict more ethnic conflict because of greater internationalization, including pressure to democratize or globalize? Does the lack of development in the Middle East keep a lid on potential violent ethnic conflicts or does it create a more immediate set of grievances? The question is hard to answer because of the unique impact of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As noted, the Palestinian issue often diverts the forces of conflict that might otherwise be aimed at the state regime.

The future of the Middle East depends considerably on what next steps the United States takes with respect to Iraq as well as the peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians, the success or failure in the attempt to rebuild and develop Afghanistan and the resulting implications for the Islamic world, and more generally whether the Arab Middle East in particular is able to achieve its development potential. And, if the Bush administration overturns the regime in Iraq and can successfully, as it claims it wants, transform the region into a network of modernizing and democratic states, then ethnic conflicts may rise considerably. But whether such conflicts become violent and unmanageable, may depend upon international efforts to help create conditions and institutions to prevent such deadly conflicts. Internationalization need not perpetuate conflict—and in the Middle East, international efforts may be critical to transforming it from an underdeveloped, conflict-laden area to a more peaceful region where the needs of its people can be met. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the twice-jailed eminent Egyptian American sociologist, noted recently: "Every qualitative change in this region was triggered by an external factor" (Myers 2003: A12).

Notes

The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace.

of: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. Some include Afghanistan while others consider it to be part of South Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Not included as states but important geographical and political entities are the Western Sahara and Palestinian Authority.

CHAPTER 9

The Impact of International Diffusion on the Escalation of the Sri Lankan Conflict

Robert C. Oberst

The discipline of International Relations has failed to adequately deal with the consequences of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in its theories. Until recently, the discipline has largely ignored ethnicity's existence or pretended that ethnicity would disappear as societies modernized and the nation-state became more established.[1] The events of the last decade have defied any predictions that ethnic conflict would go away. Ethnic conflict and its threat to the peaceful relations between nations have become more serious and not decreased since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The interaction between ethnic conflict and international actors is a complex one and International Relations theories provide us with only limited guidance to understand the phenomenon we are encountering. Most researchers treat the internationalization of ethnic conflicts as unique extensions of the war. The result has been a proliferation of literature that is of interest only to those interested in that particular conflict. There is little literature that helps us generalize about the conflict and apply our knowledge to other situations.

This chapter examines the expansion of the Sri Lankan conflict from low-level and sporadic warfare to a war with strong international connections and ties. It argues that the conflict has escalated beyond anyone's imagination largely because of the interplay of international forces and that these forces may have become more important today than the military weaponry that each side possesses or the strength of the ethnic identity that originally fueled the conflict. The interaction of the international community and the protagonists in Sri Lanka has resulted in increased warfare and a prolongation of the war. While many studies of the causes of ethnic conflict have listed numerous factors that cause it,[2] most have ignored the international factors that have been cited in this book.

The Sri Lankan war began as a local conflict between groups of an ethnic minority, the Tamils, and the Sri Lankan government. At that time, the government barely had an effective and functioning military. In 1978, neither side had extensive international connections. The war was propelled by the intensity of

ethnic groups. Many of the guerrilla's weapons were homemade or stolen from the security forces. On the government side, many police still did not carry weapons or if they did, they lugged heavy outdated rifles. Today, the war has become a high-technology conflict between relatively well-trained fighting forces. In addition, both sides rely on international support, arms supplies, and financial resources to maintain their military campaigns. The internationalization of the conflict has both reduced the role that ethnic identity plays in the conflict, and opened the possibility for resolving the conflict. The international causes of this transformation will be the subject of this essay.

This essay follows the observations of Karen Rasler, who argued that it is "misleading . . . to treat . . . the international system too much as a benign or neutral actor and neglects to consider its contribution to creating the conditions for internal war".[3] She argues that internal conflict, whether it is ethnically based or not, "is a product of a complex synergistic relationship between domestic institutional arrangements and the context of competitive international political relations."[4] She further quotes George Modelski who says, "every internal war has two faces; it is a conflict both between and within political systems; a conflict that is both external and internal."[5] Rasler urges us to consider but fails to clearly describe a reconceptualization of internationalization into a broader structural perspective. One element of this broader perspective will be described later.

An examination of the Sri Lankan conflict will help to illustrate the evolution of the internationalization that has occurred in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan conflict has gone through six distinct phases. Each phase has involved different roles for the international actors involved in the conflict and has resulted in a different type of international involvement. However, the roots of the conflict can be found in the nationalism of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Thus, a brief description of those nationalisms will be followed by a discussion of the six phases of the conflict.

The Roots of Conflict

At first look, Sri Lanka can be very deceptive. It is a small island nation that would appear to be too small for an ethnic war. However there are four ethnic groups of significant size on the island. The Sinhalese comprise 74.0 percent of the population and have dominated electoral politics with their over two-thirds majority.[6] They are largely Buddhist and speak the Sinhala language. The other three groups all speak Tamil as their primary language. The Sri Lanka Tamils comprise 12.7 percent of the population and are mostly Hindu. They inhabit the north and east of the island and are also found in the larger Sinhalese cities such as Colombo. The Indian Tamils who comprise 5.5 percent of the population are found primarily in the tea-producing region of Nuwara Eliya district and surrounding districts.[8] They are mostly Hindu and are distinguished from the Sri Lanka Tamils by their length of time on the island. Their ancestors were brought by the British in the nineteenth and early twentieth

ancestors to the first era of recorded history in Sri Lanka. The final group is the Muslims who comprise 7.1 percent of the population and are found in the Eastern Province and in smaller numbers in most cities in the Sinhalese areas. They consider themselves distinct from the Tamils despite speaking the Tamil language.

At the core of the Sri Lankan conflict have been two very strong competing nationalisms, that of the Sinhalese, and the other of the Sri Lanka Tamils. The expression of nationalism among both groups did not begin to appear until after the departure of the British from the island in 1948. Prior to that, the British had successfully suppressed nationalism by creating a Sri Lankan elite that was highly Europeanized. They spoke English, are Christian, and sent their children to London for education or at least to English-speaking schools in Sri Lanka. This led to a highly Westernized leadership class that ultimately inherited the leadership of the country when the British left the island. Without national leaders in touch with the largely rural population, both the Sinhalese and Tamils were unable to develop a strong sense of identity or nationalism.

In the case of the Sinhalese, nationalism began to emerge in the 1950s when Sinhalese Buddhists awoke to what it meant to be a Sinhalese Buddhist. The movement began with what George Bond describes as a reinterpretation of their Buddhist heritage.[10] As a result they sought to promote their language and to control the education of their people. Their vehicle to achieve these goals was the Sri Lanka Freedom Party created in the early 1950s. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike broke from the United National Party (UNP) that he had helped form to create the party. In order to make an electoral appeal to the Sri Lankan voters he appealed to the Sinhalese Buddhist peasant and ran on a platform of Sinhala Only in the 1956 parliamentary elections. He became prime minister as his coalition of parties swept the governing UNP from power. His appeal raised the hopes of the Sinhalese villager who did not speak English and who feared that their religion, Buddhism, had been seriously damaged by the 150 years of British rule on the island.

Although Bandaranaike was English-educated and came from one of the families elevated to a position of influence during the British rule, he created a surge of nationalism that was quickly adopted by the Buddhist clergy who used it to not only promote their religion but also their Sinhalese identity.

Bandaranaike's success fueled a shift in Sri Lankan politics as more politicians began wearing traditional Sinhalese rural clothing, speaking Sinhala and if they were Christian, playing down their religion or converting back to Buddhism. The rise of Sinhalese nationalism was centered in the Buddhist clergy and supported by the Sinhalese peasantry who had been largely left out of the political developments of the Westernized UNP. In the end Bandaranaike was assassinated by an angry cabal of Buddhist clergy who felt that he was not supporting them strongly enough. After Bandaranaike's death, Sinhalese nationalism began to focus on certain symbols that became a rallying point for nationalists. Among these was the recolonization of the dry zone areas of the north-central and eastern parts of the island. The goal of recolonization was to recreate the great

Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa eras. This movement has been described in very vivid terms as the "myth of reconquest."[11] Mick Moore has described it as a "return to the heartland of the ancient irrigation civilization of the Sinhalese."[12] Unfortunately that heartland was in the largely uninhabited land area between the Tamil and Sinhalese areas of the island, and in many cases encroached into areas currently inhabited by the Tamils. Thus, the reconquest of what the Sinhalese perceived to be rightly theirs, was viewed as an intrusion into the Tamil areas of the country and helped to fuel Tamil nationalism.

In the 1950s, Tamil nationalism was almost nonexistent. In fact Tamil nationalism did not begin to appear in Sri Lanka until the 1970s, as the violence in the country began to increase. The rural Tamil peasantry had been largely isolated in the northern and eastern parts of the island with outside contact limited to the Christian missionaries who set up schools in the coastal areas. Further limiting the growth of Tamil identity was the geography of the Tamils. The Sri Lanka Tamils are separated between the Eastern and Northern Provinces with little contact between them. The Eastern Province Tamils had lower levels of education and a weaker tradition of intellectual thought and literature than did the Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula. The Jaffna peninsula was the center of the culture, close to India, and populated almost exclusively by Tamils. What little growth of identity there was, was on the Jaffna peninsula where a scholarly and intellectual tradition flourished, fed by the Christian mission schools set up in the nineteenth century. But as with the Sinhalese, the British rewarded well-educated Tamils with education in English and prominent positions in the colonial administration. The result was a focus on educational and administrative success among the most educated Tamils.

The Jaffna peninsula is a densely populated region with an arid climate for agriculture. There have always been limited opportunities for educated Tamils. They could move to Colombo and live among the Sinhalese, or travel to Madras and live among the Tamils of India, or emigrate to the United Kingdom or the United States. In each case, they would be physically removed from their culture. This helped to restrict the growth of nationalism as intellectuals moved from the Jaffna peninsula.

The emergence of the Tamil rebellion in the 1970s led to an upsurge of Tamil nationalism.[13] The older elite of Tamil leadership that created the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party in the 1940s and 1950s reflected the Western-oriented elite of the country. When their politics of accommodation with the Sinhalese leadership failed, a young group of militants emerged trying to rally the Tamil population to their violent cause to bring change to Sri Lanka. They stressed what they perceived to be the threat that the Sinhalese Buddhist–dominated government of Sri Lanka posed toward the Tamil population. In the 1950s and later, the conflict had been over language. This had led to the rise of the Federal Party as the dominant Tamil party throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and to the separation of the two communities.[14] By focusing on that threat and using every instance of injustice handed out by the government or government security forces, they were able to mobilize the Tamil population and initiate a search for Tamil identity.

community. The Sinhalese feared that their culture and language, which is found only on the island of Sri Lanka, would be lost or absorbed by the much larger Tamil community of South India. The fear of what outsiders could do to their culture fueled the growth of nationalism. Among the Sri Lanka Tamils, a similar sense existed that helped to fuel their fear of Sinhalese domination by the Sri Lankan government. These fears became actualized by the 1983 riots in which police stood by as rioters attacked Tamils, and burned and looted their property. Beginning in the 1970s, the two fears collided and conflict resulted. Sinhalese efforts to reassert their place in society and their sensitivity to Tamil militant acts of violence helped to fuel the Tamil sense of persecution and discrimination. Ultimately, the war would extend beyond the nationalistic expressions of the two groups and internationalize.

Phase I (1972–1983): Organization and Buildup

The armed Tamil groups prepared for a broader conflict. Low-level conflict and a limited number of deaths marked this era. Limited contact was made with outside forces. On the Tamil side, this included the expatriate Tamil community, Indian Tamils, and organizations that provided training for the guerrillas. The government had relatively limited contact with outside forces. This included some training of officers in the United States and the United Kingdom. For all practical purposes, this was an internal conflict driven by Tamil grievances and Tamil ethnic identity in conflict with Sinhalese identity.

Phase II (1983–1987): Open Warfare

Both sides fought each other with assistance from outside forces. Foreign assistance for the guerrillas increased with Indian training and fundraising spreading from the expatriate Tamil community to drug running and arms procurement. The government began to seek U.S., Israeli, and British support; import arms and continued to seek Indian intervention in the conflict. The war was now internationalized with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel pursuing their own interests.[15] However, the strength of Tamil identity and sense of grievances was still the driving force behind the conflict.

Phase III (1987–1990): Open Indian Intervention

Indian military forces occupied the northern and eastern portions of Sri Lanka at the request of the Sri Lankan government. The Indians and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought each other during this period. This period was a bizarre interlude in the conflict with the Indians replacing the Sri Lankan government as the Tamil enemy.

Following the Indian withdrawal in early 1990, there was a period of no fighting. In June 1990, the conflict began again. The highest levels of conflict experienced to that date as well as the highest levels of government human rights abuses marked this period. Indian involvement had been neutralized while international opinion became a crucial element of the conflict for both sides. Both sides became dependent on outside arms sources, and financing. The war was now propelled by the availability of weapons and the cash to buy them. In addition, international public opinion became a crucial new factor in the war. As a result, ethnic identity's importance began to decline.

Phase V (1994–1999): The Chandrika Era: Military Success

Shortly after Chandrika Kumaratunga's election as president, fighting resumed after her government tried to negotiate with the LTTE. A massive government military buildup and offensive, along with increased and effective international diplomacy on behalf of the Sri Lankan government mark this period. During this period, the LTTE was driven from its towns and forced to occupy the jungles of the north and east, resuming a traditional guerrilla operation against the government. Much of the significant conflict during this period did not involve military conflict but rather diplomatic negotiations as the Sri Lankan government attempted to block financial help to the guerrillas and to prevent their agents in other countries from acting freely. The war had been internationalized. A debate now ensued, on the government side, about whether they should allow outside mediation. The LTTE called for it while the government rejected it. Ethnic identification was still present as a driving force behind the actions of both sides but the international dimensions often became more important in determining the actions of both sides.

Phase VI (2000–2001): The Chandrika Era: From Military Setbacks to Peace Negotiations

From 1995 until 1999 the Sri Lankan government forces were able to steadily capture territory held by the LTTE. By late 1999, the LTTE had been forced from control of the Jaffna peninsula, the Kilinochchi area, and the major towns of the Vanni jungles, south of Kilinochchi. Sensing a military victory, the government forces became more aggressive in their seizure of territory, ultimately seizing the Mannar coastal road and other areas of questionable strategic value.

In October 1999, the LTTE began an offensive to recapture the Tamil heartland of the Jaffna peninsula. Their first attacks in the Vanni were met with limited resistance as government security forces abandoned their positions and fled. By April 2000, they had captured the massive army base at Elephant Pass. As the land entry point to the Jaffna peninsula, it had great strategic value. In mid-May, they pushed north toward Jaffna city and were poised at the entry

massive inflow of military support for Israel and diplomatic activity by the United States and the United Kingdom. Outside intervention to prevent an LTTE victory appeared imminent as U.S. Assistant of State Karl Inderfurth traveled to Colombo for meetings with the government in late May. A cease-fire was signed in February 2002 and by the end of 2002 a framework for negotiations had been reached.

The Role of Outside Powers and Escalation

The role of other powers in the conflict became crucial to both sides. While the government was increasingly relying on foreign support for their war effort, the LTTE was using bases in Thailand, especially Phuket as a staging area for the shipment of arms to their forces.

It is possible that the evolution of the Sri Lankan conflict has followed a very common pattern that can be found among other nations with internal ethnic conflicts. The conflict began with very limited outside interference. The government of Sri Lanka in Phase I ignored the severity of the conflict and thus had very little interest in seeking outside support until the end of Phase I. The guerrilla groups began within Sri Lanka and were local organizations with contacts to the broader Tamil community in Tamil Nadu in Southern India. During this period, there was very little conflict and very little substantive contact with the external world. The low-intensity conflict did not require military armaments beyond those that could be stolen from the security forces. Nor was there a need for large amounts of money. As long as stolen weapons were adequate to challenge the government, large sums of money were not important.

However, during this period there were contacts with Middle Eastern groups. A number of Tamil leaders went to Lebanon for training beginning in 1977. While at these camps, they came into contact with other guerrilla leaders as well as a number of Middle Eastern organizations that were involved in the drug trade as mules or couriers—not as dealers or wholesalers.

The ties to Southern India were natural considering the ethnic and linguistic ties that existed between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the citizens of Tamil Nadu. In addition, many of the early guerrillas were either fishermen or smugglers. This meant that they had a great deal of contact with the Indian fishermen who competed with them in the Palk Strait and had ties with the smugglers along the southern coast of India. Thus, arms could be smuggled across the Palk Strait to Sri Lanka or other elements of the escalating conflict could be brought such as the statue of the first guerrilla to take cyanide and die in the conflict. The statue was brought with the assistance of Vettivelu Yogeswaran, a former Tamil United Liberation Front member of parliament and erected in Kopay, the home village of the youth. The statue had been cast in Tamil Nadu and became a symbolic tribute to the Tamil cause that security forces tried to destroy. The mangled remains of the statue after the security forces bungled their destruction effort, became a much stronger tribute to the cause of the youth. Nevertheless, internationalization was limited and the conflict was limited.

activities of both the Sri Lankan government and the guerrillas. As has been noted by Zartman, neighbors often become involved for their own selfish reasons. Initially support for the guerrillas came not from the central government in New Delhi but from the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran and DMK leader M. Karunanidhi. Indira Gandhi feared the possibility of a union of Indian and Sri Lanka Tamils and the possibility that a union might lead to independence for Tamil Nadu or at the very least increased unrest and agitation. Her strategy was to support the LTTE guerrillas to win sympathy among South Indian voters. Indira Gandhi had just returned to power in 1980. Fearing the possibility of electoral defeat again, she was attempting to broaden the support of the Congress Party by aligning with Tamil leaders in Tamil Nadu.

Gandhi began supplying arms and ultimately training the guerrillas through the Third Agency.[16] The Third Agency had been created during the Morarji Desai government to avoid security leaks that were coming out of the Indian external security agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Initially (about 1982) the Third Agency directed weapons from the Afghan guerrillas to the Sri Lankan guerrillas. The initial training camps were set up for the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) in 1982 in Tamil Nadu and later to the other groups fighting the war. This later became a point of anger with the LTTE. They blamed India for favoring and helping the rival Tamil groups at the expense of the LTTE.

As the war progressed, the guerrillas needed both more money and better access to weapons. Both of these desires led to a greater involvement of India. As Zartman[17] has noted, the involvement of neighbors escalates the conflict and makes it harder to find a settlement. This was clearly the case in Sri Lanka.

Beginning at the end of Phase I and the start of Phase II, the Tamil guerrillas began a three-pronged internationalization approach. One prong was aimed at finding sources of funds among the extensive Tamil expatriate community in North America and the United Kingdom. The second prong, disputed and not fully documented, involved transporting drugs to Europe and North America. The third prong involved establishing ties in India with Tamil Nadu leaders. Tamil claims of discrimination created a great deal of sympathy among the Indian Tamils. In addition, Indian domestic politics soon intervened in the conflict. The riots of 1983 angered many Tamils in India[18] and became a rallying point for many of them. This placed a great deal of pressure on Indira Gandhi to intervene to protect Tamils in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan Tamils living in Sinhalese areas were subjected to attacks, often while policemen stood by and watched the attackers burn and kill. In other cases, government ministers organized busloads of rioters to be taken to Indian Tamil–populated estates where the Indian Tamils were attacked. President Jayawardene remained silent for several days while the riots raged in Colombo. When he finally made a nationally televised address, the damage had been done. Many Tamils saw little hope of living as equals in a Sinhalese society. More importantly, the riots rallied Tamils in India to the side of their brethren in Sri Lanka.

Once India became involved, relations with Sri Lanka deteriorated and the war in Sri Lanka escalated after 1983. As the war grew, the Sri Lankan government

the government sought military aid and intervention from the United States and United Kingdom. U.S. President Reagan's personal envoy to Sri Lanka, Vernon Walters made visits (in 1983 and 1984) to help the Sri Lankan government deal with the growing insurgency. Walters arranged contacts with Israel and also set up the Sri Lankan government's relationship with Keeney–Meeney Services (KMS). Although fighting forces were not sent, military aid and training were provided. KMS is a mercenary company from the Channel Islands, which was hired to train government security forces. Phase II was marked by the first efforts of the Sri Lankan government to seek international support as they began to take the conflict more seriously and to realize the intensity of Tamil disaffection. U.S. involvement on behalf of Sri Lanka also raised concerns in New Delhi that further strengthened India's resolve to become involved. Indira Gandhi feared U.S. involvement in South Asia.[19] President Jayawardene's actions made her fear not only the U.S. but also Jayawardene's motivations. It was no secret that the United States would like to utilize the natural port at Trincomalee and India feared that the United States would use the ethnic conflict to negotiate a naval base at Trincomalee. RAW became the crucial Indian government link with the LTTE. These efforts ultimately culminated in the Indo-Lanka Accords of 1987.

Former Indian High Commissioner S.N. Dixit argued that Vernon Walter's involvement in Sri Lanka only heightened tensions in the region and created an adversarial relationship between India and Sri Lanka.[20] The Indian apprehension over the U.S. and Sri Lankan actions also led President Jayawardene to react. He obtained Pakistani support for the Sri Lankan war effort by 1986. This action only heightened tensions between Sri Lanka and India.

Israeli involvement in the conflict also illustrates the self-serving motives of outside party involvement. Israel discovered Tamils training in Lebanon in 1982 and along with support from the United States to become involved, established the Israeli interest sections in the U.S. embassy in Colombo. Shinbet, the Israeli internal security agency began training the military and LTTE.[21] Israel according to Ostransky was concerned that there were links between the Sri Lankan guerrillas and Palestinians.[22] As a result, they became involved in the conflict training the government and providing military arms to them. At the same time they provided training to the LTTE.

Phase III of the conflict involved the direct intervention of India. The Indo-Lanka Accords became the grounds for the direct involvement of Indian military forces in Sri Lanka. The accords were negotiated between the Indian and Sri Lankan government with limited guerrilla involvement. Not surprisingly, the accords fell apart when the LTTE began fighting the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). The pattern once again was predictable as the "friendly neighbor" assumed that their provision of assistance to the guerrillas would result in cooperation and more likely control of the guerrillas. This did not happen and India was taught a hard lesson, as their armed forces were unable to defeat the LTTE forces. The Indians had pursued their own personal interests and ultimately paid a very stiff price for their actions. When they finally left Sri Lanka in 1990, 1,500 Indian soldiers had died[23] and the actors in the conflict had changed. The Indians for all practical purposes had been neutralized as

region.

S.N. Dixit[24] argues that Vellupillai Prabhakaran became disillusioned over India's role in the conflict by the end of 1986 (seven months before the Indo-Lankan Accords). He also indicates that Prabhakaran believed that India would submit the accords to the LTTE for their approval before finalizing them.[25] India had underestimated the roles of the actors and most importantly the strength of the LTTE resolve over the conflict for the next three years and made a negotiated settlement more difficult.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth phases have been marked by increased fighting and death along with efforts by both sides to create alliances and enlist additional international support. What had been a domestic dispute had evolved into a regional conflict and now into an international conflict. The two sides had expanded outside influence beyond the region to the international community.

Phase IV was marked by extensive human rights abuses by the Sri Lankan government and the efforts of the LTTE to capitalize on the negative publicity of what turned out to be one of the most abusive regimes worldwide since World War II.[26] International sympathy turned toward the Tamils as reports of drunken security forces raping and slaughtering innocent noncombatants solely because they were Tamil became common. These abuses led to an increased involvement and monitoring by international human rights organizations. President Premadasa, who replaced Jayawardene in 1989, was president during the bloodiest years of this period until his assassination in May 1993. His replacement, D.B. Wijetunga did not react quickly or effectively enough to the growing international propaganda against the Sri Lankan government. Instead, anti-Tamil rhetoric and continued human rights abuses marked his brief presidency. When he finally did respond in 1994 it was done ineptly and did more damage to the government's image and to their relations with the Tamils.

In an effort to gain more international support, the Wijetunga government sought to display to IGOs and aid donors (NGOs) that they had subdued the Eastern Province by holding local elections in 1994. The elections became a showcase for the Sri Lankan government's progressive policies toward the Tamil population. The culmination of this effort was to hold local authority elections in March 1994. The "subdued" Eastern Province was a sleight of hand in which the LTTE and the government forces had come to an unannounced cease-fire in which each side refrained from shooting at each other as long as they remained in their areas of influence. The government forces stopped patrols in LTTE-held areas and the LTTE allowed the trains to run freely and much of the coastal highway in Batticaloa to operate even after dark. The election was boycotted by the LTTE who did not interfere with the election. The election became a corroboration of Tamil charges of the abusive nature of the government. The first slates of candidates presented to the election officials were presented by army officers on behalf of Tamil prisoners held in detention in army jails. The governing party, the UNP, used force and coercion to persuade candidates to run on their ticket. When the election was held, a former UNP deputy minister was charged with leading a patrol of police to ballot boxes in Muslim areas to stuff the boxes and insure a UNP victory. In Kattankudy, police brought

themselves in a gun battle with Batticaloa police trying to steal the ballot boxes. The final results of the election were a farce that reinforced Tamil discontent toward the government and more importantly made a mockery of the government's efforts to sway international public opinion.

The 1994 Eastern Province local elections were once again replicated in the Jaffna District local elections held in 1998. Once again, the elections were to show to the Western world that the Sri Lankan government had liberated the Tamil people and were providing them with compassionate governance. Once again, the parties contesting the elections had difficulty finding candidates. In addition, there were allegations that the EPDP, one of the parties contesting the elections was intimidating candidates. After the election, 28 winners immediately resigned from their posts apparently because the candidates did not exist. The ghost candidates were no more than fictitious names on the ballots. Once they resign, the party can appoint anyone it wants to the position in the local government.

During this time, the LTTE's international network became a highly refined supply and fundraising network. The LTTE's effective and efficient propaganda machine disturbed the Sri Lankan government to the point that the new government of Chandrika Kumaratunga, which came to power in 1994, embarked upon an international campaign to isolate the LTTE and discredit them. Although the government had earnestly worked to reduce the number of human rights abuses, it also instituted a news blackout on the Tamil areas making it nearly impossible for journalists to ascertain the extent of the human rights abuses. It appears that the government did make sincere efforts to control the military after 1994. However, the security forces, which had been allowed a free rein during the Wijetunga years, were filled with an officer corps, which had participated or looked the other way while whole villages were massacred in the preceding years. The news blackout was an outstanding public relations move but masked the failure of the Sri Lankan government to eliminate human rights abuses. This effort was marked by a remarkable diplomatic blitzkrieg by Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamer. Kadirgamer, a Tamil with limited ties to the Jaffna leadership, adeptly managed an effort to isolate the LTTE that culminated in the U.S. government's declaration of the LTTE as a terrorist organization in October 1997 and Canadian efforts to deport an important Tamil leader, the Canadians believe is an LTTE operative. The resulting consequence of the actions was international isolation of the LTTE.

The success of the policy effectively allowed the government to control information about the activities of their forces in the areas they controlled. Foreign journalists, scholars, and human rights activists were made well aware of the consequences if they reported information that was negative to the government.[27] International actors have a much stronger impact on the course of the war than in any other period during the war. The diplomatic efforts of the government to isolate the LTTE internationally may have appeared to them at the time as a wise choice. However the full extent of these actions changed the nature and extent of the war. The U.S. placement of the LTTE on the terrorist list should have had a very limited impact on the conflict—the LTTE did not

marked a significant change in the conflict and illustrated how the international environment now controlled the war. The U.S. action changed the way that the LTTE fought the war against the government. The international sympathy that the LTTE had once received during the Wijetunga years was now gone. They were now faced by a Sri Lankan army that was winning the war (Phase V 1995–1999). The LTTE perspective was that the government was able to win the war by taking the war to the Tamil people. The winning of the international propaganda war by the government limited the options that the LTTE could consider. The LTTE believes that the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly violated the human rights of the Tamil people. They saw the continued (although much reduced) prevalence of disappearances of civilians by death squads, the looting of almost all of the houses of the Jaffna peninsula by the security forces, the mass desecration of cemeteries, the creation of transit camps in Vavuniya where tens of thousands of Tamil civilians are forcibly held in squalid conditions for up to two years until their credentials can be checked, and the widespread use of security checkpoints to secure bribes and sexual favors as indicators of the reign of terror unleashed against the Tamil people.

From the LTTE perspective, the actions by the United States were seen as an insult and as a sign of the alliance of the United States and other Western powers with the Sri Lankan government. The only way to counter the Sinhalese terrorism against the Tamil people was to take the war to the Sinhalese people and once again begin to terrorize them. Within a week of the U.S. government's action, they began bombing Colombo. Bomb attacks on the Dalada Maligawa in Kandy[28] and other attacks followed this action. The U.S. and international condemnation have left the LTTE with a desperate choice. They could continue to wage a war of limited human rights abuses as they had since the July 1996 Dehiwala train bombing or they could answer the government with what the LTTE believed to be the government's own tactics of intimidating the Sinhalese population as the government had intimidated the Tamil population.

From the government's perspective, the unquestioned support from the United States and the United Kingdom allowed them to relax efforts to control human rights abuses, but more importantly, it sent a strong message to the government that they did not have to seriously seek negotiations. Unacceptable and unreasonable conditions were placed on negotiations. Until the war began to go against the government forces, the government did not seriously consider negotiations. Unfortunately, once the LTTE became militarily successful in November 1999, they became less interested in negotiations.

In the short term, the LTTE chose to fight the war as they saw it being fought against them. They appear to be able to set off bombs at will in Colombo.[29] Not surprisingly, the very tactics of the government security forces at the checkpoints appear to have not only have aided the LTTE in its attacks in the Sinhalese area but also to have seriously compromised the ability of the government to defend Colombo and Kandy. From personal observation, I witnessed Colombo-based Tamils load cases of Arrack onto buses, to be used as bribes at the checkpoints. I have been told that the LTTE then follows the buses by an hour or two with loads of contraband. They give the security forces enough time to celebrate their

similar sinister motive if the LTTE uses prostitutes to remove guards from vital checkpoints. I personally have observed an important checkpoint at the Dalada Maligawa in Kandy to be unattended or under-attended by the security forces as security force members indulge themselves with their prostitutes.

Conclusions

If the Sri Lankan civil war is any indication, the longer that a conflict is allowed to internationalize, the more difficult it will become to negotiate a peaceful solution to the war. As the Sri Lankan conflict went from the jungles of the Vanni to the foreign policy makers of Europe and North America, the war moved beyond the control of the Sri Lankans, both Sinhalese and Tamils. At the moment, the Sri Lankan government has accepted LTTE calls for outside mediation. The Norwegian government became an intermediary in 1999 just before the LTTE offensive to capture Jaffna. The failure of the 1994 peace negotiations are symptomatic of the need for outside mediation. Both sides entered the 1994 talks with emotional and symbolic agendas that merely irritated and alienated the other side. The makeup of the government's negotiating teams angered the LTTE. The placement of an LTTE flag on the negotiating table angered the government and they refused to place the Sri Lankan flag alongside it as offered by the LTTE. The two sides reached an impasse that could not be overcome without an outsider to keep them on track. The task of the Norwegians has been made difficult by the Sri Lankan government campaign to isolate the LTTE.

The fiasco of the Indian intervention in 1987 led to India becoming marginalized in the conflict. This event opened the door for further internationalization of the conflict. It is possible that if the Indians had not been marginalized, their continued presence in some aspect of the conflict may have resulted in a smaller international role for non-regional powers. However, the involvement of Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the war along with the expatriate Tamil community in Europe and North America may have made an international broadening of the war inevitable. Added to this is the efforts of the two sides to the conflict to use international actors as a strategy in the conflict and the independent role that those actors play in the conflict. This has made the foreign component of the war more important than the role of Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic identity.

The Sri Lankan civil war has evolved to a point where the international actors are now dictating the course of the war. The current escalation in the nature of the war is a direct consequence of the international actors' actions. In addition, in all likelihood, a settlement of the conflict is also in the hands of foreign forces as the two sides have eliminated any possibility of reconciliation without outside help or mediation.

The Sri Lankan case study raises questions about whether the pattern followed in the Sri Lankan civil war is similar to other conflicts. Namely, the expansion of involvement to self-seeking neighbors followed by its spread to other self-seeking nations. Ultimately both sides expanded the conflict to the international

public relations assaults. After 15 years of open warfare it is clear that the war in Sri Lanka is no longer isolated in the jungles of the north and east.

Notes

1. For a good discussion of the theoretical limitations see Carment and James (1997); Ganguly and Taras (1998).
2. Gurr (1993); Esman (1994); Brown (1993).
3. Rasler (1992: 94).
4. Ibid., 94.
5. Ibid., 41.
6. Government of Sri Lanka (1996: 40). Because of the war, Sri Lanka has not held a census since 1981. The statistics presented here are from that census. Government estimates of the current ethnic population are about the same.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Bond (1988: 300).
11. Smith (1979).
12. Moore (1985: 45).
13. This rise of nationalism is much more thoroughly described in Oberst (1996).
14. Kearney (1967).
15. Ostrovsky and Hoy (1990). Ostrovsky and Hoy describe the simultaneous visit of Sri Lankan military representatives and LTTE cadres at a Mossad training site in Israel and his responsibility to make sure that the two sides did not realize that they were both being assisted by Israel. Israel saw its self-interest met by supporting both sides.
16. Gunaratna (1993: chapter 2).
17. Zartman (1992: 31–38).
18. Dixit (1998: 19).
19. Ibid., 21.
20. Ibid., 22.
21. Gunaratna (1993). Ostrovsky and Hoy (1990) describe Mossad's involvement in Sri Lanka, not Shinbet's.
22. Ostrovsky and Hoy (1990).
23. Singh (1991: 201). Gunaratna (1993: 35) lists the official Indian government death toll of 1,155 killed and 2,984 wounded.
24. Dixit (1998: 81).
25. Ibid., 180.
26. This author's research in Batticaloa district has revealed that over 4,000 male youths were killed by the government death squads from 1990 to 1992. About one in ten males aged 15–25 in the district were killed during this period by the death squads.
27. This author's experiences are representative of the harassment that some scholars and journalists have experienced. I was given 72 hours to leave Sri Lanka in 1996 after the publication of an article, "Tigers and the Lion: The Evolution of Sri Lanka's Civil War," *Harvard International Review* vol. xviii (Summer 1996). It had appeared alongside an article by President Kumaratunga. Although the deportation order was rescinded and the order was described as a "mistake," I was then followed by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the police and Sri Lankans I spoke to were harassed by the CID. In addition my e-mail was regularly monitored by the

I complained about it in an e-mail to a friend, stating that whoever was monitoring my mail did not know what they were doing and had completely stopped all e-mail for the previous three weeks. The next day, three weeks of e-mail messages arrived at my computer. The harassment has been accompanied by increased xenophobia, as many Sinhalese, frustrated over the war effort have turned to foreigners as the cause of the conflict.

28. Sri Lankan security force check- and guard-points are notoriously porous. At night, bribes and irresponsible behavior are prevalent. During 1996 and 1997, I lived in the hills above the Maligawa and would often pass some of the guard-points late at night and find them unmanned. Fortunately, there were many guard-points around the temple and in the end they served their purpose.
29. As mentioned in note 7, some security force officers utilize the checkpoints for their own personal gain. Tamils are often victimized by bribe seekers. The result opens the door for the LTTE to smuggle arms and explosives almost anywhere they want on the island. Bribes paid in arrack result in inebriated guards who may not check the next vehicle. The hiring of prostitutes by the guards is also common. I have twice observed unmanned checkpoints where the security forces abandoned the checkpoint to receive the services of a prostitute.

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Notes on Contributors

David Carment was a World Peace Foundation Fellow at Harvard University 2000–2001. He is currently the Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS) at Carleton University, Ottawa and a professor of International Affairs at Carleton University. He continues to serve as the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project. He is a member of the Board of Directors for The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (www.fewer.org). His most recent work focuses on conflict prevention capacity building (see the working paper series at www.idrc.ca); developing risk assessment and early warning training manuals for NGOs and Regional Organizations (see www.carleton.ca/cifp) evaluating models of third party intervention (see www.carleton.ca/~dcarment/index.html).

Jeffrey W. Helsing is Program Officer in Education at the United States Institute of Peace. Helsing is the author of *Johnson's War/Johnson's Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap*. He wrote a chapter on "The American Shadow: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East" in *The International Relations of the Middle East in the 21st Century: Patterns of Continuity and Change*. He also authored a study on the Arab-Israeli Multilateral Peace Talks that grew out of the 1991 peace conference in Madrid. Helsing is co-editor, with Julie Mertus of *American University, of Human Rights and Conflict: New Actors, Strategies and Ethical Dilemmas*, a book on the relationship between human rights, peace and conflict.

Shale Horowitz is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His articles have appeared in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *East European Politics and Societies*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *International Interactions*, and other journals. His book, War after Communism: Ethnic Conflict and Stillborn Reform, is forthcoming from Texas A&M University Press.

Patrick James is professor and director of graduate studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri Columbia. James specializes in comparative and international politics. His interests at the international level

regard to domestic politics, his interests focus on Canada, most notably with respect to the constitutional dilemma. James is the author of ten books and over ninety articles and book chapters. Among his honors and awards are the Louise Dyer Peace Fellowship from the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Milton R. Merrill Chair from Political Science at Utah State University, the Lady Davis Professorship of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Thomas Enders Professorship in Canadian Studies at the University of Calgary, the Senior Scholar award from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC, and the Eaton Lectureship at Queen's University in Belfast.

Neal G. Jesse is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University. His research on electoral systems, party systems and ethnic conflict has appeared in the journals such as *Electoral Studies, Political Research Quarterly*, *Political Psychology,* and *Representation* and he also has a chapter in the book *Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote.* He is co-author of a forthcoming book from SUNY Press, *Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies*.

Steven E. Lobell is Associated Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa. His research interests include security studies, political economy, and U.S. foreign policy. He is currently working on the politics of war finance. He is the author of *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade and Domestic Politics*, as well as articles in *International Studies Quarterly*, *Review of International Studies*, *Security Studies*, and *World Affairs*.

Philip Mauceri is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Peace and Security Studies at the University of Northern Iowa. He is the author of *State Under Siege: Policy and Development in Peru*.; coeditor of *The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Economy and Society* and *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict and Reform*, as well as several articles. He has taught in Colombia, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic and is the recipient of two Fulbright awards.

Robert C. Oberst is Associate Professor of Political Science Nebraska Wesleyan University. He has worked as a Consultant to the U.S. State Department, USAID, and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Justice. His Research interests include South Asian politics, Sri Lanka politics, ethnic conflict, development administration, youth movements and violence. He has authored several books, including *Government and Politics in South Asia, Legislators*, *Development and Representation in Sri Lanka: The Decentralization of Development Planning*, and *The Lost Generation: The Political Consequence of Population Growth*.

John James Quinn is an associate professor of political science at Truman State University, Kirksville, MO, where he teaches courses relating to African development, comparative politics, international political development and political science methodology. He served for three years with the Peace Corps in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo): two years as an English teacher and one as the Regional Representative of Haut-Zaire. He is the author

Industry in Africa.

Marc V. Simon is Associate Professor and Chair of the Political Science department at Bowling Green State University. His teaching and research focuses on international and domestic conflict processes and conflict resolution. He has published articles in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Studies Quarterly International Interactions*, and *Journal of Peace Research*.

Kristen P. Williams is Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations at Clark University. She is the author of *Despite Nationalist Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Maintaining World Peace* (Praeger, 2001), and has published several articles, book chapters, and book reviews. Her current research focuses on the impact of ethnic conflicts on women in ethnically mixed marriages (with Joyce Kaufman) and the role of international institutions and overlapping identities in resolving nationalist/ethnic conflicts in divided societies (with Neal Jesse).

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